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31. Introduction
R. Quentin Grafton
The Australian National University, Australia
 Paul Wyrwoll
The Australian National University, Australia
 Chris White
The Australian National University, Australia
David Allendes
The Australian National University, Australia
Freshwater governance holds a prominent position in the global policy agenda. 
Burgeoning water demand due to population growth and rising incomes is 
combining with supply-side pressures, such as environmental pollution and 
climate change, to create acute conditions of global water scarcity. This is a 
major concern because water is a primary input for agriculture, manufacturing, 
environmental health, human health, energy production and just about every 
economic sector and ecosystem. 
In addition to its importance, the management of freshwater resources is a 
complex, multidisciplinary topic. Encompassing a range of fields in the physical 
and social sciences, the task of sustainably meeting human and environmental 
water needs requires a depth and breadth of understanding unparalleled by 
most other policy problems.
Our objective in this volume is to provide knowledge and insights into major 
issues and concepts related to freshwater governance. The book is divided 
into five themed parts: Economics, Transboundary governance, Development, 
Energy and Water Concepts. 
A part addresses each theme and opens with an introduction that provides an 
overview of key topics. For example, the introduction to the economics section 
presents two main foci: measuring the value of water and managing trade-offs 
between different water uses. The thematic case studies discuss issues such as 
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water pricing in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries, finance of water supply and irrigation infrastructure and 
improving agricultural production with enhanced water management. 
The aim of the volume is to accessibly communicate academic research from the 
many fields of freshwater governance. Too often, academic research is paywalled 
and/or written in a style that caters to colleagues in the same field, rather than 
a broader audience from other disciplines, the policy-making community and 
the general public. This open-access book presents the research of a range of 
global experts on freshwater governance in brief, insightful chapters that do 
not presume a high level of pre-existing knowledge of their respective subjects. 
This format is intended to present knowledge on the key problems of and 
solutions to global freshwater challenges.
The final part presents research from several United Nations Educational, 
Social, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) supported water research Chairs 
and Centres. Support and coordination of the insititutions highlighted in 
this part of the book is provided by UNESCO. One water research Chair is 
The Australian National University – UNESCO Chair in Water Economics and 
Transboundary Governance, which was established in April 2010 and works 
with partners in southern Africa, UNESCO, the Global Water Partnership and 
other organisations to: (1) increase the skills, capacity, networks and potential 
of leaders and prospective water managers and policy-makers; (2) sustain and 
strengthen institutional capacity (especially in southern Africa) by providing 
a platform for collaboration and institutional development; and, (3) develop 
innovative research, tools, case-studies, and insights on water economics, water 
governance and equity.
Established by the ANU–UNESCO Chair, the Global Water Forum (GWF) seeks to 
disseminate knowledge regarding freshwater governance and build the capacity 
of students, policy-makers and the general public to respond to local and 
global water issues.1 The GWF publishes accessible, subscription-free articles 
highlighing the latest research and practice concerning freshwater governance. 
A broad range of water-related topics are discussed in a non-technical manner, 
including water security, development, agriculture, energy and environment. 
In addition to publishing articles, reports and books, the GWF is engaged in a 
range of activities, such as the annual Emerging Scholars Award and hosting a 
portal to educational resources on freshwater. 
We hope that you enjoy reading this book and, more importantly, gain an 
improved understanding of the complex freshwater-governance challenges 
facing us all on a global scale and at a local level.
1 The Global Water Forum can be accessed at: http://www.globalwaterforum.org.
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72. Economics
R. Quentin Grafton 
The Australian National University, Australia
The economics of water concerns the measurement and effective management of the 
trade-offs across its many competing uses (and non-uses) over time and in different 
locations. Measurement requires estimation of the costs, benefits and risks associated 
with alternative uses of water. For example, these alternatives could be: (i) keeping 
water in the river to support ecosystem services, (ii) extracting it for a town’s water 
supply, or (iii) using water to irrigate a rice crop. Effective management ensures 
that society’s objectives for water use (for example, environmental sustainability, 
sanitation and waste disposal, or food production) are achieved by supporting 
methods to allocate water that favours higher value uses (including non-uses) and 
ensures that basic water needs are met. 
Measuring the value of water
The challenge of measuring the value of water across different settings is that 
it is used as an input or intermediate good in many production systems and, 
thus, has multiple and possibly competing values as a factor of production. But 
water can also be a final product, such as drinking water, washing, or waste 
disposal, and also has value in situ, such as when water is not extracted from a 
river to generate or retain ecosystem services and benefits. The market benefits 
of water in production processes or direct use can be determined from market 
transactions, such as the price at which water is traded in a market or water’s 
derived demand in the production of a crop or product. 
Typically, the greater challenge is to estimate water’s value in a setting where 
markets, in general, do not exist and there is no direct production beyond 
ecosystem services. Non-market valuation techniques that can, and have, been 
employed include: (1) valuing recreational sites and rivers by the travel costs of 
those who make use of ecosystems services, such as catching fish or canoeing; 
and, (2) stated preference methods whereby people are asked direct questions 
about their willingness to pay for a change in the quantity and quality of a 
water resources. In both travel cost and stated preference approaches the values 
obtained from respondents are, in general, aggregated to obtain an aggregate 
valuation from water.
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Managing trade-offs
Valuations and values of water provide the basis for allocating water efficiently 
and equitably across competing uses and users. Typically, economists use a cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) framework that also accounts for risk and enables the 
comparison of alternative allocations across competing uses. The typical rule 
is that any allocation should generate a positive net present value such that 
the ‘discounted benefits’1 of the given allocation, less the discounted costs, is 
positive. Ideally, allocations with higher benefit-to-cost ratios are preferred. For 
this tool to be useful all costs and benefits must be accounted for, including the 
hard-to-measure non-market values for water and especially water in situ. 
While CBA is a helpful economic tool to manage trade-offs, decisions about 
reallocating water across competing uses must also involve consideration of 
equity, or who gets what and when. Thus, an allocation that makes disadvantaged 
or vulnerable groups worse off, and without adequate compensation, may not 
be desirable from a societal or fairness perspective, even if the allocation has a 
high costs-benefit ratio for society as a whole. 
Beyond the calculation of costs, benefits and compensation arising from 
changes in water allocations, effectively managing trade-offs also requires an 
understanding of water externalities. This is an economic term for spillovers, 
both positive and negative, that arise from the actions of water users or keeping 
water in situ, and which are not accounted for in the decision-making of an 
individual water user. For example, a farmer irrigating a crop may impose 
externalities on downstream irrigators if the upstream farmer’s river extraction 
reduces water availability downstream. In the case of recreational users, the 
externality could be that the water returned to the river after irrigation use is of 
lower quality. If the upstream irrigator does not account for these downstream 
costs then too much water will be used in irrigation upstream. This is a common 
cause of environmental problems and is a major driver of the overuse of water.
Another challenge in water use is that water management can provide non-rival 
benefits or public good benefits. These benefits can be enjoyed by all, such as 
the aesthetic and ecosystem benefits of wild rivers, but can be underprovided 
because of ‘free riders’ who enjoy, but do not wish to pay for, these benefits. 
Typically, local, regional, or even national governments intervene to provide the 
public good benefits of water, but even so under-provision remains common. 
1 The term ‘discounted benefits’ implies that benefits felt in the longer term receive a lower weighting in 
cost-benefit calculations. So longer term benefits are significantly ‘discounted’ when we think about them in 
terms of their ‘present value’. This method for adding up costs and benefits over a period of time is a common 
technique in economics and, indeed, in the daily consumption and production decisions that we all make. 
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The key to managing trade-offs is to devise effective methods to overcome 
under-provision of the public benefits of water and prevent the overuse of water 
in cost-effective ways. These may include: cap and trade markets for water to 
reduce overuse, water emission taxes to reduce water pollution and user charges 
to recoup public benefits of use. 
Overview of chapters
The economics section of this volume has six chapters covering a broad range 
of issues. The articles provide insights into the application of economics to the 
measurement and management challenges discussed above. Ward and White 
(Chapter 3) summarise the key findings of a paper published in Water Resources 
Research showing how and the level at which households in Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries are charged for 
their water effects their consumption and behaviour. Rodriguez and McMahon 
(Chapter 4), both of the World Bank, review the financing of water supply and 
sanitation in developing countries. Their key insight is that while financing is 
a critical issue, the management of water providers and the incentives that they 
operate under are equally as important to ensure delivery of cost effective water 
services, especially to the poor and vulnerable. Abramson and Gurin (Chapter 
5) take a micro view of how farmers and households in poor countries can access 
adequate water given that they do not have access to centralised systems and 
must obtain water by their own means. While hand-operated water pumps are 
ubiquitous, they are insufficient for the needs of households and farmers, and 
powered pumps offer substantial benefits to the water-deprived. Katic’s chapter 
on water use by West African rice farmers (Chapter 6) emphasises that simply 
increasing water supplies does not necessarily raise incomes. While greater 
water availability raises yields and revenues, these can be offset by higher costs. 
Importantly, she finds that there are other ways to boost farm revenues such as 
improvements in the quality of local produce. Kajisa (Chapter 7) examines the 
growing use of private pumps and wells in Tamil Nadu, India and its impact 
on community-based and managed irrigation systems. Lower cost pumps have 
allowed individual farmers to benefit from accessing groundwater in their own 
wells, but at a social cost. This has imposed a ‘double tragedy’: the depletion 
of groundwater systems and a reduction of investment and effectiveness in 
community-based systems, which leaves poorer farmers, who have been less 
able to build and use their own wells, much worse off. The last chapter in this 
section, by Grafton and Horne (Chapter 8), is based on work published in 
Agricultural Water Management. They describe the history, net benefits and 
limitations of water markets in the Murray-Darling Basin. Their contribution 
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shows how water markets can in practice, and not just in theory, provide a 
means to improve outcomes for water users and a means to reallocate water from 
use to non-use purposes.
Dr R. Quentin Grafton FASSA is Professor of Economics, ANU Public Policy 
Fellow and Director of the Centre for Water Economics, Environment and Policy 
(CWEEP) at the Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National 
University. He is the Chairholder, the UNESCO Chair in Water Economics and 
Transboundary Water Governance and in August 2013 was appointed Executive 
Director at The Australian National Institute of Public Policy (ANIPP).
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3. Managing residential water 
demand in the OECD
Michael Ward
 Monash University, Australia 
Chris White
 The Australian National University, Australia
Water scarcity is a growing concern in many cities due to rapid population 
growth, rising incomes and the associated increasing demand for water, and 
increasingly variable water supplies resulting from changes in the global climate.
Due to the economic and environmental costs of large-scale investments 
in water supply, together with the significant time required for planning 
and implementation, many urban areas are seeing increasing use of policy 
measures designed to regulate urban water demand. This research looks at 
the effectiveness of these demand-side policy measures on residential water 
demand in the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD).
According to standard economic theory, the most efficient way to regulate water 
demand is through volumetric prices (Grafton and Ward 2008). Under such 
a system, users pay a charge for each unit of water consumed, as opposed to 
water tariffs, which charge users a block rate depending on the level of their 
consumption. By using volumetric charges, the water price can be raised during 
times of scarcity so that users consume less water, thereby reducing demand 
when supplies are low (Ward et al. 2011).
Due, however, to concerns over the equity of using water prices to regulate 
demand, and claims that residential water use is unresponsive to changes in price, 
many water utilities focus on non-price approaches. These include requirements 
or subsidies for using water-saving devices, such as low-flow shower heads and 
dual-flush toilets, and the use of public information campaigns to promote water 
conservation attitudes, such as taking showers instead of baths. 
Mandatory water restrictions are an additional non-price approach that is 
sometimes used to regulate water demand during times of water scarcity. While 
effective, they can generate significant welfare losses for water users and, as 
such, was not considered in this research (Ward et al. 2011).
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In order to understand the impact of volumetric prices, water-saving 
devices, and water conservation attitudes on residential water use, data was 
analysed from an OECD survey of 1600 respondents across ten countries 
looking at the price and non-price determinants of residential water demand 
(Grafton et al. 2011). Respondents were asked a series of questions regarding 
the following factors: (1) household characteristics (such as age, income, 
household size); (2) environmental attitudes (such as whether they are 
members of an environmental organisation); (3) adoption of water-saving 
behaviours (such as whether they turn off the water while brushing their 
teeth); (4) use of water-saving devices (such as rainwater tanks); and, (5) 
domestic water use (such as water consumption, total water cost).
Once the surveys were completed the results were collected and analysed in 
order to answer three key questions:
(1) What are the impacts of price on household water consumption?
(2) What are the impacts of water-saving devices on household water consumption?
(3) What are the impacts of attitudinal characteristics and environmental concerns 
on household water consumption?
Impacts of price on household water 
consumption
The analysis of the survey data revealed that water demand was inelastic and 
statistically significant from zero across all ten OECD countries. The price 
elasticity of demand ranged from a low of –0.27 for Norway, to a high of –0.59 
for Italy, while the average price elasticity across the entire sample was –0.43. 
A ten per cent increase in the average water price across households, therefore, 
lowers urban water use in the OECD by about 4.3 per cent. This finding supports 
the economic principal that the higher the average volumetric price of water, 
the lower household water consumption will be (see Figure 1).
The results also suggest that volumetric charges are the most important cause of 
respondents engaging in water-saving behaviours, such as turning off the water 
while brushing teeth, taking a shower instead of a bath, watering the garden in 
the coolest part of the day, and collecting rainwater and recycling wastewater. 
The estimated water savings for households facing volumetric water charges as 
a result of these water-saving behaviours was around 40 kilolitres each year, or 
a quarter of the average household water consumption in the OECD.
3. Managing residential water demand in the OECD
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Figure 1: Average water consumption per capita and volumetric price 
across ten OECD countries
Source: Adapted from Grafton et al. 2011.
Impacts of water-saving devices on household 
water consumption
The analysis of the survey data revealed that only dual-flush toilets have 
a statistically significant and negative impact on water consumption. The 
coefficient on the dual-flush toilet variable was –0.25 and statistically significant 
at the one per cent level. This suggests that the use of water-efficient toilets 
reduces household water consumption by about 25 per cent. By contrast, low-
flow shower heads and rainwater tanks did not have a statistically significant 
impact on household water consumption.
While it initially seems intuitive that water-saving devices should reduce 
household consumption, this may not necessarily be true in every case. This is 
because an increase in the water efficiency of a device effectively reduces the 
unit cost of using it and, as a result, can cause an increase in its use. Olmstead 
and Stavins provide a review and summary of several studies on water saving 
devices and also find that the impact of such devices on water consumption is 
mixed (Olmstead and Stavins 2009).
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Impacts of attitudinal characteristics and 
environmental concerns on household water 
consumption
The analysis of the survey data did not reveal significant evidence of the 
influence of environmental concerns and behaviours on household water 
consumption. Attitudinal characteristics and environmental concerns were, 
however, found to increase the use of dual-flush toilets, which significantly 
reduces water consumption.
Some environmental behaviours were found to have a statistically significant 
and positive effect on the probability of undertaking water-saving behaviours. 
For example, being a member of an environmental organisation or a supporter 
of an environmental organisation increased the probability of turning off 
water while brushing teeth, plugging the sink when washing dishes, watering 
the garden in the coolest part of the day, and collecting rainwater/recycling 
wastewater. Higher levels of environmental concern were also found to be 
statistically significant in terms of increasing the probability of undertaking a 
range of water-saving behaviours.
Policy implications
Overall, the results suggest that volumetric water pricing is one of the most 
effective policy measures available to regulate household water consumption. 
The results also suggest that water-demand management policies, which 
combine a volumetric charge for water use and a higher average water price 
with campaigns to promote water-saving behaviours (such as taking showers 
instead of baths) and the use of water-saving devices (particularly dual-flush 
toilets) would further improve the regulation of residential water demand. 
Michael Ward is Professor in Economics at Monash University, Australia. After 
receiving a PhD in Economics from the University of Washington, he has 
published across a number of economic disciplines in some of the world’s leading 
journals. In 2008, his paper with Jay Shimshack and Tim Beaty was selected 
as the ‘Best Economics Paper’ by the Agricultural and Applied Economics 
Association for work in the area of food safety and nutrition. The article is 
based on an original piece of research published in Water Resources Research, 
‘Determinants of residential water consumption: evidence and analysis from a 
10-country household survey’. 
Chris White is Managing Editor of the Global Water Forum and also works 
as a Research Associate at The Australian National University and as an 
Environmental Economist at URS, London.
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4. Water finance: Preparing for the 
next critical juncture
Diego J. Rodriguez
World Bank, United States
Amanda McMahon
World Bank, United States
Water supply, sanitation and irrigation infrastructure provide the critical water 
services that make economies prosper. The costs of investments in these sectors 
are low compared to the benefits they provide. By 2025, global water-sector 
spending will be in the trillions (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) 2006). By 2050, the pace of urbanisation will be such that 
achieving universal access to the supply of water and sanitation will cost the 
developing world an additional one per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) 
(US$7.6 billion) every year compared to current needs (Roehrl 2012). The poorest 
of these countries, despite their greater need, will have the fewest resources to 
invest.
The 2008 global financial crisis has introduced a new dilemma. As GDP growth 
slows, so does funding for water services. Credit for developing countries has 
dried up (World Bank 2013) and current private investment in water services is 
only about a third the size of development assistance to the sector. Within that 
slice, international and domestic investors are working with an increasingly 
narrow list of large, urban areas in middle income countries.
By and large, low-income countries are considered too risky for investment. But 
with water demand outpacing supply in several large cities, they could become 
the next growth market for international investors. In order to make private 
money work to their advantage, these countries will need a sturdy public sector 
that can promote efficiency and equity in water services and ensure a stable and 
enabling environment, including institutional, legal and regulatory structures.
It is estimated that more than 75 per cent of all sector funding is provided 
through public sources, coined by the OECD as the ‘3 Ts’, or tariffs, taxes, and 
transfers. While desirable for funding and maintaining infrastructure (because 
they don’t have to be repaid), each T has a set of drawbacks that make it less 
optimal (in many cases) than private sector funding.
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Tariffs are collected directly from households in exchange for water services. 
If set too low, they risk putting service providers out of business and 
providing incentives for people to over consume. If set too high, they are 
not equitable and leave customers dissatisfied.
Tax revenues are provided annually from national or sub-national governments 
to local service providers. Water budgets change in line with changes to tax 
revenues, leaving service providers with short-term cash that does not promote 
long-term investment or incentives to improve performance. A recent study by 
WaterAid shows that many countries in Africa reduced their budget allocations 
to water between 2008 and 2010 (WaterAid 2011). Furthermore, most developing 
countries run their budgets on yearly cycles, creating uncertainty regarding the 
future tax revenue that will be allocated to water. This is a disincentive for 
operators to enter into long-term sector planning.
Transfers from donors are well-intentioned but less effective by the time they 
reach the local service provider. They are as subject to the same volatility as 
taxes and slower to deliver on promises: sector disbursements average only 70 
per cent of commitments. Transfers are also rarely aligned with local capacity to 
spend the resources. In a 2011 UN-water global annual assessment of sanitation 
and drinking-water GLAAS survey of 38 countries, a meager 18 per cent of 
participating countries disbursed more than 75 per cent of donor capital 
commitments to sanitation (World Health Organization (WHO) 2012). This is 
also exacerbated by the (sometime) discrepancies between donor and country/
sector priorities.
Each of these ‘3 Ts’ crystalises the status quo, whereby infrastructure is fixed 
in the short term without incentivising long-term efficiency improvements or 
thinking on investment. This arrangement has left poor countries at a critical 
juncture. Once the world economy starts accelerating again, both private and 
public funds will rush into the sector. Unless serious reforms are in place, more 
dollars will go to waste and the status quo could become irreversibly solidified.
Countries need to be ready to make the best use of all their resources by 
improving water’s public sector framework (Rodriguez et al. 2012). First, to 
protect the public’s interest, they need to heed lessons from the history of 
privatisation in water. This includes sound governance structures, enforced 
regulations and separation of powers among institutions. Whether the private 
sector is brought in to improve operations; provide technical assistance; invest 
in, manage, or own the water infrastructure is irrelevant. The key is having a 
public sector that is willing to counter-regulate at the same speed: share risk, 
protect water consumers and maintain control over performance and delivery 
of results. Second, governments need to drive service providers toward financial 
sustainability through two means: services that recover most, if not all, of their 
own costs and more efficient public spending.
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In many developing countries, recovering operational costs will require cutting 
expenses (through efficiency improvements and reductions in unaccounted 
for water) and increasing revenues (higher tariffs and better collection rates). 
Four years of such efficiency improvements helped Uganda’s National Water 
and Sewerage Corporation double its revenues. Reforms were realised through 
a private sector management structure whereby staff were paid to reach 
performance targets.
The other side of financial sustainability — government spending — can be 
improved by more transparent budgeting, long-term investment planning (that 
integrates the melting pot of funding sources), and hiring the right skill sets to 
manage spending. To do this requires serious consideration of operating costs 
and the subsidies that pay for them — where they are going and how they are 
impacting the daily decisions of consumers and service providers.
While such reforms would make current spending more efficient, governments 
and donors can do much more to help address the financing gap. They have the 
power to make service providers more self-sufficient by allowing tariffs to reflect 
the real cost of services, or providing guarantees and risk-pooling instruments 
that enable private borrowing. They can also remove the information asymmetries 
that block private finance from entering the water sector by inventorying assets, 
mapping out potential water markets, or showcasing creditworthy utilities. 
More transparency would reduce risks and entice the private sector to court 
a new market of poor people that is three billion strong and growing. Lastly, 
they can work together to ensure that grants are allocated based on country and 
sector needs. This will ensure full ownership of the process.
The Philippines is implementing such game-changing reforms, taking a holistic 
approach that supports private participation while at the same time strengthening 
local government capacity to design and implement projects. The government, 
as financial broker, is pioneering a way to pool the risk (the country is host to 
6000 small utilities) and leverage resources toward a more sustainable public–
private partnership in water. It is worth noting that these advances have been 
backed by top-level leadership, which is rare in many developing countries.
Whenever it comes, the next influx of cash (and the mechanisms through which 
it is loaned) will set the pace for a new generation of water infrastructure. Poor 
countries should take this time to get their financial house in order by designing 
a sector investment plan like Indonesia’s or undertaking a Public Expenditure 
Review, like Malawi. Such instruments will help public and private interests see 
the goal, understand the limitations and budget and plan accordingly. They can 
also provide a framework under which donors and development institutions 
coordinate at the country level to provide longer budget cycles and more 
strategic support that aligns with their respective comparative advantages.
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For most low-income countries, simply financing more water infrastructure 
and services — from public or private sources — will not solve the problem. 
Changing how the money is budgeted, targeted and executed is the proper place 
to start.
Dr Diego J. Rodriguez is a Senior Economist at the Water Unit of the Department 
of Transport, Water and Information and Communication Technology of the 
Sustainable Development Vice-Presidency of the World Bank. He is the task team 
leader of the new World Bank initiative on the quantification of the tradeoffs 
of the energy-water nexus and the program manager of the Water Partnership 
Program. 
Amanda McMahon is a Program Officer in the Water Unit of the Department 
of Transport, Water and Information and Communication Technology of the 
Sustainable Development Vice-Presidency of the World Bank. She provides 
operational support to the Water Partnership Program, a US$40 million trust 
fund that enhances bank operations and analytical work across all water sub-
sectors. 
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5. Outlining a transition from cost-
effective to productive rural water 
service improvements
Adam Abramson
Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Israel
Although global trends indicate that the Millennium Development Goals for 
drinking water have been met, many developing countries still lag behind, 
including rural Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF)/World Health Organization (WHO) 2012). Despite a gradually emerging 
shift in policy from rights-based to market-based water development, and 
growing recognition of the importance of achieving full cost recovery of water 
improvements from users, market forces have remained sidelined from the rural 
water sector in SSA (United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development 
(UNCSD) 2012; United Nations (UN) 1992, 2002; Fonseca 2003). Instead, soft 
financing arrangements predominate, ranging from charity to, at most, user 
payment of operation and maintenance costs, with capital costs being met by 
donor funding or subsidies (Harvey 2007). As a result, the goal of minimising 
water costs to maximise aid effectiveness has been deeply entrenched in the 
sector, limiting the use of water technologies to only a few of all technologically 
feasible options for these areas.
According to the criteria of cost-effectiveness, most remote water interventions 
use the cheapest available means for providing improved water services. In many 
areas, this is the ubiquitous hand-pump-operated borehole — the most common 
water source in rural areas, with almost one billion rural users worldwide 
(UNICEF/WHO 2012). Hand-powered pumping is cheap, but limits the supply of 
water to exclusively domestic uses. Higher yielding water sources are common 
in many parts of Africa, suggesting that there is a widespread potential for small-
scale productive or multiple-use groundwater sources (MacDonald et al. 2012). 
Yet higher yielding pumps, such as motorised pumps, are seldom considered, 
much less seen, in remote areas of SSA.
Such approaches may drastically reduce pumping costs in communities with 
grid electricity. For off-grid communities, solar photovoltaic (PV)-powered 
pumping is suitable for both productive irrigation and domestic uses, as its 
output aligns with the water needs of crops. It may also provide excess or ‘free’ 
electricity to off-grid communities and has minimal operation and maintenance 
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costs (Burney et al. 2009). Diesel-powered pumping may be less sustainable and 
subject to volatile price fluctuations, but is one of the few alternatives available 
to off-grid communities.
Figure 1 presents a cost comparison between hand pumps and these other, 
higher yielding approaches for a new borehole that are typical of rural SSA: 
grid -, solar - and diesel-powered submersible pumps.
Figure 1: Cost comparison of water quantity improvements by pumping 
method for a village of 20 poverty-level households
Source: Author’s research and sources referred to in the text. Cost comparison of a new community 
borehole across various pumping methods and yields for a village of 20 households living at the rural 
poverty line of $1.25 per capita per day (pcpd). A value of 20 metres total pumping head is used as an 
estimate of regional average groundwater depth for SSA (MacDonald et al. 2012). A financing timeframe of 
15 years is considered at a discount rate of ten  per cent. A range of costs for diesel ($1, $2 and $3 per litre), 
solar PV arrays ($3, $6 and $9 per Watt-peak) and grid electricity ($.02, $.05 and $.10 per kilowatt hour) 
are compared. Grundfos WebCAPS® software was used to determine appropriate pump sizing, with local 
prices and meterological data for Livingstone, Zambia (Grundfos). Borehole construction was assumed to 
cost $5000 (Author’s fieldwork, 2009 –11).
Hand pumps are certainly the lowest cost and, for meeting minimal water 
supply standards, represent the most cost-effective approach. Only a small 
proportion (two per cent) of household income would be required to fully 
finance the investment (although this contribution is rarely made). The cost 
of transitioning from a hand pump to a higher yielding motorised pump is 
dependent on the source of power available, and the price of solar and diesel 
inputs. If grid electricity is available, there is only a marginal increase (between 
three to four per cent of income) in total cost across all yields investigated. If 
not, users would need to pay between four per cent and 12 per cent of their 
income for diesel-powered improvements, or between five per cent and 13 per 
cent for solar-powered improvements over 15 years. 
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Figure 2 presents the cost of water under these alternatives.
Figure 2: Cost of pumped water by pumping method
Source: Author’s research. Water costs ($/cubic metre) across the same alternatives and scenario investigated 
in Figure 1, with a 15-year lifetime and ten per cent discount rate. The dotted line represents the price 
of water at any number of hand-operated borehole replications. Almost all higher yielding alternatives 
provide water at a lower cost per volume than handpumps. For shallower groundwater depths than 20 
metres, these trends would be more acute, and vice versa. 
While handpumps provide the lowest total cost per replication, a steady 
decrease in marginal water costs with yield exists for alternative pumping 
approaches. Thus, the requirement of cost-effectiveness only holds for 
minimum yields (up to 20–30 cubic metres/day per borehole, or 200–300 
litres pcpd for a village of 20 households). At higher yields, hand pumps are 
the least cost-effective alternative. In other words, the effectiveness of every 
dollar spent pumping water increases with the amount of water pumped. This 
suggests that water-related productive activities would provide increasing 
returns on investment, at least within these parameter ranges and assuming 
water is a limiting production factor.
Hand pumps are ubiquitous in rural areas primarily because low density 
populations have low-yield requirements for meeting domestic water service 
standards. Under cost-effective criteria, alternative pumping approaches are 
excluded since additional water only creates additional cost. But if small-scale 
productive water uses could be coupled to project costs, additional revenue 
could be generated.
To demonstrate the impact of this policy shift in a realistic, field-based context, 
I investigate a potential market-based ‘water-for-work’ program, as outlined in 
a previous study (Abramson et al. 2011). Under this arrangement, multiple-use 
water improvements that are capable of meeting both domestic and productive 
water needs are designed for unreached villages. Community gardens drawing 
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upon these water systems are developed, and households contribute their 
time cultivating high-value produce, which is sold and profits directed toward 
financing the system. This setup removes monetary limitations and may enable 
market-based cost recovery of water improvements where conventional cash 
payments fail.
I investigate this setup in the same typical village in which a multiple-use 
borehole is developed, and labour in the community garden is conducted over 
two years (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Net revenue of hypothetical ‘Water-for-Work’ program coupled 
to various pumping methods
Source: Author’s research. Net revenue generated under a multiple-use, new community borehole and pump 
coupled to community drip irrigation of high-value, off-season produce. Where net revenue is above zero, 
full cost recovery is feasible within two years. While hand-powered pumps incur a relatively small amount 
of debt, the 15-year costs of higher output water supplies could be amortised with a small community work 
commitment in grid-connected areas, and with a larger, but still reasonable, community work investment for 
off-grid areas. The same scenarios described in Figure 1 are applied here, where each household is allowed 
500 litres per day of domestic water. This comparison assumes that all excess water beyond that amount 
is used for drip irrigation of tomatoes over two seasons as part of a water-for-work approach as described 
by Abramson et al. (2011), who also describe the agronomic costs. A price of $1/kilogram and a maximum 
yield of 50 tons/hectare are assumed. The Hydrus® 1-D Soil-Plant modelling software was used to model 
transpiration under eight millimetres of PET, groundwater salinity of 0.5 deciSiemens per metre (dS / m), and 
a growing season of 120 days (Hydrus). The relative yield to relative transpiration relationship for tomatoes 
was taken from Ben-Gal, et al., and used to determine actual tomato yield (2003). Weekly work requirements 
for drip irrigation are taken from Woltering et al. (2011).
Under the alternative policy of incorporating water-based revenue, optimal 
technology outcomes and pumping schemes are drastically changed. Because 
hand pumps are the lowest yielding alternative and inhibit significant 
productive use, they provide no return on investment. Grid-powered motorised 
pumps provide significant net revenue, while the costs of solar- and diesel-
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powered improvements could both be recovered fully under alternative pump 
outputs. For context, even these expanded outputs require labour commitments 
less than what has been stated and revealed from a recent field study in rural 
Zambia, suggesting that demand for such a program would be sufficiently high 
(Abramson 2012).
These results suggest that in seeking to minimise costs of rural water 
improvements, a strategic opportunity for rural community development is 
being overlooked. Certainly, other models may exist for expanding water service 
provision. Microfinance, for instance, is already being implemented in the rural 
water sector, and may provide a suitable platform for scaling this policy shift.
Adam Abramson received his PhD from the Blaustein Institutes for Desert 
Research, Zuckerberg Institute for Water Research, Ben Gurion University of 
the Negev. His doctoral research focused on financing rural water improvements 
and resulted in his thesis ‘Decision support system (DSS) for assessing the 
feasibility of cost recovery of rural water improvements in Africa’. This article is 
based on his work in developing a DSS, and his field experience in rural Zambia. 
He thanks the Grace & Hope Charitable Trust, United States for support for this 
research. He can be contacted at dr.adam.abramson@gmail.com and his website 
is www.outoftheground.org.
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6. Improving West African rice 
production with agricultural water 
management strategies
Pamela G. Katic
 International Water Management Institute, Ghana
The populations of West African countries continue to grow at rates exceeding 
three per cent per year. The international food price spike of 2008 focused 
attention on the risks to national security and livelihoods associated with 
importing significant quantities of food; and government and donor investment 
strategies now focus on ensuring national food security. Since rice is a key staple 
crop in the region, increasing rice production in a profitable way is critical to 
food security and sustained economic growth.
Over the last 20 years, increases in rice production have generally been obtained 
by putting more land under cultivation. As pressure on land intensifies, however, 
the results are a dramatic decline in soil fertility, increasingly degraded natural 
resources and increasing conflicts over land use. In this context and as observed 
worldwide, water-management interventions are key to the intensification of 
rice production. The importance of irrigation or water control in enabling a 
‘green revolution’ has been underlined in many continental, regional and 
national strategic policy documents.
Diverse typologies of rice-irrigation systems exist in West Africa, which can be 
categorised into two broad classes: conventional systems and emerging systems. 
The conventional systems are mainly initiated and developed by governments 
and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), or are developed by communities 
or individuals over a number of years. Conventional systems include public 
surface irrigation systems and small reservoirs. The emerging systems are 
those irrigation systems initiated and developed by private entrepreneurs and 
farmers, either autonomously or with little support from the government and/
or NGOs. The emerging systems include river/stream lifting or pumping-based 
irrigation systems, public/private partnership-based systems, lowland/inland 
valley rice water capture systems, and private small-reservoir systems.
In order to understand the impact of alternative water-management options 
and policy interventions on the profitability of rice production, this study 
analysed farm household data from three donor-funded project surveys in 
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three West African countries.1 The data was collected in two sites in Ghana, 
one in Burkina Faso and one in Niger; and looked at detailed rice-production 
budgets of small-scale farmers. The farmers interviewed were classified into 
three water management systems: irrigation (public scheme), supplemented 
rain-fed (rainfall aided by autonomously sourced water supplies) and purely 
rain fed (Katic et al. 2013).
Once the surveys were completed, the results were collected and analysed with 
a policy analysis matrix (PAM)2 in order to answer three key questions:
1. What is the impact of water management interventions on rice farmers’ 
income?
2. Is local irrigated rice price competitive against imported rice without 
additional public policy interventions?
3. What are the major determinants of local rice profitability in West Africa?
Impact of water management interventions on 
rice farmers’ income
The analysis revealed that water-management interventions may or may not 
increase rice farmers’ income in the sites studied. Our result is in contrast to 
previous studies that have found (under different assumptions on labour costs 
and local prices) that rice production always breaks even, or earns positive profits 
in the region (Coronel and Lançon 2008; Seini 2002; Seini and Asante 1998).
On one hand, water management raises rice revenues by increasing yields. On 
the other hand, these farming systems require a higher amount of labour per 
unit of land, increasing production costs. While in the Ghanaian sites, the cost 
of implementing water management (both supplemented rain-fed and irrigated 
systems) outweighs modest increases in rice yields valued at low prices; in 
Burkina Faso, lower wage rates and a higher price for local rice mean that the 
value of greater yields is more than sufficient to cover the costs of irrigation.
1 ‘Lowland paddy fields development/Disseminating lowland rice cultivation in inland valleys in West 
Africa’ and ‘Assessing the impact of Sawah development on rice farmers in the Ashanti region, Ghana’ both 
funded by the Government of Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and WAIPRO (West African Irrigation 
Project) funded by USAID.
2 A PAM is an analytical framework that is frequently used to advise agricultural policy in the context of 
comparative advantage and private competitiveness. It consists of a two-way accounting matrix measuring 
revenues, costs and the derived profits at private (actual) and social (efficiency) prices.
6. Improving West African rice production with agricultural water management strategies
29
Comparative advantage of local rice production
The data revealed that internationally traded rice varieties are higher quality 
than locally produced rice. Thus, with or without pricing policies, local rice 
cannot compete with imported rice on price because they are different products.
The main public policy in place in the region that affects the profitability of 
local rice production is an import tariff that inflates the price of competing 
Asian rice varieties. Although imported rice is more expensive than local rice, 
even if no tariff were imposed, most local consumers still buy it due to its non-
price attributes (absence of stone, less broken rice, uniformity and appearance). 
Even the lowest quality imported rice (Thai 25 per cent broken) is still better 
than the rice produced in all study areas.
The price gap between imported and local rice confirms that the two categories 
of product are not considered as substitutes by consumers. Thus, there are 
two different markets and the popular import tariffs have a weak additional 
demand impact on the market for local rice. Just because local rice is cheaper, it 
does not mean it is more competitive because the two products are not directly 
substitutable. This result suggests that there is a huge opportunity for the 
local industry to upgrade rice quality via effective policies/investments. This 
opportunity is greater for irrigated rice farms because the higher yields realised 
imply that the quality upgrade is applied to a greater production level.
Determinants of local rice profitability
The analysis revealed that the major factors influencing rice profitability in West 
Africa are labour costs, world rice prices and local rice quality. In addition, 
exogenous or policy-induced changes in these factors have a greater impact on 
rice produced under some form of water management.
Labour costs
Results suggest that profits are sensitive to labour costs. The analysed sites 
comprised small-scale farms where most labour is family based, whose 
opportunity cost is likely to be lower than the market wage. Rice production 
becomes a profitable venture when labour is valued at a rate lower than 
two-thirds of the market wage (or the quantity of labour employed falls 
below two-thirds of its original value). When comparing rain-fed fields with 
those under some form of water management, profits are more responsive 
to labour costs in the latter, simply because these systems are currently 
more labour intensive. Thus, efforts to increase the mechanisation levels of 
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rice production systems in the region are especially needed to reduce the 
intensity of on-farm labour use in irrigated farms and boost yields even 
further by diminishing harvesting and post-harvesting losses.
World prices 
Sensitivity results reveal that large variations in world rice prices would 
substantially impact the local rice industry. A fall in the price of the higher 
quality international varieties would reduce demand for local production and, in 
turn, reduce the price local farmers receive. In fact, if prices fell to pre-2008 levels 
and technology was unchanged, rice production throughout the whole region 
would become unprofitable for farmers. What is more interesting, even if local rice 
is upgraded to a 25-per-cent-broken quality equivalent, it will be less costly to 
rely on imported rice than to produce it internally. In this case, however, irrigated 
systems would be much more resilient to the competition of cheaper imported rice 
than rain-fed production because they attain higher yields.
Rice quality
The data reveals rice quality is as key to farm profitability as yields. The low 
quality of rice obtained after milling is explained by a combination of factors 
that include poor seed variety, lack of soil and water management, low input use, 
inappropriate farming, harvesting and post-harvesting techniques, and milling 
technology. The study results show that there is potential to raise private profits 
with quality improvements (profits would be over US$400/hectare if local rice 
is upgraded to a 25-per-cent-broken quality equivalent). In particular, irrigated 
systems benefit more from rice-quality upgrades because the effect on profits is 
complemented with greater yields. As a result, policies to improve both physical 
and quality loss should be complementary to reap the greatest potential from 
this use of land.
Policy implications
Overall, the results suggest that while trade policies are not effective in boosting 
local rice production in West Africa, investment policies, such as irrigation 
developments, have potential to raise the returns to rice producers. The 
results also suggest that to simultaneously enhance farm incomes, contribute 
to national economic growth and increase food security, water management 
must be complemented with further farm interventions to reduce quantity and 
quality losses.
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7. An assessment of the replacement 
of traditional irrigation systems by 
private wells in Tamil Nadu, India
Kei Kajisa 
Aoyama Gakuin University, Japan and International Rice 
Research Institute, the Philippines
In developing Asian countries, a major recent change in irrigation management 
is the rapid spread of private pumps and wells (modern irrigation systems). This 
process was accelerated by the introduction of the hydraulic drilling method in 
the 1980s and further by the development of the pump industry in China and 
India in the 1990s. The spread of modern systems is associated with the decline 
in traditional, communally managed irrigation systems.
An example of this trend can be found in Tamil Nadu, India. Traditional 
irrigation systems in this region are tank systems, which consist of a water 
storage area, sluices, and water supply channels. The water storage area is a 
small reservoir constructed across the slope of a valley to catch and store water. 
Water is controlled by the sluices, which are attached to the tank bank and is 
delivered to paddy fields through channels. This communal infrastructure has 
been collectively managed by informal local bodies. Although tank systems were 
the dominant source of irrigation until the early 1960s, in the last three decades 
a massive diffusion of private wells and pumps has occurred throughout India, 
including Tamil Nadu (Figure 1).
The dissemination of private wells provides more freedom for users to 
control irrigation water, in terms of the timing and amount of water 
delivered to their own fields, compared with collectively maintained tank 
systems and, thus, those who have access to wells can increase their yield 
and income (Palanisami 2000). This process has, however, been associated 
with the degradation of traditional tank systems as there are now less users 
to maintain them, which could negatively affect the agricultural production 
of remaining tank users. State statistics have aggregated these positive and 
negative effects of private wells, and show a net increase in the average yield 
of rice, a staple crop in the area, and an increase in the average income of 
farmers (Government of Tamil Nadu).
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Figure 1: Percentage share of well-irrigated and tank-irrigated area in total 
irrigated area in Tamil Nadu from 1960 to 2005
Source: Author’s research.
Double tragedy among tank users and well 
users
A closer look at the original data, however, suggests that the recent change to 
irrigation systems in Tamil Nadu is associated with increased poverty among 
a particular group of farmers: the tank users in high well-density areas. In 
principle, water from communal tanks is available to all farmers in the system 
command area. On the other hand, access to irrigation water from private wells 
is limited to owners and to those who can purchase water from the owners. 
Thus, with the decline in tank systems, farmers who are dependent solely on 
tanks will be disadvantaged, while farmers who have recourse to private wells 
can achieve higher levels of income and crop yield. Since this negative impact is 
large enough and the compensation of yield loss through income diversification 
is difficult, farmers without access to wells tend to fall into poverty. Table 1 
summarises the rice yield, household income per capita, head count poverty 
ratio, and rice profit by irrigation status classified by the condition of tank 
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(deteriorated or maintained) and by the access to wells (access or no-access). The 
worst situation across all indicators is that of farmers using deteriorated tanks 
without access to wells (column 1 of Table 1).
Table 1: Comparison of rice yield, income, poverty ratio, and rice profit by 
irrigation status
Irrigation status (1) (2) (3) (4)
Condition of tank Deteriorated Maintained Deteriorated Maintained
Access to wells No-access No-access Access Access
Rice yield (t/ha) 3.2 3.6 4.4 4.1
Household Income per 
capita (Rs./month) a
262 309 561 589
Head count poverty 
ratio b
0.67 0.59 0.30 0.24
Rice profit (Rs./ha) -929 4,801 1,897 5,619
Source: Author’s research. (a) The value is converted into a per capita base using the adult equivalent of 
household members. (b) The international poverty line of US$1 per day, adjusted for purchasing power 
parity, has been used. Use of the national poverty line of Rs. 324 (equivalent to US$36.40 at PPP exchange 
rate) monthly per capita for 1993–94 does not change the qualitative results.
The story does not end here. Since groundwater is a typical example of a common 
resource, under open access private users do not take into account the existence 
of a negative externality that their use imposes on other users. Hence, the likely 
outcome is the overexploitation of groundwater beyond a socially optimal level 
and, in the medium- to long-term, more costly irrigation as wells have to pump 
from deeper below the surface. Eventually, well users become unable to earn 
as much profit on rice as they did previously due to the higher electricity and 
infrastructure costs of pumping water from a depleted aquifer. Table 1 shows 
that among the well users (columns 3 and 4), the profit with the deteriorated 
tank is much lower than the other case, provided that the deterioration occurs 
in the high well-density areas (Kajisa et al. 2007). A detailed regression analysis 
supports this story, which can be found in the original piece of research assessing 
the introduction of the new irrigation systems in Tamil Nadu that this paper has 
summarised (Kajisa 2012). In this way, the replacement of tanks by private wells 
results in a double tragedy: increased poverty among non-users of wells and 
potentially no long-term profit among well users.
Toward a win-win solution
We call the above-mentioned story a tragedy because no individual currently 
has an incentive to change their actions. With regard to the first tragedy, the 
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negative effect on the farmers with no access to wells has been created by the 
decline in collective management of tanks. Since well users do not suffer as 
much as non-users from this decline, they have little incentive to correct it. The 
second tragedy, related to the groundwater table, is a typical example of the 
‘tragedy of the commons’. Since the root of the problem is a negative externality 
transferred by each individual well user onto other well users, no incentive for 
correction exists. Without policy interventions, the correction of this double 
tragedy is difficult.
My simulation has shown that the revitalisation of collective tank management 
could effectively reduce poverty. In addition, revitalisation could supplement 
groundwater aquifers through percolation and thus alleviate the problem of 
overexploitation. Reducing the number of electric pumps could also be effective 
to avoid overexploitation. The first option for this purpose should be the 
abolition of the policy of free electricity for agricultural use, which may be 
politically difficult. Another strategy could be to charge a progressive sales tax 
on higher horsepower pump sets and deeper drilling of bore wells in order 
to deter over-dissemination and over-deepening of well irrigation systems. The 
government could then use the revenues from electricity, or from a tax, for tank 
revitalisation projects. This transfer could be considered legitimate because well 
users would receive an indirect benefit from the revitalised tanks, in that water 
from them permeates to re-supply groundwater aquifers.
Dr Kei Kajisa is a Professor at Aoyama Gakuin University in Japan and an 
Adjunct Scientist at the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the 
Philippines. His research interest includes institutional design for sustainable 
collective irrigation management in Asia. The article is based on an original 
piece of research published in Water Policy, vol. 14: ‘The double tragedy of 
irrigation systems in Tamil Nadu, India: assessment of the replacement of 
traditional systems by private wells’.
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Introduction
Efficiently allocating water across competing demands and allowing for its 
reallocation as circumstances change and environmental concerns gain higher 
priority are challenges faced around the world (United Nations 2011; World 
Water Assessment Programme 2012; Grafton et al. 2012a, 2012b). This chapter 
assesses the development and implementation of water markets in the Murray-
Darling Basin (MDB), which involves five states and territories (Queensland, 
New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory) 
and the federal Australian Government.
In recent research (Grafton et al. 2014), we addressed the development and 
current status of water markets in the MDB, described what provisions were 
made to secure environmental flows, and identified lessons learned.
Review of water market development
The creation of statutory rights for water first occurred in Victoria in 1886 
and in New South Wales in 1888. Originally, it was envisioned that state 
governments would allocate water to meet explicit policy objectives (Martin 
2005). Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, however, these water licences were 
altered to specify the amount of water that could be diverted. Eventually, water 
licences became shares in a consumptive pool. The bundle of rights incorporated 
in a water licence was eventually unbundled to the extent that we see today. 
Water entitlements are an ongoing claim to a share of a water resource while a 
water allocation is the volume of water assigned to a particular entitlement in a 
specific water year. 
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Reforms in 1994 separated water rights from land ownership and unbundled 
access and delivery rights, allowing for more trading flexibility. While allocation 
trade began in response to the 1982–3 drought and entitlement trade was 
permitted on a state-by-state basis starting in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
the 1994 reforms allowed trade to increase significantly (Grafton et al. 2012a, 
2012b). Their implementation came at the same time that a cap was placed on 
total surface water abstraction in the southern part of the basin; this cap not 
only limited withdrawals but also preserved the reliability of existing water 
entitlements by ruling out new claims on water resources.
Reforms continued into the 2000s, albeit at a slower pace (Horne 2012). As water 
trading helped users cope with increasing scarcity, government agencies also 
took action to secure flows for the environment: A$500 million was provided in 
2004 as part of the National Water Initiative, and droughts encouraged another 
A$3 billion investment for environmental flow purchases in 2007. Equally 
important, the 2007 reforms established a Murray-Darling Basin Authority, and 
barriers to trade (such as interstate trade restrictions) were mitigated in order 
to improve competition within water markets and provide better information to 
buyers and sellers (Connell and Grafton 2011; Horne 2012).
Status of water trading in the Murray-Darling 
Basin
The trade in both entitlements and allocations within the MDB today represents 
about 80 per cent of all such trade in Australia. Entitlement trading in the 
southern part of the MDB peaked in 2008–9 (National Water Commission 
2011:106). The allocation market, in contrast, has grown steadily over the past 
five years and, on average, represents 30 per cent of the total annual water 
allocation (National Water Commission 2011:74). 
Government purchases of entitlements beginning in 2008 have made up a 
significant portion of entitlement trading (see Figure 1). Although entitlements 
are separated into several classes of reliability (the lowest of which suffers more 
severe cutbacks in allocations than the higher), prices for entitlements of each 
class have been relatively stable because they reflect future expectations and 
are therefore not influenced by short-term variations. In contrast, the price of 
allocations has tracked closely supply shocks. Figure 2 captures the price spikes; 
the impacts of widespread drought in 2008–9 saw the highest average prices 
(over A$400/megalitres(ML)), while 2010–11, a relatively wet year, saw prices 
drop to A$20/ML (National Water Commission 2011:34).
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Figure 1: Water entitlement trade in the Southern Murrary-Darling Basin
Source: National Water Commission (2013).
Figure 2: Average prices for water allocation trades in the Murray-Darling 
Basin ($/ML)
Source: National Water Commission (2013). July 2007-2008 figures not available.
One major trade barrier, termination charges levied by irrigation districts, was 
addressed in 2010. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
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imposed rules that prohibit districts from hindering the devolution of 
entitlements to individual members and their sale thereafter. As a result, 
individual irrigators can now sell entitlements outside of the irrigation district 
without paying an arbitrary termination fee. Concerns on the part of districts that 
entitlement trading would imperil their financial stability haven’t materialised 
because entitlement sellers have chosen to maintain water delivery contracts for 
allocation purchases (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2013).
In addition, remaining trading restrictions are being eliminated or loosened. 
As an interim step, state water trading rules override the rules established 
as part of the Basin Plan (Minister for Sustainability, Environment, Water, 
Population and Communities 2012:122). The Basin Plan will take full force 
between 2014–19. Once that occurs, the unbundling of statutory rights will 
be complete and entitlement trades will no longer be restricted based on water 
volumes or the purpose of use; restrictions to protect the environment will be 
assessed when users apply for local use licenses. The states meanwhile continue 
to restrict water entitlement trading volumes. For example, the government 
of New South Wales has imposed a three per cent limit on water entitlement 
purchases for environmental purposes that would in practice preclude future 
government purchases and is incompatible with Basin Plan rules. We argue that 
the resolution to this conflict will showcase how much enforcement power the 
Basin Authority possesses.
Despite barriers, gains from trade across the basin have been substantial. One 
estimate indicates that reallocation of water rights has boosted the gross regional 
product of the southern part of the basin by A$370 million (National Water 
Commission 2010). Meanwhile, risks to towns and cities are mitigated because, 
in the event of drought or other supply shocks, they can purchase allocation 
water on the market. 
The provision of timely and accurate market information is important to 
facilitate trading. For this reason, the national government is establishing, in 
cooperation with the states, a National Water Market System (2014) to convey 
this information to market participants. Its implementation has been slow and 
inconsistent, however: months to years have elapsed without critical updates 
being made to the information system.
Provisions for environmental flows
The cap on water extraction instituted in the 1990s was designed to limit 
adverse environmental impacts, but the timing and location of extraction could 
be altered by trading. Over the period from 1998–9 to 2007–8, some waterways 
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within the basin experienced increased end-of-system flows as a result of 
trading, and these flows helped protect ecological assets during the prolonged 
Millenium Drought (National Water Commission 2010).
A distinction should be made between two types of environmental flows. 
‘Rules-based’ flows are those that remain after all entitlement holders have 
extracted their allocations. Allocations vary based on hydrologic conditions 
and the interests of individual states, so these flows are not a fixed proportion 
of available water. These flows were reduced more severely than irrigation 
allocations during the Millenium Drought (Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation 2008:59). This was one factor that prompted 
the national government to invest in ‘entitlement’ flows, or flows derived 
from entitlements purchased by the government for the purpose of improving 
environmental outcomes. Using the funds mentioned above as part of the 
reform packages, the Australian Government has closed contracts for over ten 
per cent of total water entitlements in the basin at an approximate cost of 
A$2 billion (Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population 
and Communities 2013). In addition, the government has funded water 
infrastructure projects designed to reduce water losses and subsequently 
direct the conserved water to the environment.
Lessons learned
Lessons learned can be summarised as follows:
• Crisis can serve as a focusing event —  The severe droughts experienced in the 
basin prompted reform activity.
• Markets strengthen regional resilience — Trade-induced flexibility is improving 
outcomes for agricultural users, and entitlement portfolios for environmental 
flows are improving environmental outcomes.
• Leadership is necessary in the political realm — Basin-wide community 
support is indispensable, and political leadership is integral to implement 
market-based reforms.
• Extraction caps are paramount — Monitoring and enforcing surface water 
extraction caps strengthens water rights.
• Water storage facilitates trading — In addition to allowing downstream users 
to use allocation water on demand, water storage infrastructure extends the 
allocation trading season.
• Timely and accurate information facilitates trading — Participation can be 
encouraged by disseminating information on prices, which reduces uncertainty.
• Statutory rights provide a flexibile framework — Statutory rights allow for 
reform and reallocation without recourse to courts; one drawback is that 
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policy changes can alter the value of statutory rights, but these changes can 
be appropriately compensated.
• Markets can secure environmental benefits — While increased end-of-system 
flows depend on the direction of water trade, governments can always 
undertake water acquisition for the environment.
• Water buybacks for the environment work — Government purchases of water 
entitlements in the market have helped acquire water more cost-effectively 
than alternative subsidy schemes (Productivity Commssion 2010; Qureshi 
et al. 2008; Grafton and Hussey 2007).
• Prices reflect scarcity and risk perceptions — Allocation water prices have 
tracked supply shocks closely, and the disparity between the prices of 
different classes of entitlements reflects future expectations of water 
allocation to particular entitlements.
• Inputs from local and basin-wide interests have different roles to play — Local 
input is useful to develop site-specific environmental recovery plans, but it 
can hinder the development of basin-wide markets; regional markets may 
require support from higher levels of government to overcome local interests.
• Monitoring and enforcement cannot be neglected — The initial cap in 1995 
didn’t control extraction from groundwater aquifers and other diversions, 
and this resulted in an undesired shift toward unregulated water sources.
Conclusion
A long reform process has unbundled statutory water rights into access 
entitlements, rights to annual allocation volumes, tradable delivery shares and 
non-tradable water use licenses that regulate how water is used at certain locations. 
These changes have enabled a water market to emerge that has successfully 
reallocated water throughout the MDB. Meanwhile, entitlement acquisition 
largely by governments has secured significant additional environmental flows. 
The success of market-based platforms depends to a great extent on their design. 
Governments must work with all stakeholders to establish a fair and efficient 
system. Infrastructure systems play a critical role in regulating the supply side 
of the market, and accurate information on supply volumes and trading prices 
underpins the demand side. After two decades of improving the regulatory 
framework, markets have become an important element of water provision in 
the MDB. They are helping water users and governments manage trade-offs 
between water use and the environment, particularly in dry years.
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9. Transboundary water governance
Daniel Connell
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The effective management of water across borders is central to overcoming 
the challenges of water scarcity. Transboundary management requires water 
managers to respond to outcomes that result from interactions beyond their 
borders. This can involve decisions on polluting activities positioned near 
downstream borders that have impacts experienced outside the jurisdiction, the 
consequences of a dam for cross-border flows, or how much water should be 
extracted for irrigation upstream.
To achieve the goal of better transboundary water management, governments 
need to understand the biophysical characteristics of water and the varying 
relationships that different people and interest groups have with it. The 
challenge for decision-makers is the uncertainty about the likely effects of policy 
choices when there are likely to be long-term benefits. Further, environmental 
systems are frequently subject to thresholds and cumulative impacts that result 
in significant loss when they occur, but which are hard to predict and difficult 
to reverse. 
Role of national governments
National governments have a number of important and unique attributes. First, 
their capacity to make laws and enforce them. Second, their access to funds 
(including the capacity to tax), research and management. Third is the greater 
jurisdictional capacity to assess issues from a catchment-wide perspective (at 
least within their borders) and distribute costs and benefits between different 
stakeholders, particularly upstream and downstream. Finally, there is the 
potential for a higher degree of corporate consistency over the long term than 
is possible for most other institutions. To illustrate the issues of transboundary 
governance within a federal state we briefly review the history of water 
governance for the Colorado River.
The Colorado River
The role of the US federal government in the negotiation of the 1922 Colorado 
River Compact is a good example in coordination across multiple jurisdictions 
at the sub-national level. Bringing together the seven upper and lower Colorado 
Basin states, Hubert Hoover, the national government-appointed facilitator, 
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brokered a water-sharing arrangement that has proved surprisingly resilient 
over the subsequent 90 years. One of the first products of the new compact 
(a voluntary agreement made under the implied threat of an externally 
imposed solution) was the Hoover Dam funded by the federal government 
and completed in 1935. The capacity of the dam to provide hydropower and 
regulate river flows has underpinned the development of the south-west of 
the United States since the 1930s. 
The central government of the United States (defined in its wider sense so as 
to include national institutions, such as the Supreme Court) has subsequently 
shaped development in the region by funding strategic projects, such as the 
Central Arizona Project; influencing water-management plans through legislative 
requirements, such as the 1973 Endangered Species Act; and arbitrating disputes 
between the Colorado Basin states. More recently, using an approach that hints at 
how its role could evolve to deal with the predicted disruptive impacts of climate 
change, the central government pressured the lower Colorado states to negotiate 
between themselves an exceptional circumstances drought-management plan to 
share water that would protect key assets, such as the major cities. The four 
states acted in response to the threat by the national government that if they did 
not come to an agreement it would impose its own water sharing plans on them. 
International transboundary water governance 
National governments have significant coercive power to set water policy across 
sub-national jurisdictions. In theory, replicating the same structure at the next 
level up, international transboundary water governance, would require some 
form of international government with executive power to force negotiations 
and resolutions, as in the case of the Colordao River. But the collection of 
institutions that most nearly resembles an ‘international government’ is 
the United Nations (UN) and its various agencies. The UN is, by and large, a 
consensus-based organisation that is ill-equipped to solve contentious trade-offs. 
The sovereignty of nation states is a key principle of the UN and, in practice, the 
General Assembly and other UN bodies are not vested with the power to make 
or enforce decisions on how particular countries use transboundary waters. 
In the absence of an overarching authority to further the collective interest by 
enforcing rules, making investments and distributing costs and benefits, a wide 
range of actors exert influence in the international sphere, such as the World 
Bank; powerful nongovernmental organisations, such as the World Wide Fund 
for Nature; large commercial companies; and, various UN agencies. 
National governments are the foundation upon which international society is 
built and agreement on transboundary waters unavoidably requires agreement 
9. Transboundary water governance
49
by sovereign governments. Nevertheless, the power and authority of national 
governments is circumscribed by multiple interests and other layers of 
government. Consequently, compared to the sub-national level governments, 
there is a more heterogeneous arrangement of frameworks within which 
national governments pursue their individual and collective interests related to 
transboundary waters. This chapter demonstrates the complex nature of these 
frameworks and provides examples of their components through five sections 
covering a range of different issues.
Overview of chapters
In this section Warner, Zeitoun and Mirumachi (Chapter 10) discuss the power 
dynamics underlying transboundary governance between nation-states. They 
argue that transboundary relations are typified by a mixture of cooperation 
and conflict. In contrast to common preoccupations concerning military 
and economic instruments of ‘hard power’ to resolve water disputes, they 
demonstrate the importance of nonviolent, co-optative instruments of ‘soft 
power’, from side payments and bribery to persuasion and inciting desire to 
emulating success. The long-held disagreement between Egypt and Ethiopia 
over the latter’s plans to dam the upper Nile provides a demonstratation of these 
points, as well as the fact that, no matter how hegemonic or dominant a state, its 
hard and soft power are ultimately fluid.
A well-established means of achieving cooperation between nation states is 
the adoption of shared legal frameworks or agreements. Treaties, for example, 
may stipulate the rights and obligations of signatories in the joint management 
process and, importantly, place restrictions on actions that may harm other 
signatories. International water law advanced significantly during the twenty-
first century and, although a proposed universal treaty (the 1997 Convention on 
the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses) has received 
insufficient support to come into force, there is a large and increasing number of 
legal agreements between states. In this chapter Gerlak, Lautze, and Giordano 
(Chapter 11) analyse an important aspect of such agreements: the sharing of data 
and information concerning the state of shared water resources. They find that 
states are engaging in greater data and information exchange, but uncover a 
reluctance on the part of many states to legalise formal schedules for exchange. 
Another prominent method for governing international water resources, and 
one that can be a product of formal legal agreements, is river basin organisations 
(RBOs). These multilateral organisations provide a framework for states to make 
decisions, resolve disputes, share information and generate knowledge. In this 
chapter, Schmeier (Chapter 12) observes that success varies greatly between 
different RBOs and suggests that differences in institutional design and, in 
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particular, the organisational set-up and water-governance mechanisms an RBO 
provides, can contribute to its success. Understanding which characteristics 
work, and in what context, sheds important light on how to achieve improved 
cooperation and collective outcomes in the reform of existing RBOs and design 
of new ones.
The legal and geopolitical context prompting states to sign an international 
transboundary water agreement is the subject of Villar and Ribeiro’s (Chapter 13) 
contribution to this section. Notably, cooperation was achieved in the authors’ 
example without prior conflict. The authors show how the process leading to 
the 2010 Agreement on the Guarani Aquifer, encompassing Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay, began with scientists recognising the shared nature 
of the aquifer and the need for its joint management and was supported by 
multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank. The essay is a valuable survey 
of the key passages in the agreement text, particularly those relevant to the 
main principles of the UN Law of Transboundary Aquifers: sovereignty, the 
equitable and reasonable use of water resources, the obligation not to cause 
harm, cooperation and the exchange of data and information.
The final chapter in this section is a case study in potential conflict. Wirsing 
(Chapter 14) details the plans of China and India to exploit the Brahmaputra River 
for hydropower and water diversions for agriculture and other uses. The author 
views the lack of existing agreements with concern, arguing that, even if water 
is not the issue at the centre of these emerging powers’ difficult relationship, 
their respective water insecurity means that disputes over exploitation of the 
Brahmaputra could have much wider impacts.
Dr Daniel Connell is Research Fellow at the Crawford School of Public Policy 
and Director of Education programs, UNESCO Chair in Water Economics and 
Transboundary Governance, The Australian National University. 
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With monotonous regularity since the late 1980s nongovernmental organisations 
(NGOs), politicians or think tanks have predicted a water war. Recently, a UK 
minister predicted war in the coming decades (Harvey 2012). No such thing 
has happened, though, and prominent water scholars have argued a war fought 
strictly over water is unlikely in the future (Wolf 1996; Allan 2001).
That does not mean there is peace and harmony among co-riparians. Power 
differences and latent conflicts persist, usually under the radar of the basin 
hegemon (or dominant power), but in full view of those who live their effects. 
The state of affairs in many transboundary basins can be characterised as a mix 
of cooperation and conflict (Mirumachi and Allan 2007), with those benefitting 
from the status quo emphasising the former. Our first article on the subject 
called this the ‘ugly’ side of cooperation (Zeitoun and Mirumachi 2008).
A clue to understanding this situation, we argue in its sequel (Zeitoun et al. 
2011), is to look at what lies beneath: how power is exercised. The ‘water 
wars’ discourse has simplistically focused on the exercise of hard power, 
predominantly violence and coercion. Both philosophical reasoning (Hannah 
Arendt) and empirically grounded hydropolitical work (Dinar 2009) has shown, 
however, that rule based on fear and brute power has little hope in the long 
term. Some kind of legitimacy and consent is needed to perpetuate any skewed 
transboundary water arrangement based on unequal power relations. 
Empirically, we find relations between riparians to be governed by a wider 
spectrum of power instruments, from side payments and bribery to persuasion 
and inciting desire to emulating success. This wide range of nonviolent, co-
optative power manifestations is collectively known as ‘soft’ power: getting 
others to want what you want. Nye (1990)  sought to explain how relations 
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can be peaceful through the power of attraction without the need for a threat 
of violence. We find, however, that soft power not only contains the positive 
power of attraction, but also its negative, repellence away from certain agendas 
and issues, and towards maintenance of a biased status quo.
Nye was reiterating Machiavelli’s understanding of power as a centaur, half man 
(arguably rational), half horse (based on strength). He was far more optimistic 
than Machiavelli about human progress towards eternal peace, buttressed 
by freedom and trade. Fragmented evidence to support this hope exists in 
transboundary water contexts; many treaties never really came off the ground, 
and even in highly integrated Europe, diplomatic crises over water are not 
unheard of (Warner and van Buuren 2009).
A soft power perspective may not yet be sophisticated enough to explain power 
relations between riparians. Our analytical framework of ‘hydro-hegemony’ 
(Zeitoun and Warner 2006)  highlights how conflict, even if it is not open 
and visible, can be structurally present between riparians (and groundwater 
users from transboundary aquifers). In an integrated transboundary water 
configuration, interests between dominant and subordinate are harmonious; in 
a distributed power configuration, they are fundamentally at odds. Cooperation 
by the non-hegemonic actor, or its compliance with certain states of affairs, does 
not necessarily mean consensus. Successful framing by the stronger party of 
the common good (soft power), however, can result in power differences going 
uncontested and countries signing treaties that bring highly differential benefits. 
Unqualified calls for and claims to transboundary cooperation ‘of any sort, no 
matter how slight’ (UNDP 2006)  are therefore as wrongheaded as are alarms 
over water wars. Policy and programs promoting unqualified ‘cooperation’ were 
criticised on the grounds that negative forms of cooperation need reform or 
resolution, not management or encouragement.
The ‘hydro-hegemony’ framework is indebted to the Gramscian concept of 
hegemony as ingrained in material and ideational structures pervading social 
systems (Selby 2005; Davidson-Harden et al. 2007).  River negotiations are 
multi-level power games (Warner 2008) in which state representatives are the 
lynchpin. Representatives of hydro-hegemons can deny there being conflict 
and appear magnanimous, while knowing full well that the odds are stacked 
in their favour. State representatives may frame their water interest in non-
contestable security terms (Buzan et al. 1998). Whether picked up, amplified 
and given material support, or purposely backgrounded, such discursive 
framing of issues matters.
A useful example is that of Egypt’s long claim of a veto on any upstream ‘arrest’ 
of Nile waters for consumptive use, through irrigation reservoirs, distribution 
systems and the like. Underpinned by one of the largest armies in the region, the 
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national government has previously declared upstream dam-building to be a casus 
belli (a legitimate reason to start a war) should it lead to lower inflow into Egypt 
(Warner et al. 2012). It could be argued that this threat has prevented Ethiopia, 
the Blue Nile upstream power, from building dams in the past; alternatively 
there is also the material reality that the country could hardly fund and realise 
its own dam infrastructure. This penury is worsened by the stipulation of (once) 
key multilateral funders that they will not fund transboundary projects lacking 
the endorsement of all riparian sates. The balance of power in favour of Egypt 
relies on the moral and material support of the United States, to which it is one 
of the biggest allies in the region.
But it’s not all about hard power. After Gamel Abdel Nasser’s 1952 revolution, 
the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the building of the Aswan Dam, Egypt 
became a respected southern leader. The government organised or condoned 
several cooperative, technical and political water fora about the river Nile 
(UNDUGU, TECCONILE, Nile 2002) on the unstated premise that these bodies 
would not tamper with Egypt’s self-ascribed water rights, laid down in treaties 
agreed with Sudan, but none of the other Nile riparians, in 1929 and 1959. 
The government of Anwar Sadat signed a Camp David treaty with Israel, which 
anointed the country as a ‘peacemaker’ in the eyes of influential superpowers, 
and the country has seen prominent nationals (Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Mahmoud 
Abu-Zeid) ascend to leadership positions in multilateral institutions, bestowing 
upon Egypt an aura of authority and legitimacy in the United Nations (UN) 
world order. In everyday interaction, upstream states have for decades refrained 
from taking action against Egypt’s interest without prodding.
A recent shift in the Nilotic water-sharing status quo over the past (half-) 
decade, however, seems to reflect a shift in the hegemonic power balance. Egypt 
is arguably not as important to American interests as it used to be, while its 
upstream neighbours do not appear to be as intimidated by Egypt as they once 
were. Opposition to Egypt’s unilateral hegemony have been voiced by Tanzania 
and Uganda since the 1960s. It was not until 2010 that the upstream states 
signed their own agreement without Egypt (Nicol and Cascao 2011). 
External direct investment, especially from China and the Gulf states, has 
dramatically improved the bargaining and economic position of upstream 
countries. China has used its own soft power through the provision of 
investment to these countries: buying oil in Sudan, supporting the giant 
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance (Millennium) Dam, and investing in land in 
several Nile states. China’s non-interference in political relations and the 
persuasive example of its own economic success raises goodwill. Moreover, 
Egypt’s relative international standing as an ‘example’ has also seen a slide, 
following allegations of human-rights violations, alienation from Israel, and 
failing megaprojects under Hosni Mubarak. 
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Nile politics telescoped in 2011. While Egypt was enmeshed in its February 
revolution, South Sudan gained independence and Ethiopia inaugurated its 
big dam. Ethiopia’s 6000 megawatt hydropower dam, with an estimated cost 
of US$4.5 billion, is largely self-funded from bonds and taxes. Two Egyptian 
governments have since protested loudly, first using the language of casus belli, 
then calling for negotiation and finally, in 2013, proposing joint funding. As 
the dam is located only 20 kilometres from the Ethio-Sudanese border, a dam 
collapse would flood the Sudanese capital of Khartoum. Overall, however, Sudan 
stands to benefit from the dam in terms of better flood regulation, irrigation 
and a nearby source of hydropower, and would gain from approximation to 
Ethiopia. Sudan, however, has so far sided with Egypt in its refusal to sign the 
Nile treaty, at least officially, suggesting Egypt's soft power is still palpable if 
dwindling (Hamzawy 2010). Egypt currently has little realistic alternative to 
joining the new arena of Nile negotiations and no longer holds de-facto veto 
power over major upstream projects like Ethiopia’s dam. 
Power dynamics, such as those noted in the above example, show that no matter 
how hegemonic or even dominant a state, its hard and soft power are ultimately 
fluid. Examination of the soft-power subtext helps us understand what’s 
going on in basins around the world. Similar analyses are not only applicable 
to the familiarly contentious Euphrates/Tigris, Jordan, Ganges, Brahmaputra 
and Colorado basins, but also to seemingly peaceful European transboundary 
streams such as the Rhine and Scheldt (Zeitoun and Warner 2006, Warner 
and van Buuren 2009).  The incorporation of soft power into the analysis of 
conflicts in hegemonic contexts provides insight into the choices riparian 
states (can) make or avoid in their transboundary water interaction; and into 
how negotiations and treaties can lead towards conflict management but not 
necessarily to conflict resolution.
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11. Greater exchange, greater 
ambiguity: Water resources data 
and information exchange in 
transboundary water treaties
Andrea K. Gerlak
University of Arizona, United States 
Jonathon Lautze 
International Water Management Institute, South Africa
Mark Giordarno
International Water Management Institute, South Africa
Effective management of the world’s water resources is considered to require 
access to credible and reliable data and information regarding the state of 
the resource, and how it is affected by water use and development, land use 
practices and climate change (Bernauer and Kalbhenn 2010; Rogers and Hall 
2003; Timmerman and Langaas 2005; Wolf 2007; United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 2009). 
Water resources data and information exchange is a key principle of the 
growing global normative framework for transboundary waters that shapes 
international law (Conca et al. 2006). Data and information exchange is an 
important design principle associated with the effectiveness of institutionalised 
cooperation (Zawahri 2008; Stinnett and Tir 2009). Joint water resources data 
and information gathering can alleviate disputes over data and prevent broader 
conflict (Bernauer and Kalbhenn 2010). Increasingly, using data and information 
to understand complex problems is seen as a key component of the successful 
governance of common pool resources and adaptive management strategies 
(Dietz et al. 2003; Raadgever et al. 2008). 
The issue of access to data and information on transboundary water resources, 
i.e. basins and aquifers that are shared by two or more states, is particularly 
important given the potential for conflict. Despite international calls for data 
and information exchange in transboundary waters and for exchange of basin-
specific evidence to support cooperative management, no systematic research 
has been undertaken to understand where, how frequently, or what water 
resources data and information are exchanged.
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Table 1: Select examples of water resources data and information exchange 
Hydrologic data 1928 Convention between the German Reich and the 
Lithuanian Republic regarding the maintenance and 
administration of the frontier waterways, which states 
in article 10: ‘‘The ordinary water-gauge observations at 
the usual observation posts shall be exchanged monthly 
immediately on receipt of the water-gauge lists’’
Hydrologic information 1972 Agreement relating to the establishment of a Canada-
United States committee on water quality in the St. 
John River and its tributary rivers and streams that cross 
the Canada-United States boundary in article 1 that the 
committee should ‘‘exchange appropriate information about 
plans, programs, and actions which could affect water 
quality in the Basin’’
Research, investigations, and 
assessments
1957 Agreement between Iran and the Soviet Union for the 
joint utilization of the frontier parts of the rivers Aras and 
Atrak for irrigation and power generation, which states that 
‘‘both parties hereto agree jointly to carry out exploration 
of the rivers Aras and Atrak all along the border common 
to the USSR and Iran and accumulate technical data related 
to their respective flows. They also agree to carry out 
necessary outdoor and indoor studies for the preparation of 
preliminary plans for irrigation and power generation from 
the strait of Ghis Ghalasi up to the end of the frontier of the 
river Aras and all frontier parts of the Atrak River’’
Unspecified type as general 
reports
2004 Agreement on the Establishment of the Zambezi 
Watercourse Commission, which includes provision to 
‘‘collect, evaluate and disseminate all data and information 
on the Zambezi Watercourse as may be necessary for the 
implementation of this Agreement’’
Prior notification 1994 OKACOM agreement on the Okavango basin in 
southern Africa. Article 1 addresses prior notification, calling 
for signatories to ‘‘notify the Commission of any proposed 
development or other matter which falls within the function 
of the Commission’’
Formalized communication 1994 OKACOM agreement on the Okavango basin in 
southern Africa. The agreement establishes ‘‘a commission 
which will have formal meetings for sharing information and 
concern’’
Source: Authors’ research.
In a recent piece of research (Gerlak et al. 2011), we examined the content of 
all known and available transboundary water treaties signed between 1900 and 
2007 in order to formally assess the sanctioned exchange of data and information 
in transboundary water settings. 
For the purposes of the study, data are defined as ‘hard’ numbers relating to water 
resources, such as rates of river flow and levels of water quality. Information is 
defined more broadly as general qualitative information, such as communication 
that a flood is impending or other conclusions reached from the analysis of 
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hard data. A third type of data and information exchange includes provisions to 
conduct joint research, investigations and assessments that include, or could be 
inferred to include, some aspects of data and information exchange. 
In addition to these direct mechanisms for data and information exchange, we 
also examined more indirect mechanisms including prior notification provisions 
and formalised communication. Prior notification refers to treaty provisions 
for prior consultation, notification or consent of planned measures related to 
water. Formalised communication refers to provisions for joint management 
institutions, regular political consultations, consultations as conflict resolution 
measures and arbitration. Table 1 provides some examples of water resources 
data and information exchange identified in the study.
Table 2: Indirect and direct data and information exchange mechanisms (N = 287)
Direct water resources data and information exchange 37% (106)
Indirect water resources data 
and information exchange
Prior Notification 87% (248)
Formalized Communication 90% (259)
Source: Adapted from Gerlak et al. 2011. N = number of total treaties investigated. Treaties may include 
more than one type of information exchange mechanism.
In cases where the exchange of hard data could not be specifically identified, 
agreements were classified as exchanging only information. As such, records of 
information exchange in the study may contain exchanges of data where data 
is not explicitly mentioned in the treaty. The frequency with which data and 
information are exchanged is divided into one of four categories: (a) regular, (b) 
event triggered, (c) on demand, or (d) unclear.
The findings of our research suggest that, while complete data and information 
exchange does not occur globally, most transboundary water treaties have some 
mechanism for exchanging water resources data or information. Interestingly, 
however, despite the importance of data and information exchange for 
transboundary water resources, the results also suggest that states continue to 
largely rely on indirect mechanisms to share and exchange data, including prior 
notification and formalised communication. As Table 2 indicates, for example, 
only 37 per cent, or 106 of the 287 treaties investigated include direct data and 
information exchange mechanisms.
Looking at how treaties have changed over time, we find that the use of direct 
mechanisms for exchange has increased from less than 20 per cent in the pre-
World War II period to more than 50 per cent in the post-Cold War era. The most 
notable increases in the use of direct exchange mechanisms occurred during the 
1930s to 1940s, and a consistent increase in their use was observed from the 
1970s through to the present (Figure 1).
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The latter of these two trends might suggest that the 1966 Helsinki Rules on 
the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers and 1997 UN Convention on the 
Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses may play a role in 
influencing basin-level exchange.  
Figure 1: Direct and indirect mechanisms for water resources data and 
information exchange by decade (per cent of agreements)
Source: Adapted from Gerlak et al. 2011.
Looking at the different types and functions of transboundary water treaties, 
the results suggest that data and information exchange in procedural and 
generative treaties have seen the greatest rise. Procedural agreements are those 
that provide frameworks for regular, collective decision-making (e.g., joint 
water management committees) while generative agreements develop new social 
practices (e.g., establishing principles, such as ‘no significant harm’). As such, 
we find that water resources data and information exchange is correlated with 
changes in the goals and nature of treaties themselves. 
In addition, we observe exchanges occurring in all geographic regions of the 
world. While, however, exchange in transboundary settings is not unique to 
democracies, the results suggest that democracies have a greater frequency of 
exchange than autocracies or other types of regime. This suggests that common 
values do help to reduce transaction costs in seeking solutions to collective 
action problems (Agrawal 2002), and that democracies, which may be more 
attentive to demands from constituents for cooperation and transparency, are 
therefore more likely to agree to share information in the first place (Shanks et 
al. 1996). 
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Overall, our research suggests a convergence towards inclusion of water 
resources data and information exchange as a key component of water treaties. 
This movement towards a more formal, direct exchange of data and information 
represents a key principle of an emerging governing framework for shared river 
basins (Conca et al. 2006).
Table 3: Frequency of direct water resources data and information 
exchange
Frequency Percent of frequencies of exchange (N=111)
Regular exchange 29% (32)
Event-triggered 9% (10) 
On request, as needed 16% (18)
Unclear 46% (51) 
Source: Adapted from Gerlak et al. 2011.
While, however, we observe a growing trend for data and information exchange, 
we also find that only 29 per cent of agreements call for regular exchange of 
data or information; that is, with particular intervals defined, such as every 
six months or annually (Table 3).  It appears, therefore, that states prefer 
unclear, event-triggered, and on-request exchange mechanisms to regular data 
exchange.  This suggests a reluctance on the part of many states to formally 
legalise detailed schedules for exchange. Future research could therefore 
investigate the underlying causes or reasons for this hesitation around regular 
exchange and its implications for transboundary water management.
In conclusion, while our research suggests that states are increasingly engaging 
in data and information exchange in transboundary water agreements, we 
have uncovered a reluctance on the part of many states to legalise formal 
schedules for exchange. This ambiguity in terms of the frequency of exchange 
is consistent with earlier research on international water resources that suggests 
that states may intentionally design vague mechanisms related to data exchange 
in order to allow for greater flexibility in the face of resource uncertainty, or 
to serve domestic political purposes (Fischendler 2008).  While it may have 
political benefits, this level of ambiguity may also trigger questions over the 
meaningfulness of irregular data and information exchange, and require closer 
examination from both academics and water policy decision-makers.
Andrea K. Gerlak is the Director of Academic Development with the International 
Studies Association and Policy Associate with the Udall Center for Studies in 
Public Policy at the University of Arizona. 
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12. Opening the black box of river 
basin organisations 
Susanne Schmeier
Mekong River Commission (MRC)–Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) Cooperation Programme, 
Vientiane, Laos
During the past decades, research on the governance of internationally shared 
river and lake basins provides ample evidence that cooperation can prevail 
over conflict (Wolf 2007; DeStefano et al. 2010). Scholars have also been able 
to provide comprehensive explanations for why and under which conditions 
agreements on shared watercourses are signed and river basin organisations 
(RBOs) emerge (Song and Whittington 2004; Dinar 2007).
The mere existence of RBOs does not, however, necessarily ensure that water-
related problems in a shared basin will be solved, nor that the resources of the 
basin will be managed in a sustainable way. Instead, reality shows that some 
RBOs have been able to effectively govern their basin while others have failed, 
or have made limited contributions to the solution of water-related challenges. 
In some river basins governed by RBOs, key problems of collective action have 
been addressed successfully. In the Danube and the Rhine river basins, for 
instance, the activities of the respective RBOs have significantly contributed to 
improving the water quality of the rivers. In other basins, however, challenges 
remain in spite of the existence of the RBO — such as in the Mekong River Basin, 
where the Mekong River Commission (MRC) is struggling to address conflicts 
over the use of the river and, in particular, the consequences of unilateral 
water use projects. And yet in other basins, the activities of an RBO might 
have addressed some water resources governance challenges, but also caused 
additional ones. A promiment example is the Senegal River Basin, where joint 
water resources development projects have been established in order to boost 
the economic development of the members of the Organisation pour la Mise en 
Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal (OMVS), but have led to unexpected environmental 
and social impacts.
While there are a number of potential explanations for such variation in the 
effectiveness of river basin governance, most often focusing on the nature of the 
basin itself as well as more general relations among riparian states (see, among 
others, Marty 2001; Hensel et al. 2006; Dinar 2009), I suggest that it might 
be the RBOs themselves that matter. That is, the way RBOs are designed and 
operate as institutionalised forms of cooperation can also be expected to have 
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a major influence on water resources governance outcomes. Hence, it is time to 
open the black box of RBOs. Only understanding the design of RBOs and its 
effect on their capacity to respond to challenges of water resources governance 
will enable us to design institutions that will be able to effectively govern shared 
watercourses.
In order to understand the design of RBOs, and thus build a basis for the analysis 
of its influence on river basin governance, I propose to differentiate between 
two institutional design categories:
• the organisational set-up of RBOs, representing the RBO’s infrastructure and 
consisting of its member states/its inclusiveness, its functional scope, its 
legal bases and water law commitments, its organisational bodies and the 
role of its secretariat or executive body as well as its financing sources, and
• the  water resources governance mechanisms  the RBO provides, including 
decision-making, information-sharing, monitoring or dispute-resolution 
mechanisms, as well as means for including non-state actors into its river 
basin governance activities.
Understanding the impact of RBO design on water resources governance 
requires, as a next step in analysis, a basic understanding of how existing RBOs 
encompass the aforementioned design characteristics. Since research on the 
design of RBOs is limited and rarely goes beyond comparative case studies, I have 
embarked upon establishing a baseline for the institutional design of all RBOs 
governing internationally shared watercourses (119 in total; see Schmeier 2013). 
This mapping exercise provides a comprehensive picture of institutionalised 
river basin governance. 
Looking at the membership structure of RBOs — one of the most obvious 
institutional design features — reveals that the number of member states varies 
considerably across RBOs, ranging from bilateral RBOs, such as the International 
Boundary Commission between Canada and the United States, to RBOs with a 
large number of members — up to 14 in the case of the International Commission 
for the Protection of the Danube River, or 11 in the cases of the Niger Basin 
Authority and the Nile Basin Initiative respectively. Even more importantly, 
RBOs also vary with regard to their inclusiveness; that is, whether they include 
all riparian states to a basin or a subset of them only.
Similarly, RBOs vary with regard to their functional scope and the issues they 
cover. While water quantity and quality are the issues addressed most often 
by RBOs, other issues such as hydropower management, irrigation, or river-
based tourism are less commonly tackled by RBOs. In addition to issue coverage, 
the baseline scoping exercise has also indicated that RBOs tend to adjust and 
often expand their functional scope in order to integrate into their work newly 
arising exogenous challenges, such as climate change. Several RBOs, including 
the International Lake Constance Conference, the International Commission 
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for the Protection of the Rhine, and the MRC, have recently included climate 
change in their functional scope and initiated a number of related river basin 
governance activities.
For the second category of institutional design features, the river basin 
governance mechanisms of an RBO, the analysis has shown that dispute-
resolution mechanisms vary considerably. While some RBOs lack pre-defined 
mechanisms for solving emerging disputes among their members, others rely 
on mechanisms that are outdated (such as the reference to the Commission of 
Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration of the Organization of African Unity 
which ceased to exist after the replacement of the organization by the African 
Union), leaving few RBOs with readily available mechanisms for addressing 
disputes among their members.
As indicated by the aforementioned examples, the baseline analysis has shown 
that RBOs vary considerably in their design. Accordingly, we can expect that 
such design features will have an influence on whether and to what extent an 
RBO can govern a river basin sustainably and effectively.
The baseline analysis on the institutional design of RBOs provides an 
important starting point for future research that investigates the relationship 
between their design and their performance governing the river basin with 
which they have been entrusted — especially in light of exogenous conditions, 
which are often expected to determine whether and to what extent RBOs 
can be successful in river basin governance. Most importantly, such further 
research and the detailed investigation of how institutional design matters 
and which features are most likely to make a difference can also inform policy 
makers about how to reform existing RBOs and design newly emerging ones. 
Opening the black box of RBOs can thus contribute to sustainably governing 
internationally shared water resources — even under adverse exogenous 
conditions — by providing concrete advice for policy action and thus the pro-
active governance of water resources in shared basins through institutionalised 
cooperation among riparian states.
Dr Susanne Schmeier’s research focuses on governance of shared water resources 
and the role institutions play in building resilience to environmental change in 
internationally shared rivers and lakes. Schmeier currently works as a Technical 
Advisor to the Mekong River Commission (MRC) in Vientiane, Lao PDR. She 
can be contacted at Schmeier@transnationalstudies.eu.This article is based 
on a research project conducted from 2008 to 2012. Findings are published 
in Schmeier, 2013, Governing International Watercourses, Routledge. Data on 
the design of all 119 international RBOs is available at the Transboundary 
Freshwater Dispute Database, http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/
database/index.html.
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13. The agreement on the Guarani 
Aquifer: Cooperation without conflict
Pilar Carolina Villar 
Federal University of São Paulo, Brazil
Wagner Costa Ribeiro
Federal University of São Paulo, Brazil
The Guarani Aquifer System (GAS) is a transboundary aquifer that encompasses 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay (Figure 1). It covers an area of 1,100,000 
square kilometres within the Paraná Sedimentary Basin. In August 2010, the 
four states signed the Agreement on the Guarani Aquifer, which is the first 
shared-management agreement for a transboundary aquifer in Latin America.
The agreement on the Guarani Aquifer is unique in many ways: 
• it was the first signed under the influence of the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution A/RES/63/124 (2008): the Law of 
Transboundary Acquifers
• there are no regional conflicts over the use of its waters because the aquifer 
has been the subject of cooperation initiatives since the 1990s 
• a range of actors have participated in these initiatives, including regional 
academic research networks, governments, international organisations and 
private companies.
This paper analyses the legal and geopolitical context that prompted the 
signing of the agreement on the Guarani Aquifer and evaluates its potential 
for preventing future conflicts and deepening cooperation between states. The 
research used qualitative analyses of results from the GAS Project (IW-Learn 
2013), Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) documents (MERCOSUR 2001, 
2004, 2009), international rules related to water resources (UN 1997, 2011), the 
agreement on the Guarani Aquifer (GAA 2010), and relevant literature (Eckstein 
and Eckstein 2003; Jarvis et al. 2005; Feitelson 2006; Zeitoun and Mirumachi 
2008; Laborde 2010; Sindico 2010; McCaffrey 2011; Villar and Ribeiro 2011).
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Figure 1: Guarani Aquifer
Source: World Bank/GWMATE.
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The construction of the GAS cooperation 
process
Science played an important role in the cooperation process. The regional research 
community was responsible for recognising the transboundary character of 
the aquifer and the need to promote awareness regarding the matter. Indeed, 
academic researchers organised the first international meetings and projects 
concerning the aquifer. These efforts to gather funds for more ambitious projects 
attracted the involvement of national governments and a range of international 
organisations, such as the World Bank and the Organization of American States.
The alliance of these actors enabled the Environmental Protection and Sustainable 
Development of the GAS Project. This project was the most ambitious groundwater 
initiative in South America. The six-year project (2003–9) increased awareness of the 
GAS’s characteristics and stimulated debate on groundwater management within 
the four countries at national, provincial, and community levels.
Parallel to the execution of this project, the MERCOSUR, included the Guarani 
Aquifer in its agenda. An Ad-Hoc High-Level Group was created in 2004 with 
the objective of drafting a shared aquifer-management agreement between 
the parties (World Bank/GW MATE 2009).  The MERCOSUR Parliament also 
proposed: (i) the formation of a commission to study, analyse and compare 
each country’s water-resource legislation; (ii) an agreement for the common 
management of the GAS and a transitional project assuring the continuity of the 
GAS Project structure; and, (iii) the establishment of a regional Research and 
Development Institute for the Guarani Aquifer and other aquifers shared by the 
states (Villar 2010).
Unfortunately, none of the MERCOSUR proposals were realised. Many factors 
contributed to this: the institutional fragility of the Mercosur Parliament, 
constant tensions within the bloc over trade relations, disagreements over the 
acceptance of new members, and the failure of the regional trade architecture to 
address conflicts over the construction of pulp mills on the Uruguay River. In 
this context, states decided to follow a more traditional approach and establish 
an international agreement.
The agreement on the Guarani Aquifer
The agreement on the Guarani Aquifer (see Amore 2010; República Argentina, 
República Federativa del Brasil, República del Paraguay and República Oriental 
del Uruguay 2010a, 2010b) follows the main guidelines of the UNGA Resolution 
A/RES/63/124 (the Law of Transboundary Acquifers), especially in relation to 
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the following principles: sovereignty, the equitable and reasonable use of water 
resources, the obligation not to cause harm, cooperation, and the exchange of 
data and information.
Mention of the sovereignty principle in the UNGA Resolution A/RES/63/124 
and the subsequent emphasis in the Guarani agreement (preamble and articles 
1, 2 and 3) were much criticised. McCaffrey (2009, 2011)   and McIntyre 
(2010) point out that the reaffirmation of this principle is inconsistent with the 
spirit of cooperation and equitable use, since states can appeal to sovereignty 
as a protective shield for imprudent, inadequate, or illegal actions. Improving 
cooperation, however, requires the promotition of dialogue between sovereign 
states. An important starting point is for all parties to feel secure in their rights. 
As Laborde (2010) explains, the sovereignty principle merely restates the well-
established principles of international law and ensures safeguards for the 
aquifers, thus preventing the aquifer from being considered a ‘common good 
of mankind’.
Equitable and reasonable use of water was included in Article 4 of the Guarani 
agreement which determines that states:
shall promote the conservation and environmental protection of the 
Guarani Aquifer System so as to ensure multiple, reasonable, sustainable, 
and equitable use of its water resources.
The obligation not to cause harm is stated in Article 6:
Parties that perform activities or work for utilizing the water resources 
of the Guarani Aquifer System, in their respective territories, shall adopt 
all the necessary measures to avoid causing significant harm to the other 
Parties or the environment.
By these means the agreement reaffirms the two major principles of international 
water law (i.e., equitable and reasonable use, and the obligation not to cause harm).
Cooperation is one of the strong points of the agreement and appears in many 
articles, such as 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, and 14. These statements foresee the need 
to exchange information on water resources and the right to seek additional 
information. Notably, articles 8 and 12 seek to build on the foundation provided 
by the GAS Project:
The Parties shall proceed to adequately exchange technical information 
about studies, activities and works that contemplate the sustainable 
utilization of the Guarani Aquifer System water resources. (Article 8)
The Parties shall establish cooperation programs with the purpose of 
extending the technical and scientific knowledge on the Guarani Aquifer 
System […]. (Article 12)
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Article 12 also reaffirms the obligation to provide information in the case of 
activities or works which could have transboundary impacts. Articles 9 and 10 
further codify this issue:
[…] information shall be accompanied with technical data available, 
including results from an evaluation of environmental effects; so that, 
the Parties receiving the information could evaluate the potential effects 
of the activities and work. (Article 9)
Each Party shall provide the appropriate data and information required 
by other Party, or Parties with respect to the projected activities and 
work in their respective territory that may have effects beyond their 
boundaries. (Article 10, 2)
Finally, Article 15 states that a dedicated multilateral Commission will oversee 
the cooperation process. Unfortunately, the countries have yet to establish 
it and determine its statutes, competences, members and budget. Desirable 
objectives for the Commission would be: leadership in disseminating and 
producing knowledge about the aquifer; harmonisation of legal instruments, 
such as wellhead protection areas and groundwater permits; establishment of 
methodological guidelines for a groundwater database; and, coordination of a 
common groundwater informational system.
As the agreement makes no mention of the recharge areas of the aquifer 
with higher natural vulnerability that are more likely to create conflicts, the 
Commission could take the lead in designing a common strategy to manage 
these areas, especially the ones within or very near the frontier zone.
In case of conflicts over the use of the Guarani Aquifer, the Commission would 
be in a position to present recommendations. Article 17 affirms:
If through direct negotiations an agreement is not reached within a 
reasonable period, or if the dispute is only partially resolved, the Parties in 
the controversy shall, through mutual agreement, solicit the Commission 
related in Article 15 to, upon a presentation of the respective positions, 
evaluate the situation and, if appropriate, formulate recommendations.
According to this Article, however, the Commission will still have a restricted 
role because its participation has to be evoked by the Parties through mutual 
consent and its intervention has no binding consequences. If the countries can’t 
reach an agreement after this procedure, Article 19 mentions the possibility of 
an arbitration procedure which would be defined by a future protocol.
Despite the progress in developing the Guarani Agreement, its power remains 
limited and further action is required. At the international level, states have to 
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yet ratify the agreement, establish the Commission and its powers, and propose 
an additional protocol setting the dispute resolution mechanism. At the national 
level, all Parties need to improve groundwater management and monitoring.
Although much work remains, considering the absence of conflicts over the 
GAS, the fact that four countries managed to structure a common base for 
groundwater management is a considerable achievement. As Delli et al. (2009) 
explained, preventative diplomacy is usually the best way to prevent disputes, 
but it is hard to prove this statement due to the lack of practical initiatives. 
Without tensions it is hard to mobilise actors, interests and resources.
Literature highlights the value of conflicts to create cooperation. But the GAS 
case calls attention to the role of scientific and international organisations in 
promoting conditions to create common arrangements based on a precautionary 
approach, since there are no transboundary conflicts over the use of the 
aquifer or water scarcity. The mobilisation of different stakeholders over the 
Guarani Aquifer, the end of the GAS Project, and the approval of the UN Law 
of Transboundary Aquifers created positive pressure to deepen the cooperation 
process over the GAS and sign this unique regional agreement. The challenge 
now is to continue this process beyond the initial momentum and ratify and 
implement the treaty, particularly through the creation of an effective and 
empowered Guarani Aquifer Commission.
Pilar Carolina Villar is Professor of Environmental Law in the Federal University 
of São Paulo (UNIFESP). 
Wagner Costa Ribeiro is Professor of Geography at the University of São Paulo and 
Resarcher at Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico – 
CNPq. This article is partly based on material from ‘The agreement on the Guarani 
Aquifer: a new paradigm for transboundary groundwater management?’, Water 
International 36(5):646–60.
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14. The Brahmaputra: Water hotspot 
in Himalayan Asia
Robert G. Wirsing
Georgetown University, Qatar
Analysts around the world increasingly have their eyes on the Brahmaputra River, a 
transboundary watercourse with headwaters in the Tibetan Plateau of the Himalayan 
mountain range. The three riparian states sharing the Brahmaputra — China, 
India and Bangladesh — are the world’s first, second and seventh most populous 
countries. All three face severe problems of water scarcity and steeply rising demand 
for power generation. The possibility of serious resource conflict involving these 
demographic giants stems from plans, some already being implemented, to put the 
river’s thus-far relatively unexploited waters to greater use.
The combination of burgeoning populations, rapid economic growth and 
intensified global competition for energy resources is putting increasing emphasis 
on hydropower. India, already the world’s sixth largest energy consumer, ranks 
seventh globally (2008) in current hydropower generation. Only about 20 per 
cent, however, of India’s hydropower potential has been developed thus far. 
With its untapped potential standing at 95 per cent, the importance of the 
Brahmaputra is clear.
In 2010 China consumed 20 per cent of the world’s primary energy supplies, 
overtaking the United States to become the world’s largest energy consumer. 
With its installed hydropower capacity reportedly having reached 213,000 
megawatts by the end of 2010, it was by far the world’s leading producer of 
hydroelectricity. It plans to lift the proportion of non-fossil fuel use in the 
country’s energy sector to 15 per cent by 2020, and half of that is expected to 
come from hydropower. That means that China aims to have 430,000 megawatts 
of hydropower capacity hardly a decade hence, the equivalent of one new Three 
Gorges Dam each year over the current decade. Given the overall vast leap in 
anticipated energy consumption, this converts to a major surge in hydroelectric 
dam building.
China is now predictably casting its eyes on the Brahmaputra’s hydropower 
potential on China’s side of the border. According to Tibet researcher 
Tashi Tsering, China has already constructed ten dams on tributaries of the 
upper Brahmaputra, with three more under construction, seven more under 
consideration, and yet eight more proposed (Tsering 2010). Those dams already 
built are small in scale and, since none are on the Brahmaputra itself, have 
stirred little interest outside China. China’s plans, however, apparently include 
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building five major dams directly on the Brahmaputra mainstream. Completion 
of construction on the first of them, the US$1.18 billion 510 megawatt Zangmu 
hydropower project in the middle reaches of the river, is expected by 2014.
More worrying yet, from the the perspective of India, is the possibility that 
China’s aggressive search for promising hydropower dam sites in Tibet might 
ultimately drive Beijing to focus on the so-called Great Bend in the Brahmaputra, 
the point in the Himalayas where the river curves south onto India’s Assamese 
plain. It was reported in May 2010 that research had indeed been carried out for 
a massive project at the bend (Watts 2010). Tsering (2010) predicts that China 
is likely to construct a 38,000 megawatt hydropower station and large storage 
dam near Motuo and, if built, ‘China will gain significant capacity to control the 
Brahmaputra’s flow. Basically, India will become dependent on China for flow of 
what is now a free-flowing international river’ (Hindustan Times 2010; see also 
Rafferty 2010).
Diversion of the Brahmaputra’s waters is another — and much more portentous 
— potential use. Planned diversion of this river’s waters from India’s water-
surplus north-east to drought-stricken western and southern states, though at 
least temporarily on hold, is the key to India’s River Linking Project (RLP). 
China’s diversion plans, on the other hand, are lodged in the mammoth and 
already underway South-North Water Diversion Project (SNWDP). If proposals 
to include the Brahmaputra in an extended version of the still pending western 
route of the SNWDP were implemented, the consequences for downstream 
India and, even more so Bangladesh, might be disastrous.
China’s southern belt has historically been a water surplus region while its 
north and north-west have been increasingly water scarce. According to a 
recent article in the Economist, this disparity has become alarming. ‘Four-fifths 
of China’s water is in the south’, it reports, but ‘half the people and two-thirds 
of the farmland are in the north … .’ At least as alarming, it says, is the problem 
of water pollution: a recent study of the Yellow River and its tributaries, for 
instance, concluded that a third of the water, with about 4000 petrochemical 
plants feeding into it, was unfit even for agriculture. In fact, many of China’s 
rivers are simply disappearing: since the 1950s, overexploitation by farms or 
factories has driven down the number of rivers by nearly half — from about 
50,000 to 23,000 (Economist 2013).
A similar pattern of spatial variability in water supply also exists in India, where 
the north and north-east regions have been water surplus, while large portions 
of its west and south are water scarce. About 62 per cent of annual freshwater 
availability in India is found in the river basins of India’s north leaving about 67 
per cent of the country — mainly its west and south — with water availability 
of about 38 per cent (Kumar 2005).
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Chinese and Indian hydrologists have naturally been giving attention to the 
prospects for water diversion — for transferring major quantities of river water 
from south to north in China, from north to south in India. China launched the 
massive SNWDP in 2001; India gave official sanction to its equally massive RLP 
in 2002.
It is, of course, where Indian water-diversion plans meet up with China’s that 
transboundary concerns emerge; and it is the distinct possibility that they may 
meet up on the Brahmaputra that is currently exercising the imaginations of the 
region’s strategic analysts.
Unknown presently is whether India’s RLP will ever get off the ground. Also 
unknown is whether the RLP, if fully implemented, will include the Brahmaputra 
in its Himalayan component. Clearly, however, India’s future diversion of the 
Brahmaputra’s waters remains a live possibility — even a probability should 
the more threatening projections of the country’s coming water scarcity prove 
correct. Moreover, should China move towards the Brahmaputra in coming 
years with an eye not just on hydropower but also on diversion, pressure on 
New Delhi to match Beijing’s with an aggressive plan of its own would likely 
become irresistible.
There is uncertainty with regard to Beijing’s plans. Official denials of Chinese 
plans to divert the Brahmaputra’s waters are common. Of late, however, there 
have been a number of proposals floated indicating China’s interest in diverting 
massive amounts of water to China’s arid north-east from the Brahmaputra’s 
middle reaches.
Brahma Chellaney, one of India’s foremost strategic thinkers, has argued that 
it is not a question of if, but when, China will go ahead with the proposed 
diversion of Brahmaputra waters to its parched north. And such a diversion, he 
warns, ‘would constitute the declaration of a water war on lower-riparian India 
and Bangladesh’ (Chellaney 2011).
The relations between India and China are driven, of course, by much more 
than water; and even water cannot be confidently said to be driving things 
relentlessly and unalterably in the direction of violent conflict between them. 
Still, China’s dire water circumstances, combined with its impressive economic 
strength, military power and uniquely advantageous upper riparian position, 
give us little reason for optimism when it comes to river-sharing agreements 
with lower riparian countries. India and China have recently signed an accord, 
updating earlier agreements, in which the Chinese consented to increase the 
supply to India of flood data of the Brahmaputra River (Hindu 2013). And the 
joint statement accompanying the accord did promise some greater transparency 
in regard to dams and water sharing on the Brahmaputra (Hindustan Times 2013). 
Aside from that, however, no major agreements currently exist between China 
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and India in regard to water sharing of the transboundary Brahmaputra; and 
one should not expect any grand cooperative interstate scheme to develop soon 
in regard to that river. On the contrary, mounting tensions and at least verbal 
skirmishing between China and India over the Brahmaputra’s contested waters 
seem more likely. There will surely be water woes impacting their relationship, 
in other words, even if water wars never materialise.
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15. Development
Bob Warner 
The Australian National University, Australia
The inclusion of targets for access to improved water and sanitation in the 
Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) reflected a clear appreciation in 
developing countries and their partners of the critical role that water and 
sanitation services play in people’s wellbeing. The costs incurred when people 
cannot acquire safe drinking water, or do not use hygenic sanitation practices 
are large: a recent World Health Organization (WHO) study estimated the global 
economic losses associated with inadequate water supply and sanitation to be 
US$260 billion a year, or 1.5 per cent of the GDP of the countries included in 
the study (WHO 2012). 
Typically, although not exclusively, it is the poor who have limited access and 
bear the bulk of these costs. Further, the majority of those without access live in 
rural areas — 89 per cent of those without access to improved water, and 70 per 
cent of those without improved sanitation (Sy et al. 2014). These factors mean 
that capacity to manage costs, and to take action to reduce the risk of incurring 
them, is limited.
The distillation of the water and sanitation challenge into two measurable targets 
has helped focus attention and attract commitment of financial resources to dealing 
with the issue. But it also risks masking the complexity of the problems associated 
with reducing the costs of using unsafe water and unhygenic sanitation. 
For water, some of the complexities arise because of the nature of water as 
an economic good and the need for societies to find ways of managing trade-
offs between alternative uses, as well as to address strong social expectations 
concerning access to a necessity of life. A further level of complexity arises 
because of the need for robust institutions: to devise and implement policy, to 
manage water resources, and to provide water-supply services to households.
These complexities can be challenging in developed countries, but they are 
exacerbated in developing countries by the constrained functionality of formal 
institutions that would underpin market solutions, and limited capacity of 
public sectors to provide water or to regulate provision. Property rights in 
general, not just with respect to water, are hard to define and protect, and the 
means to resolve disputes that cross communal boundaries are often absent or 
dysfunctional. This can constrain adoption of private and communal solutions 
that require scale to be viable (for example, where water needs treatment and 
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transmission and distribution structures). And in most developing countries, 
governments do not have the financial and managerial capacity (and in some 
cases the interest) to provide public sector solutions, or to implement policies to 
manage externalities associated with use of water resources. 
Typically, the majority of households in developing countries rely on private 
(including self-provision) and community initiative to meet their water 
needs. (A recent study of private water provision in Bangladesh, Benin and 
Cambodia, for example, estimated that only 11 per cent of the total population 
of these countries get their water from state-run systems, Sy et al 2014.) In 
the foreseeable future, this pattern is unlikely to change, especially for poor 
and rural households. Policy makers — and their development partners — are 
thus increasingly focusing on what is required to help ensure that private and 
communal provision delivers safe water, and that households are able to pay 
for it. Among other things, this requires understanding the market for water 
and the drivers of household demand, calibrating the enabling environment 
for private sector investment in water supply, and developing policies that 
address the ability to pay of poor households that often have seasonal or 
volatile cash incomes. 
Overview of chapters
In the development section of this volume there are six contributions that 
illustrate a selection of the complexities involved in addressing the water needs 
of poor people in developing countries, and ways in which new solutions may 
be emerging. Bain et al. (Chapter 16) show how the indicator used in the MDGs 
— which measures access to a water source that is likely to be protected from 
outside contamination — may give a misleading impression of the extent to 
which people are using water that is safe to drink. They argue that if the data are 
adjusted for water quality, a much higher proportion of the world’s population 
still lacks access to safe water than progress towards the MDG target implies. In 
a similar vein, Vedachalam (Chapter 17) provides evidence from urban centres in 
India that access to improved water sources does not necessarily translate into 
regular availability of safe water: constrained supply from improved sources 
drives households to augment piped supplies with other, less reliable water. 
He also argues that the sustainability of some improved water sources is under 
threat from depletion and contamination. Karim et al. (Chapter 20) examine the 
complex social effects that can arise if development projects and technology 
alter the balance between competing uses of water sources. Their paper explores 
the impact on within-household gender violence of the installation of deep tube 
wells for irrigation that reduce the ability of hand pumps to provide water for 
domestic purposes. Berg (Chapter 19) considers the challenges of regulating 
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state-owned water utilities, and the fact that regulation alone cannot sustain 
service delivery unless supporting insitutions and structures are in place. 
He proposes elements of governance and utility organisation that are pre-
conditions for good performance, without which external regulation is unlikely 
to achieve traction. And finally, Foster et al. (Chapter 18) look at the impact of 
the revolution in mobile communications in helping to solve one of the great 
challenges of water supply: facilitating payment and redressing the problem 
of cost recovery for both public and private water-service providers. Their 
analysis shows the importance of the opportunity cost of time to customers, 
and the costs to utilities of operating physical payment offices, and how the 
introduction of mobile bill payment services offer savings to both sides of the 
water service market.
Bob Warner is Director, Pacific Research Partnerships at the Crawford School of 
Public Policy. He was co-author of a recent World Bank Directions in Development 
publication, on provision of water and sanitation services to the poor by the 
domestic private sector. His email address is bob.warner@anu.edu.au.
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In early 2012 the United Nations announced that the drinking water target of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) had been reached in 2010: in two decades, 
and five years ahead of schedule, the proportion of people without sustainable 
access to safe drinking water had been halved (World Health Organization (WHO)/
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 2012a). Whilst this undoubtedly 
represents a major achievement, fundamental concerns regarding the monitoring 
of safe water have been gaining prominence (Harmon 2012).
The measure used to assess progress towards the MDG target is use of 
an  improved  source; these are water sources that were considered likely to 
provide safe drinking water (Table 1). Consequently, this approach is an 
assessment of specific types of water sources, rather than the quality of the 
water they provide. Improved sources do not always supply safe water due to 
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the presence of microbial or chemical contamination. In order to explore the 
scale of this discrepancy and how it might be addressed in monitoring, the 
Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) for Water Supply and Sanitation of WHO 
and UNICEF commissioned a number of nationally representative studies. These 
Rapid Assessment of Drinking-Water Quality (RADWQ) studies were conducted 
in Ethiopia, Jordan, Nicaragua, Nigeria and Tajikistan between 2004 and 2005.
Table 1: The Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) classification of source 
types into improved and unimproved
Source class Types of source included
Unimproved drinking water 
sources
Unprotected dug well, unprotected spring, cart with small 
tank/drum, surface water (river, dam, lake, pond, stream, 
canal, irrigation channels), and bottled water.
Improved: Piped into 
dwelling, plot, or yard
Piped water connection located inside the user’s dwelling, 
plot, or yard.
Improved: other sources
Public taps or standpipes, tube wells or boreholes, protected 
dug wells, protected springs, or rainwater collection.
Source: WHO/UNICEF 2012b.
In recent work (Bain et al. 2012), we sought to determine how these data on 
water-source quality would affect assessments of progress towards the 2015 
MDG target in these countries. We adjusted reported coverage estimates for the 
following water quality parameters: thermotolerant coliform bacteria, arsenic, 
fluoride and nitrates. Accounting for compliance with the WHO Guidelines 
for Drinking-Water Quality for these parameters substantially lowers estimates 
of ‘safe’ water use in four of the five countries (see Figure 1). In Ethiopia and 
Nigeria, the countries with the largest populations, the adjustment represents 
an additional 8.9 and 22 million people without safe water in 2008. Across the 
five countries, the adjustment reduces reported access by 32 million people — 
a sizeable difference when compared to the 70 million that have begun to use 
improved water sources in these countries between 1990 and 2008.
The RADWQ studies show marked differences between countries, not only in 
the extent of the adjustment, but also in the likelihood of particular supply types 
being contaminated. Although there are some general trends in water quality 
between supply types, this is not consisent between countries. For example, 
in Nigeria boreholes were more likely to be compliant (86 per cent) than piped 
supplies (77 per cent), whereas in Ethiopia the reverse was the case (66 per cent 
versus 80 per cent respectively). As these data highlight, there remains a need 
for substantial improvement of ‘improved sources’.
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Figure 1: Estimated percentage of the population using safe drinking 
water in 1990 and 2008 in five countries and the MDG target for 2015, 
by indicator 
Source: Bain et al. 2012. Reproduced with permission of the World Health Organisation (ID: 125807).
Studies in a number of other countries also highlight the discrepancy between 
improved water sources and the provision of water that is free of chemical and 
microbial contamination. For example, a preliminary study shows the Chinese 
population that gained access to safe water between 1990 and 2010 is at most 
330 million, whereas 457 million people are reported by the JMP as having 
gained access to an improved source during the same period (Yang et al. 2012).
The compliance rate of improved sources is also known to vary considerably 
within countries; for example, between urban and rural areas or socio-economic 
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groups. In related work (Yang et al. 2013) we combined data from the RADWQ 
studies with contemporary information from household surveys in the five 
countries to investigate socio-economic disparities in access to safe water. We 
found statistically significant differences in water quality between the poorest 
and richest households in Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Nigeria, even though we 
were unable to account for differential safety of sources of the same type. We also 
investigated differences in access to safe water by wealth quintile for users of 
the same type of supply using two household surveys that included measures of 
water quality. Whereas data from Bangladesh showed little difference in arsenic 
contamination between poor and rich borehole users, piped supplies used by the 
richest in Peru were considerably more likely to have adequate levels of chlorine 
residual (>0.1 parts per million) than those used by the poorest. Although this 
provides only a partial and indirect indication of microbial contamination, the 
results are consistent with a more recent study in Peru (Miranda et al. 2010) 
that found the absence of an adequate chlorine residual to be more common 
in drinking water used by low-income households and in rural areas. The 
study also found similar patterns in the presence of total coliform or E. coli and 
provides compelling evidence of persistent disparities in water quality between 
urban and rural areas as well as income quintiles.
The magnitude of the problem globally has also been estimated. Given that 
nationally representative water quality data are only available through RADWQ 
for five countries, and that results vary greatly between countries, this exercise 
requires a range of assumptions and may be imprecise. When water quality 
is incorporated, however, global estimates of those without safe water range 
from 1.8 to 1.9 billion (Payen 2011; Onda et al. 2012; Wolf et al. 2013) — over 
a quarter of the 2010 world population and more than double the reported 
population not using improved sources.
The majority of the studies described above, including the RADWQ studies, have 
assessed water quality as the point of collection and have been based on sampling 
at a single timepoint rather than regular monitoring. They may not, therefore, 
reflect the quality of the water at the point of use; water quality can deteriorate 
due to handling practices during transport and storage, but may also be improved 
by treatment in the home (Wright et al. 2004). One-off sampling may overestimate 
yearlong safety since water quality can vary seasonally (Wright et al. 1986) and 
infrequent sampling may miss contamination events. Further research is required 
to understand how the safety of supplies varies throughout the year and what 
factors are the most important determinants of safety. 
There is a great need to improve sector monitoring, including safety. Proposals 
prepared by expert working groups for the JMP recommend monitoring an 
‘intermediate’ service level after the exprity of the MDGs (UNICEF/WHO 
2013). The intermediate service level would include accessibility, continuity of 
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supply as well as accounting for water safety (provisionally defined as <10 E. 
coli per 100 millilitres throughout the year). This would represent a substantial 
improvement on the current practice of monitoring ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ 
(Bartram 2008). There are, however, many challenges that need to be overcome, 
not least of which is establishing the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of water 
quality surveys in countries with limited data. 
This work shows that interpretation of the MDG indicator as a surrogate for safe 
water can lead to substantial overestimates of the population using safe drinking 
water and, consequently, may also overestimate the progress made towards the 
2015 MDG target. The current indicator does not adequately capture differences 
in safety between countries and does not reflect disparities in safety within 
countries. Whilst progress has been made, adjusting for water quality shows 
that much of the world’s population still lacks access to safe water. 
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Professor Stephen Gundry directs the Water and Health Research Centre at the 
University of Bristol. 
Dr Jim Wright is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Southampton. 
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where he works on water pollution and aquatic environment change. 
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17. Water supply and sanitation in 
India: Meeting targets and beyond
Sridhar Vedachalam
Cornell University, United States 
Target 7C of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) calls for halving the 
proportion of the population (baseline 1990) without sustainable access to safe 
drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015 (United Nations (UN) 2000). A large 
developing country like India is critical to meeting this target. Even though the 
MDGs set out to measure and reduce the population without sustainable access 
to safe water and sanitation, difficulties have been encountered in measuring 
‘safe’ and ‘sustainable’, which have led to a revision of the target to achieving 
access to improved sources of water and sanitation (Zetland 2008). It has been 
argued that the revised goals grossly overestimate the access to safe water and 
sanitation (Bain et al. 2012; Satterthwaite 2009).
Table 1: Population (per cent) of India with access to improved sources of 
water
Year Urban Rural Total
1990 88 63 69
1995 90 70 75
2000 93 77 81
2005 95 83 86
2010 97 90 92
Source: World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 2012a.
Table 1 shows the distribution of India’s population with access to an improved 
drinking water source. By 2010, 92 per cent of the population had access to an 
improved source of water, which brought down the proportion of the population 
without such access from 31 per cent in 1990 to eight per cent in 2010 (WHO/
UNICEF 2012a). If Target 7C of the MDG (improved water access) were to be 
applied on a country-level basis, India has already surpassed the target well 
before 2015.
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Table 2: Population (in percent) of India with access to improved sources 
of sanitation, and no sanitation
Year
Improved No sanitation
Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total
1990 51 7 18 28 91 75
1995 53 10 21 25 86 70
2000 55 14 25 22 79 63
2005 56 19 30 18 73 57
2010 58 23 34 14 67 51
Source: WHO/UNICEF 2012b. The proportions of the population with access to improved sources and 
no sanitation do not add up to 100 percent. The remaining population has access to unimproved sources.
It is a somewhat different story, however, on the sanitation front. Table 2 
shows the proportion of the population with access to an improved source of 
sanitation, and those that lack any source of sanitation and have to use open 
defecation. Though the proportion of the population with access to improved 
sanitation nearly doubled in the last 20 years, a majority of the population 
still does not have access to any sanitation and has to resort to open defecation 
(WHO/UNICEF 2012b). The five states of Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, 
Jharkhand and Odisha — largely rural and located in the central and eastern 
parts of the country — have less than 30 per cent access to a sanitation source 
(International Institute for Population Sciences and Macro International (IIPS) 
2007). It appears that India is likely to miss Target 7C of the MDG (improved 
sanitation access), and any hope of achieving the target by 2015 rests on the 
progress made in these five large states.
Access to water and sanitation also involves issues of gender and caste. In 2005, 
only half the population had access to water on the household premises, and 
12 per cent spend 30 minutes or longer daily to get water for the household 
(IIPS 2007). Of the households that don’t get water on premises, adult females 
are responsible for fetching water in 81 per cent of the families. Even among 
children below 15 years of age, girls are four times more likely than boys to 
be responsible for collecting water (IIPS 2007). Beyond gender, Indian society 
also has an uncomfortable history with caste discrimination that is relevant 
to sanitation access: lower castes have been traditionally entrusted with 
occupations such as collecting human/livestock waste.
These underlying traditions show up in the data as well. The states with the 
highest rates of access to sanitation (except the capital region of Delhi) are the 
eight north-eastern states and the southern state of Kerala, all of which are 
known for an egalitarian society (Milner 2009; Subramanyam and Subramaniam 
2011). Additional analysis of the sanitation data by income quintiles reveals 
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that the poorest 40 per cent in India have hardly benefited from improvements 
in sanitation. The poorest quintile is 47 times more likely than their richest 
counterpart to practice open defecation, a disparity three times greater than 
that observed in Africa (Brocklehorst 2010).
Table 3: Status of water supply and wastewater treatment in the six 
largest cities of India 
City
Water supply Wastewater
Capacity 
(MLD)
Hours 
per day
Consumption 
(LPCD)
Unaccounted 
(%)
Generated 
(MLD)
Treatment 
capacity 
(MLD)
Bangalore 965 4 34-44 772
Chennai 198 4 20 158 264
Delhi 4346 4 78 26 3800 2330
Hyderabad 578 0.5-4 96 33 462 593
Kolkata 1625 9 116 30-40 706 172
Mumbai 3000 5 90 18 2400 2130
Source: McKenzie and Ray 2009; Shaban and Sharma 2007; Central Pollution Control Board 2009.
Although urban areas of the country fare better than their rural counterparts 
on water and sanitation access, a larger and denser population, coupled with 
dwindling natural sources of freshwater pose unique challenges to large cities, 
such as Bangalore, Mumbai and New Delhi. Table 3 shows the status of water 
and wastewater infrastructure in the six largest cities in India. Though the 
major cities reported an increase in the service coverage between 1991 and 1997 
(Ruet et al. 2002), the availability of water supply ranges from four hours or less 
per day in Delhi, Bangalore and Hyderabad to nine hours in Kolkata; and 18 
per cent (Mumbai) to 50 per cent (Kolkata) of the urban water is unaccounted 
for (McKenzie and Ray 2009). A household study conducted in seven cities in 
India found the average per capita consumption of water to be 92 litres per 
capita per day (LPCD), below the World Health Organization (WHO) guideline 
of 100 LPCD for optimal access (Shaban and Sharma 2007). Further analysis of 
the data by socio-economic quintiles shows that water consumption increases 
with a rise in socio-economic status, although the inter-quintile differences are 
not significant. The near-uniform water consumption across different income 
groups is largely a result of supply constraints and is not impacted by varying 
economic abilities (Shaban and Sharma 2007).
These numbers raise doubts about whether access to improved water sources 
translates to regular availability of safe water. Residents in several Indian cities 
augment their piped supplies with private wells and other informal methods, 
such as private tankers (Srinivasan et al. 2010). The use of groundwater for 
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residential as well agricultural consumption is driving down water tables in 
many parts of the country, especially the agricultural bread-baskets of Punjab 
and Haryana (Rodell et al. 2009). Continued groundwater depletion can result 
in an inability to meet residential needs, reduced agricultural productivity and 
increased conflict over water rights.
Additionally, the lack of wastewater treatment capacity in cities like Delhi and 
Kolkata (Central Pollution Control Board 2009) threatens public health and the 
safety of already-scarce freshwater resources. A discussion on water security 
is incomplete without planning for adequate infrastructure for wastewater 
treatment. Not only does it allow for better management of available water 
resources, treated wastewater can be an additional source of freshwater in water-
deficient regions (Vedachalam 2012).
Even though India has reported tremendous progress towards achieving the 
MDGs for access to water, the revised targets do not necessarily mean continuous 
and safe access to water, not to mention economically affordable water. Even large 
cities that boast higher rates of access are able to guarantee little water for a few 
hours a day, imposing health, economic and social costs on the residents. The 
Indian economy loses 73 million working days a year due to waterborne diseases, 
caused by a combination of lack of clean water and inadequate sanitation (DFID 
2010). Access to sanitation, even more so than water, is a robust indicator of 
human development due to the complex role played by social, institutional and 
cultural factors (Vedachalam 2011). Low rates of access to sanitation underscore 
lack of action on several fronts, only some of which are due to lack of financial 
resources. Targeted investments in communities and individuals (Gupta 2012), 
along with institutions, will allow India to expand and ensure safe access to 
water and sanitation to all its residents well beyond 2015.
Dr Sridhar Vedachalam is a Postdoctoral Associate at the New York State Water 
Resources Institute at Cornell University. His research involves analysing water 
and wastewater infrastructure issues, such as planning, financing, use and 
regulation. He received his PhD in environmental science from The Ohio State 
University. He can be contacted at sv333@cornell.edu. 
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The revolution in Africa’s mobile communications sector offers new opportunities 
to address the continent’s enduring water service challenges. Over the past 
decade, mobile phone subscriptions in Africa have grown to over 620 million 
and, by 2013, more Africans will have a mobile phone subscription than access 
to an improved water source.
Juxtaposing the rapid upsurge in mobile phone ownership is the slow progress 
being made towards the water access Millenium Development Goal (MDG). 
Between 1990 and 2008, the number of urban Africans lacking access to safe water 
more than doubled from 25 million to 52 million (World Health Organization 
(WHO)/United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 2010). Many water service 
providers (WSPs) are unable to meet the needs of a rapidly growing population 
as they remain trapped in a vicious cycle of poor operational performance and 
low cost recovery.
A key contributor to this spiral of decline is under-collection of water bills, 
which costs the urban water sector in Africa almost US$500 million a year — 
equivalent to 0.07 per cent of the continent’s GDP. Around one in five urban 
households with a piped connection fails to pay for water, while recent World 
Bank analysis suggests more than half of African utilities collect revenue from 
fewer than 50 per cent of their customers (Bannerjee and Morella 2011).
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Figure 1: Opportunities for expansion of mobile water payments: mobile 
money deployments in Africa to 2011
Source: Authors’ research.
In an effort to turn around their ailing financial positions, many WSPs are 
teaming up with mobile network operators (MNOs) to enable customers to pay 
their water bills using ‘mobile money’.1 Since 2009, at least 35 WSPs in east 
and southern Africa have launched a mobile bill payment service in concert 
with global MNOs including Safaricom/Vodacom, Airtel and MTN. In order 
1 Mobile money is an electronic payment system that enables money transfers to and from an electronic 
account that can be accessed via an ordinary mobile phone. Each customer’s account is linked to their 
mobile phone number by means of an in-built SIM-card application. Physical cash withdrawals and deposits 
are facilitated by a network of retail agents. While configurations vary across providers, the viability of 
mobile money is premised upon the cost base associated with an agent network, which is lower and more 
flexible than establishing ‘bricks and mortar’ bank branches. Mobile money can therefore profitably extend 
the reach of financial services to those who have traditionally been unbanked, such as low-income or 
remote households. The scale and growth of the opportunities for mobile water payments is demonstrated 
by Figure 1, which displays mobile money deployments in Africa to 2011.
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to ascertain the implications of this trend, our team conducted a four-country 
study that examined mobile water payment deployments across Kenya, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Zambia (Hope et al. 2011).
For the WSPs that we investigated, mobile payment adoption rates range between 
one and ten per cent of customers (Table 2). In terms of transaction volumes, 
the National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC) in Uganda leads the way 
with 23,000 customers transferring US$300,000 worth of revenue via mobile 
phone each month. The notable exception to the otherwise low levels of uptake 
is Kiamumbi, a small peri-urban community on the outskirts of Nairobi, where 
three quarters of the customer base have switched to the mobile payment option.
Table 1: Mobile water payment adoption rates for studied WSPs
Country WSP
Mobile 
network 
operator
Served 
population
Mobile 
payment 
adoption
Months 
since 
launch
Kenya
Nairobi City WSC Safaricom 2,250,607 4% 13
Kisumu WASCO Safaricom 181,512 8% -
Nanyuki WSC Safaricom 57,252 1% 1
Kiamumbi WT Safaricom 2,922 76% 11
Tanzania
Dar es Salaam Airtel
2,380,000 1% 27
WASCO Vodacom
Uganda National WSC
MTN
2,426,502 10% 7
UTL
Zambia Lusaka WSC Airtel 1,285,270 - -
Source: Hope et al. 2011.
In order to ascertain the benefits, motivations and barriers relating to customer 
adoption of mobile water bill payments, we conducted a household survey of 
water users in Kiamumbi. Time savings (98 per cent) and cost savings (63 per 
cent) emerged as the key reasons why customers opt to pay bills by mobile phone 
(Figure 2). On average customers switching to mobile payments save 80 minutes 
a month, with women being the main beneficiaries. Of the numerous socio-
demographic, wealth and water-service satisfaction indicators we subjected 
to logistic regression analysis, full-time work status emerged as a statistically 
significant predictor of mobile payment usage. This finding points to the 
importance adopters place on being able to pay bills outside of business hours.2
2 The results from the survey however fail to unravel why Kiamumbi adoption rates are so much higher than 
elsewhere in east Africa. Some possible explanations include: (a) a longer than average trip to the alternative 
pay point; (b) a wealthier than average community placing a high value on their time; (c) a high degree of trust 
in the operators due to the scheme’s strong operational performance, small size and community-orientation; 
and, (d) the high water tariffs which reduce the relative size of the mobile payment fee as a percentage of the 
overall bill.
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Figure 2: Time and cost associated with bank trips are keys drivers behind 
the adoption of mobile water payments in Kiamumbi
Source: Hope et al. 2011.
Across other large east African WSPs we examined, it is clear there are systemic 
obstacles hindering large-scale use of the mobile payment option. The first 
relates to customer perceptions of the integrity and trustworthiness of an 
electronic billing system. Deployments in Kenya, for example, lack a mechanism 
for automatically updating the WSPs billing system immediately upon receipt 
of a mobile payment, fuelling customer fears that last minute payments will 
not be recognised until after the generation of disconnection lists. Similarly, 
across all four countries, we noted a general unease associated with conducting 
a transaction that fails to produce a physical receipt, which has traditionally 
been an unambiguous proof of payment and defence against disconnection. In 
a number of the study locations there was a lack of awareness of the mobile 
payment option, suggesting greater marketing and promotional efforts are 
needed. Finally, transaction tariffs levied by MNOs on customers (which can 
be as high as US$0.30 per payment) are in some cases prohibitive, particularly 
those tariff structures that penalise low-income households for paying bills in 
many small instalments.
Where the above-mentioned constraints are released, mobile payments offer 
considerable benefits for both water users and service providers. For WSPs, 
operating physical payment offices is costly — utilities need to cover ongoing 
expenditure relating to rent, labour, insurance and cash transportation. The 
NWSC estimates its new electronic billing system will save US$420,000 per 
year as a result of pay point closures. Moreover, electronic billing will lower 
the risk of administrative error and misappropriation, in turn building greater 
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consumer trust and willingness to pay. Perhaps most importantly, the increased 
convenience of bill payment is likely to drive an increase in revenue collection 
ratios. In Kiamumbi, for example, those using mobile payments are now ten per 
cent more likely to pay by the bill payment deadline than their counterparts 
paying at the bank. Results from Kiamumbi also illustrated the time and 
cost savings that mobile bill payments can generate for customers (Figure 3). 
Replicating these productivity gains across other urban centres in Africa will 
lead to significant social and economic benefits.
Figure 3: Indicative transaction costs for those taking a trip by public 
transport to pay water bills
Source: Hope et al. 2011.
With the mutual benefits that mobile water payments afford, this revenue 
collection mechanism can help provide the circuit-breaker that many 
African utilities seek to escape the vicious cycle of low cost recovery and 
poor operational performance. Ultimately, it is hoped this will translate into 
more reliable water services for customers and network expansions for the 
unserved. Technical and pricing innovations could also unlock mobile payment 
solutions that can directly benefit low-income, unconnected water users by 
eliminating profiteering operators from standpipes and providing a more secure 
and transparent mechanism in which rural communities can store funds for 
waterpoint maintenance. Yet, despite the significant potential, mobile water 
payments are only an instrument for transferring and storing money. Ultimately, 
the scale of the impact will depend upon the institutional, financial, operational, 
and regulatory responses that put this tool to good effect.
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19. Good governance for state-owned 
water utilities
Sanford V. Berg
University of Florida, United States
Two decades ago, many industry observors thought that private investment in 
water utilities would re-mediate and expand water systems in the developing 
world. Many (if not most) utilities are, however, still owned by nations, states, 
or municipalities. In many nations, water regulators were established to provide 
some ‘comfort’ to capital markets that pricing decisions would be based on 
financial sustainability rather than short-term political needs. Those oversight 
agencies are now, however, faced with the challenge of regulating another 
government entity: a publicly owned water utility that often depends on 
infusions of funds from the national treasury, donors, or a municipal government. 
A fundamental lesson that emerges from a recent survey (Berg 2013) of 
developing countries is that sector regulation must be embedded in an adequate 
and consistent institutional framework in order to have a positive impact 
on performance. Sector regulation, by itself, is no guarantee of performance 
improvements in the drinking water supply and sanitation sector. Case 
studies and empirical analyses suggest that, without significant changes in the 
supporting institutions, the standard tools of regulation will not be effective. 
This conclusion is disturbing, especially for developing countries, since it means 
that the establishment of a regulatory agency might raise hopes, but ultimately, 
the agency’s rules are unlikely to improve performance without additional, 
politically difficult initiatives.
As stated by an industry observer, ‘to have effective regulation, you must have 
utilities that can, in fact, be regulated’. The problem boils down to getting a 
broader set of institutions to support regulatory and managerial actions that 
promote good sector performance (Body of Knowledge on Infrastructure 
Regulation (BoKIR) 2012). This means getting the governance structures right 
(rules of the game) and the substantive actions right (play of the game). For 
example, Uganda’s successful performance was embedded in a reform process 
that involved ‘regulation by contract’, not external regulation by an autonomous 
agency (Mugisha and Berg 2008).  The United Nations  Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) report (Berg 2013) identified the 
following elements that promote success for state-owned and municipal utilities:
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• Independent directors: The role of the utility’s board of directors is a topic 
that is under-studied, yet it surely belongs on the list of issues warranting 
greater attention. If those monitoring and evaluating management (on behalf 
of the owners; i.e., the nation or the municipality) are driven by political 
concerns, they will tend to have a short-term view of outcomes: keep tariffs 
low, ‘do not rock the boat’ and leave technical management alone since ‘they 
know best’. Certainly, regular interference by directors is to be avoided: 
let managers do their job. If business plans and executive performance are 
not monitored, however, then the board’s governance responsibilities are 
abrogated. Little is known about the selection process, retention and other 
aspects of the boards of state-owned water utilities (assuming that they are, 
indeed, corporatised). Best practice suggests, however, that having respected 
representatives of different professions (for example, law, engineering, 
business and accounting) can promote healthy discussions and more careful 
reviews of management performance (Vagliasindi 2008). Note that if board 
members primarily come from (and return to) the realm of politics, they are 
likely to be more concerned with future political opportunities (and so will 
tend to be ‘captured’ by those making the appointments).
• Managerial commercial orientation: If the utility is fully embedded in a 
ministry or within a municipality, the likelihood that its managers will have a 
commercial orientation is reduced. A focus on cost-containment requires that 
financial sustainability be emphasised rather than (current) social concerns, 
since future performance will be weak if the utility acts like a charitable 
organisation. This point runs counter to the orientation of many water 
utilities. Yet waving the flag of ‘social needs’ over utility operations does 
not justify the inefficiencies that characterise many state-owned enterprises 
and municipal water utilities. In fact, those who speak loudest on behalf of a 
‘social orientation’ are often the same ones who appoint politically connected 
individuals to positions of responsibility in utilities: managers who lack the 
expertise and professionalism required for making sound business decisions.
• Clarity of roles: Within the utility, each job description requires careful 
consideration. An organisational chart is only useful to the extent that it 
reflects actual interactions. If the enterprise consists of silos that hardly 
interact (for example, engineering and sales) then customer orientation 
becomes subservient to political infighting. Promoting interactions and 
learning among different units contributes to improved performance.
• Coherence among objectives: If managers have not prioritised objectives, 
there is likely to be inconsistency in decision-making. Keeping tariffs low is 
one popular objective, but it is inconsistent with expanding service coverage 
to the poor (unless a donor or government provides funds consistently over 
time). Thus, there is a clear need for a business plan that reflects reality. 
Similarly, a customer orientation promotes community and trust and supports 
the legitimacy of the water utility activities.
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• Internal performance incentives: Uganda’s National Water and Sewerage 
Company utilised incentives to meet targets (Muhairwe 2009).  A strong 
case can be made that incentives and information are the cornerstones of 
good performance — both require that governance systems monitor trends 
over time and that boards take action when there is weak performance. 
Executives manage what they measure. One objective of a benchmarking 
study is to measure productivity and efficiency so that the analyst can make 
comparisons: productivity considers the link between utility inputs and 
outputs. Efficiency is related to productivity, but it involves establishing a 
standard and determining how close the firm comes to meeting that standard: 
how far is the utility from ‘efficient practice’?
• Integrated information system: Data represent the raw material for 
decision-making. Investment decisions cannot be made in a vacuum. 
Maintenance requires an asset registry and information about reported 
leaks and customer complaints. Multi-period information on operations 
and financial conditions is essential for sound decision-making. Retaining 
historical data provides analysts with the opportunity to identify trends and 
conduct more robust statistical analyses. When managers make investment 
and operational decisions, they need to be clear about the objectives of 
the project, the techniques being used and the level of detail required 
for the dataset. The absence of such specificity limits accountability and 
diminishes organisational learning.
• Business plan: The combination of objectives, past outcomes and expected 
revenues, costs and other outlays serves as the basis for a business plan. 
Customer usage data and population growth can be used for forecasting 
likely future demand. Business plans serve as reality checks for decision-
makers: are the cash flows reasonable and will the operational and expansion 
targets be met under current financial constraints? Will quality of service 
be improved under the business plan? This element of utility governance 
reinforces the need for a commercial orientation and for trained engineers 
and managers who can develop a sound business plan.
• Staff participation: Staff engagement is important for setting goals and 
developing incentives. Staff support requires that they have input into 
the business plan, performance incentives, and other aspects of utility 
operations. A top-down approach is not an effective way to run a complex 
organisation where information is widely diffused, and those in closest 
contact with customers and operations need to have a voice in how things 
are done. Given the potential importance of political appointments to the 
management of an organisation, there can be a lack of continuity within the 
regulatory agency. Also, staff training and capacity building may be given 
inadequate attention by top management.
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These elements of governance and utility organisation lead to decisions that 
improve a utility’s performance. Advocates (and incentives) for efficiency 
are crucial. Sound engineering is necessary, but not sufficient for improved 
utility performance. That means that governance within water utilities must 
be addressed (including selection of CEOs and boards of directors via non-
patronage routes), just as external oversight of water utilities (sector regulators 
and government ministries) needs to be improved. Institutions matter — perhaps 
even more than money. As Rodriguez et al. (2013) emphasise, ‘simply financing 
more water infrastructure and services — from public or private sources — 
will not solve the problem. Changing how the money is budgeted, targeted and 
executed is the proper place to start.’
Dr Sanford Berg earned his PhD in Economics from Yale University. His research 
has focused on infrastructure industries: the role of research and development 
in determining the basic industry conditions and the role of public policy 
in determining sector performance. Berg has examined the role of network 
industries in economic growth and the promotion of innovative approaches 
to improving water sector performance. He is the co-author of Natural 
Monopoly Regulation: Principles and practice (Cambridge University Press). He 
has published more than 100 articles on infrastructure issues, joint venture 
activity and innovation. A recent publication is Water Utility Benchmarking: 
Measurement, methodologies, and performance incentives (International Water 
Association Publishing, 2010). His email address is sberg@ufl.edu.
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The global water crisis has affected women and men in different ways. There is 
evidence that millions of women as a result carry a double burden of disadvantage 
from the water crisis (Wallace and Porter 2010; United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) 2006).  In many instances, water development projects and 
water privatisation restrict women’s access to water, further increasing their 
burden (UNDP 2006; Brown 2010).  In rural Bangladesh, women are primarily 
responsible for domestic water use and men are mainly engaged in irrigation 
(Jordans and Zwarteveen 1997).  Technology-intensive water development 
initiatives have, however, largely emphasised irrigation, thus facilitating men’s 
water needs at the expense of women’s (Sadeque 2000; Chadwick and Datta 1999).
Gendered roles and marital violence in rural 
Bangladesh
Marital male violence against women is widespread in rural Bangladesh. A recent 
study showed that almost 62 per cent of married women were subject to either 
physical or sexual violence by their husbands (García-Moreno et al. 2005). Women 
are not, however, abused randomly. Researchers mention many cases of wife 
battery being used as a punishment for failing to fulfill gendered household 
obligations (Baden et al. 1994; Bhuiya et al. 2003). In a recent study we explored 
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the implications of a groundwater development project on women’s workload and 
their exposure to marital violence (Karim et al. 2012). Fieldwork was conducted in 
a northwest Bangladesh village between July 2004 and July 2005.
The water development project
Groundwater was the only reliable source of water in the vicinity of the study 
village. There were three means of lifting groundwater: deep tube-wells (DTWs), 
shallow tube-wells (STWs) and hand pumps. DTWs and STWs are operated by 
motorised pumps and are exclusively used for irrigation, whereas shallow hand 
pumps are used for domestic purposes. In the dry season, however, only a few 
hand pumps lift water because of a lowering of the groundwater table (Jordans 
and Zwarteveen 1997).  The project facilitated DTW-based irrigation, which 
contributed to an increase in the area’s agricultural productivity; however, 
many households faced a domestic water shortage in the dry season because the 
extra irrigation further lowered the groundwater table.
Gender roles, dry season water crisis and 
women’s workload
Women’s water needs were mostly related to their domestic obligations, whereas 
men’s water needs were mostly related to irrigation. The study estimated that, 
on average, a woman spent seven hours and 25 minutes daily on domestic water-
related work, but a man spent only 19.2 minutes. In the dry season, to fulfill their 
obligations, women had to walk to distant wells, which resulted in an increase of 
their domestic workload (see Table 1). A number of women (15.1 per cent) also 
faced severe difficulties in fulfilling their obligations because of the extra time 
spent collecting water (see Table 1). Therefore, the development project actually 
reduced the ability of women to fulfill their normative gender role.
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Table 1: Survey of dry season water shortage, increased workload and 
women’s difficulties
N Frequency Percentage
Households with domestic water 
shortage
196 87 44.4
Women’s water-collection time 
increased
185* 102 55.1
Women’s water-related workload Mean (%) Range
Normal water collection time 
(minutes/trip)
185 14.35 (7.63) 02–35
Dry season water collection time 
(minutes/trip)
185 18.75 (10.4) 02–45
Extra water collection time in the dry 
season after project (minutes/day)
185 20.6 (22.57) 00–90
Extra water collection time following 
the water development project 
(minutes/day for affected women)
102 37.4 (17.14) 14–90
Women’s difficulty in fulfilling 
obligations
Extra time spent (mins/day) N=185 (%)
0 <30 30–59 ≥ 60
No/little 77 26 8 0 111 (60.0%)
Moderate 6 10 30 0 46 (24.9%)
Severe 0 1 11 16 28 (15.1%)
Source: Authors’ research; adapted from Karim et al. 2012. *11 households that did not have any female 
members who carried out water-related work were excluded.
Women’s obligations, increased workload, and 
marital violence
Data indicated that women were obliged to unconditionally obey their husbands. 
A 36-year-old woman exemplified this obligation: ‘but I made a mistake, as I 
argued with him … .’ The interviews also indicated that women were expected 
to manage time. A woman who had experienced violence said that it occurred 
as a punishment for failing to fulfill her household duties. It also illustrates how 
the lack of water contributed to make the situation worse:
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I went to fetch water … It took a long time because there was a long line 
… but when I came back, I saw that the man was home. He asked me 
to serve lunch … . I replied that it took a long time to collect water (as 
our nearest three hand pumps had dried out). But he said that it was my 
problem if other women can cook on time for their husbands! So when I 
told him to go to see the deep (DTW) … he got angry and started beating 
me … I did not argue anymore; rather I went to cook …
The other informants supported a perception of marital violence being very 
common and justified, for a range of reasons such as burning the food while 
cooking, not having washed the husband’s clothes, or not making palatable 
food. Because the water crisis meant that women had to walk to distant wells, 
sometimes several times in a day, it directly challenged the basic gendered norm 
system and increased the possibility of socially justified violence.
Conclusion
The water development project largely facilitated men’s irrigation water needs 
by installing DTWs. Irrigation water became available all year, whereas the 
domestic water supply decreased. Many women thus walked to distant wells for 
domestic water collection, which increased their workload. This challenged their 
possibilities of fulfilling household obligations, thereby increasing the risk of 
normative marital male violence against women as a punishment for their failure.
In a patriarchal social context, a gender-blind water development project may 
have severe negative consequences on the lives of many women. We suggest 
that any water sector projects (e.g., irrigation, fisheries, or health and sanitation 
projects) should take women’s contextual gendered roles and obligations and 
social aspects of marital violence into account. Before implementation, there is 
a need to explore how the development project may influence or be influenced 
by social norms that determine the relationship between men and women. 
At the same time, it is important for development interventions to challenge 
the existing gendered norm systems and to initiate a discussion within the 
community on gendered roles, rights and obligations.
Dr K.M. Rabiul Karim is Associate Professor in the Department of Social Work 
at the University of Rajshahi. This article is based on an article first published 
in Health Care for Women International titled ‘Water development projects and 
marital violence: experiences from rural Bangladesh’. For more information, 
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21. Energy
Jamie Pittock
The Australian National University, Australia
Energy and water resources are critical for human wellbeing, but measures to 
secure their supply are inextricably linked and often conflict (Pittock 2011). 
Common to these resources is the need to supply a growing and wealthier 
global population while sustaining environmental health and responding to 
climate change. The following chapters explore key links between sustainable 
management of water and energy supply.
Energy
Currently the world’s energy is overwhelmingly sourced by combusting fossil 
fuels, a process that emits dangerous levels of greenhouse gases. Thermal 
electricity generators, including fossil fuel and nuclear power stations, require 
large volumes of water for steam generation to drive turbines, as discussed 
by Byers (Chapter 22) and Spang (Chapter 23). To mitigate climate change 
and increase energy self-sufficiency, there is great interest in low-carbon and 
renewable energy sources. Many renewable energy generators, however, also 
consume large volumes of water (Gerbens-Leenes et al. 2008). First-generation 
biofuels consume (transpire) an order of magnitude more water than other 
energy sources. Evaporation from reservoirs makes hydropower another thirsty 
energy source. Solar thermal power stations and geothermal generators may 
also require a lot of water, depending on the technologies used. While wind 
and solar photovoltaic technologies use little water directly, the deployment 
of these intermittent generators may require energy storage technologies or 
complementary sources that do consume significant volumes of water, such as 
hydropower.
Natural gas may be a ‘transition fuel’ that emits less carbon per unit of energy as 
our societies work out how to decarbonise our energy supplies. The combination 
of new technology and desire to source low-carbon energy domestically is driving 
the rapid expansion in exploitation of unconventional gas resources globally. 
This is exemplified by the debate over development of a shale gas industry in 
India, as outlined by Biswas and Kirchherr (Chapter 25). These resources include 
shale and coal seam (coal bed methane) deposits that are accessed by drilling, 
dewatering relevant geological structures and hydraulic fracturing (fracking). 
Water resources may be impacted by dewatering of aquifers and pollution from 
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some types of fracking fluids, well blowouts and disposal of production water, 
as discussed by Hildebrand et al. (Chapter 24). This example highlights the risk 
that well-meaning policies in one or a few sectors, such as energy and climate 
change, may have perverse impacts on sectors like water if they are not managed 
well. Hence future energy policies will depend on adequate consideration of 
water management (Hussey and Pittock 2012).
Water
Water resources are unevenly distributed around the world. A growing portion 
of the world’s people live in water-scarce areas that are naturally dry, or where 
increasing populations reduce the per capita share. Around a third of the world’s 
people lack access to improved sanitation services and a sixth do not have adequate 
drinking water supplies. In most cases there are technological interventions that 
can supply water to people, and the global water community has concluded that 
lack of funding (economic water scarcity) and poor governance are the main 
barriers to more sustainable management (World Water Assessment Programme 
(WWAP) 2009). Water requires a lot of energy to move and can require a lot of 
power to purify. From a positive perspective, reducing water demand can also 
reduce energy consumption. However, as water becomes more scarce, or polluted 
and requiring of treatment, or where the sources of water supply are diversified 
as an adaptation to climate change, then the energy required to secure supplies 
increases. The high energy consumption of desalination plants exemplifies this 
trade-off (Pittock et al. 2013). Better practices may bring positive synergies, for 
example, use of wastewater treatment to generate energy (Byers, Chapter 22).
Further, as freshwater ecosystems are the most species-rich per unit area, 
one consequence of the growing exploitation of water resources is a loss of 
biodiversity. Ecosystems services (such as fisheries) that millions of people 
depend on for their livelihoods are also diminished, as they are usually 
externalities in water infrastructure development decisions (Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) 2005). Orr (Chapter 26) (Orr et al. 2012) outlines 
a particularly stark example of hydropower development on the Mekong River. 
The dam developments are driven in part by China’s climate change mitigation 
policy and will seriously impact on freshwater biodiversity, and diminish the 
wild fish supply that is the main source of protein for the people of the lower 
Mekong. The research projects the significant land and water resources required 
to produce protein supplies to replace the fish lost to hydropower and highlights 
the risks of negative impacts from poorly considered sectoral policies.
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The nexus approach
The four following chapters, as introduced above, are examples of the energy–
water trade-off that, in recent years, has been dubbed a ‘nexus’ (Hoff 2011). Many 
other sectors are closely linked with energy and water and various international 
forums have been considering nexuses, including the links between climate, 
energy, health, food and water policies and practices. It is worth asking whether 
this nexus approach is just the latest piece of academic jargon, or whether it 
provides a useful, new way to better manage positive synergies and trade-offs 
across sectors?
Critics of the approach note that the various nexuses identified are subsets 
of and a possible distraction from the broader need to implement sustainable 
development. A further criticism is the anthropogenic focus of the current 
resources framing of these nexuses that largely excludes consideration of 
biodiversity and other aspects of environmental health. A contrary perspective 
of nexuses is that they enable focused debate between specific sectors that may 
otherwise be frustrated by the complexity of sustainable development writ 
large. This may enable identification of tractable solutions among a few sectors 
that have lessons for resolving other complex, multidisciplinary, multi-sectoral 
problems. The challenge for people applying the nexus approach is to move 
beyond naming problems by focusing on elucidating practical solutions. In one 
typology, the solutions that emerge from research on the energy–water nexus, 
and other nexuses, fall into four categories (Pittock et al. 2013): providing 
and drawing on information across sectors in decision-making; applying new 
technologies; using market-based mechanisms to reduce externalities; and, 
enhancing regulation and other forms of governance.
This contribution and the five following chapters highlight the trade-offs 
between energy supply and water consumption. Hopefully these writings will 
inspire readers to redouble efforts to identify positive synergies and find ways 
to minimise negative trade-offs between the energy and water sectors and, as a 
result, among a range of sectors that are vital for the wellbeing of people and 
the environment.
Dr Jamie Pittock is Senior Lecturer at Fenner School of Environment and 
Society and Director of International Programs for the UNESCO Chair in Water 
Economics and Transboundary Water Governance, The Australian National 
University.
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22. Water security at the energy 
crossroads
Edward Byers
Newcastle University, United Kingdom
Water, sanitation, and energy are undoubtedly keystone components of civil 
infrastructure that enable cities to support populations; they are the foundations 
of civilisation. The growth of megacities is, however, rapidly depleting water 
resources and leading to declining levels of water security across the world. 
Failure of critical infrastructure services, such as water and energy, can cripple 
a city in a matter of hours and leave millions vulnerable.
Yet that which is most dear to us is now often subject to complex interactions 
before we are able to access it. Energy is used for pumping, transport and 
treatment of water and wastewater; water is used through most stages of energy 
production and generation. But most of the resources used are non-renewable, 
often involve pollution and bring us closer to the planetary boundaries defining 
the safe operating space of humanity (Rockström et al. 2009). Should we continue 
propagating the interdependencies between energy and water or should, in 
some cases at least, we be working to decouple these two crucial resources?
In the current system, increasing demands on one usually means increasing 
demands on the other. But there are alternatives and, hence, water security 
finds itself at the ‘energy crossroads’ through the multitude of options available 
for alleviating scarcity issues; options which may use disparate levels of energy. 
On the other hand, water security also meets energy at the crossroads in a future 
that is partly governed by the water-intensity of future energy systems.
Increasingly, the analysis of water supply options is conducted considering 
the energy intensity of exploiting that resource. A variety of capital-intensive 
options to meet marginal demands may be evaluated, including desalination, 
wastewater recycling, inter-basin transfers and increased storage capacity. The 
uncertainties in the performance and utility of each option may, however, be 
large. These variabilities are driven by the energy sector and stem from variation 
in demand growth, energy price fluctuation and dependency on climate-
vulnerable water resources. These uncertainties, amongst others, present a 
challenge in predicting future operational expenditure, the majority of which 
is usually energy costs. In the United Kingdom, higher water-quality standards 
have resulted in a doubling of energy use since the 1990s, and this is set to 
rise (Council for Science and Technology (CST) 2009); lower river flows during 
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the more frequent droughts projected under climate change will require more 
stringent wastewater treatment as receiving bodies will have less capacity to 
dilute effluent (Hall et al. 2012).
Supply Energy intensity 
kWh/Ml
Source and notes
Conventional 500-900 Water UK 2010; Perrone et al. 2011. 
Variable on plant size.
Water recycling 2,500-6,500 Water UK 2010; Perrone et al. 2011. 
Depends on level of treatment, Primary, 
Secondary, Advanced.
Desalination Perrone et al. 2011; WRA (2011) 
Variable on water salinity and 
technology, and some of the energy 
demand can be met through waste heat 
or solar PV.
•  Brackish 9,500-22,000
•  Sea water 34,000100,000
Imported water 0.04 Derived from Sampson et al. 2007, 
into kWh/Ml/km distance/ ΣΔm positive 
elevation from source to treatment.
Figure 1: Ranges of energy intensity for different water supply options 
can vary by orders of magnitude. With depleted resources, however, 
energy intensive supply is increasingly competitive
Source: See table.
There is, however, great benefit in decoupling this nexus of water and energy 
use. One irony is that wastewater has a chemical energy content higher than 
the energy required to treat it, the former just needs to be harnessed (Heidrich 
et al. 2011).  Increasingly, anaerobic digestion (AD) is being deployed around 
the world in both high-tech and low-tech configurations. AD is the breakdown 
of biodegradeable matter in the absence of oxygen and can be used to treat 
both solid and liquid waste. Biogas is one of the main byproducts and consists 
mostly of methane, which can be burnt for electricity generation, heating or 
cooking. AD applications in developed countries will play a small part towards 
energy security and low carbon energy supply, whilst flipping the energy 
balance of wastewater treatment. In less developed countries, AD can provide 
a meaningful step towards proper sanitation and associated health benefits, 
whilst free biogas used for cooking drastically reduces indoor air pollution, a 
killer of 1.5 million women and children each year (World Health Organization 
(WHO) 2006).  Conversely, seawater desalination and long-distance transport 
and pumping, such as the California State Water Project and the Central 
Arizona Project, result in roughly ten times the energy intensity of conventional 
treatment facilities (Water Reuse Association (WRA) 2011)  due to the long 
distances, evaporation losses and changes in elevation.
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Figure 2: Freshwater abstractions by the energy sector are decreasing, yet 
the proportions remain substantial 
Source: EEA 2010.
In many countries, energy is produced by thermoelectric power stations on 
surface waters abstracting proportions of cooling water far exceeding those 
taken for public water supply and often matching agriculture (United Kingdom: 
56 per cent, United States: 41 per cent, Europe: 45 per cent; see Figure 2 for 
further details on Europe). Most is returned, but evaporative losses from cooling 
towers can reduce this amount by 75 per cent. Energy demands are growing, 
thermal efficiencies are not improving rapidly enough, and power plants with 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) increase water consumption in the order of 
80 per cent (National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) 2009). The strong 
prospects for shale gas and coal with CCS look set to lock electricity supply 
into another half-century of water-thirsty power plants. Even the fuels used 
require water for extraction and processing, leading to contamination. In recent 
years, thermoelectric nuclear and fossil fuel plants in the United States, Europe 
and China have faced output reduction and even shutdown due to low river 
flows and high water temperatures (Averyt et al. 2012; Pan et al. 2012 Economist 
2013), a problem that is expected to worsen with climate change (van Vilet et 
al. 2012). Alternatives to water-intensive energy supply do exist, mostly in the 
form of some renewables and more strategic siting of power stations and grid 
balancing. But in order to play the crucial role of increasing both energy and 
water security, the benefits of the options need to be recognised in planning 
processes, alongside caveats that may include lower efficiencies and higher costs.
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Capital investment projects in both sectors lock in decisions for decades 
that span considerable uncertainty. Short-term demand reductions and 
market mechanisms can ameliorate cross-sector risks, but the resource 
interdependencies will remain. Thus long-term planning that reduces critical 
resource interdependencies and improves performance under wide ranges of 
uncertainty, such as climatic changes or geo-political risks, is needed.
In its current state, the energy sector poses unacceptable risks to the public water 
supply and agriculture sectors that must be addressed with robust decisions 
encompassing sustainability, security of supply and affordability. Whilst the 
challenges facing each sector of the water–energy–food nexus are great in 
themselves, decision-makers must recognise the win-win-win opportunities 
that are presented by tackling them together, which are elegantly summed up 
by Wangari Maathai (2012), ‘Our planet is finite, our fates are intertwined, our 
choice is clear — stand together or fall divided.’
Edward Byers is a PhD student at the School of Civil Engineering & Geosciences 
at Newcastle University and Topic Editor, Energy of the Global Water Forum. 
His research focuses on UK infrastructure transitions in the water-energy nexus. 
He is affiliated with the Infrastructure Transitions Research Consortium and the 
Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research and can be contacted at e.a.byers@
ncl.ac.uk.
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23. A thirst for power: A global 
analysis of water consumption for 
energy production
Edward Spang
University of California, Davis, United States
Water and energy resource systems are fundamentally interrelated. Secure and 
reliable access to both resources is critical to basic survival, as well as ongoing 
economic development at all scales and in every region of the world. At the 
most basic level, water is required in the production of energy, and energy is 
required in the treatment and transport of water — a linked relationship known 
as the water–energy nexus. While both sides of the water–energy nexus merit 
attention for improving resource use, this research effort focuses on the water 
requirements of energy systems and the associated implications for national 
water security.
As competition for finite freshwater resources intensifies around the world, it is 
increasingly important to balance the demand for water across multiple sectors 
while also protecting ecosystems (Palaniappan et al. 2008). Understanding 
the water demand of energy systems is fundamental to overall national water 
security, since the production of energy requires significant quantities of 
freshwater. While agricultural demand dominates overall demand for water in 
many regions of the world (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO) 2003), the demand for water from the energy sector can 
be a major competitor. In the United States it is a relatively even split between 
water withdrawals for irrigating crops (40 per cent of total) and for cooling 
thermoelectric power plants (39 per cent) (Department of Energy (DOE) 2006). 
Further, the division between agricultural and energy-based demand for water 
is no longer straightforward as irrigated crops are increasingly being converted 
to biofuels in many regions (Gerbens-Leenes et al. 2009).
The quantity of water consumed by the energy sector varies substantially 
by the technology deployed for fuel extraction and processing (fossil fuels, 
nuclear fuels and biofuels) as well as electricity production (thermoelectric 
and renewable technologies). As a regional portfolio of energy production 
technologies changes or expands, there is an associated fluctuation in the 
burden on local water resources. Figure 1 represents a consolidation from the 
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literature of water consumption estimates for a variety of energy technologies 
(note that the estimates are provided in log scale to show variability within and 
across technology categories).
Figure 1: Water consumption coefficients for energy technologies (log scale)
Source:  Gleick 1994; Fthenakis and Kim 2010; Mekonnen and Hoekstra 2010;  Mielke et al. 2010; Macknick 
et al. 2011; Wu et al. 2009; National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) 2010; Mittal 2010.
Given the potential impacts of energy policy decisions on regional water 
security, the application of metrics to assess the water burden of national energy 
portfolios is underdeveloped. Most of the literature has focused on estimating: 
the water consumption of specific energy technologies (see sources listed for 
Figure 1); country-level or regional analyses of water consumption across a 
complete energy portfolio (DOE 2006; Elcock 2010);  or, a global analysis of 
water consumption by a single energy type (Vassolo and Döll 2010). A clear 
estimation of water consumption for complete national energy portfolios at the 
global scale does not, however, currently exist.
This research addresses this knowledge gap by synthesising and expanding 
previous work to develop a global distribution of water consumption by 
national-level energy portfolios. The water consumption for energy production 
(WCEP) indicator was defined and calculated to quantify the relative water use of 
158 national energy systems. WCEP is an estimation of freshwater consumption 
across all energy categories, including fossil fuels, nuclear fuels, biofuels and 
electricity production. Hydroelectricity is not included in the analysis because 
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its associated water consumption (often defined as the estimated evaporation 
from the reservoir) is only partially linked to energy consumption. The majority 
of dams serve multiple purposes, including the essential water security services 
of flood control and water storage (Briscoe 2009). An overview of the global 
results of the WCEP assessment is provided in map form in Figure 2.
Research results estimate global WCEP at approximately 45 billion cubic metres 
of water per year. Of course, there is high variability in the WCEP across the 
158 countries that were assessed (ranging from nearly zero to 12.6 billion cubic 
meters). As expected, larger countries with greater economic activity had 
the highest WCEP values. In terms of the per capita estimates for WCEP, the 
countries that were heavy producers of fossil fuel or biofuels demonstrated 
greater intensity of energy-based water consumption (see Figure 3). These 
results suggest that the economic imperative to develop fossil fuels drives higher 
WCEP, even in countries that lack sufficient water supplies. Meanwhile, biofuels 
require so much water that any national commitment to their production has 
significant water consumption implications.
While these results are based on a comprehensive review of currently available 
data, future research in this area could be significantly enhanced through better 
data and widespread adoption of consistent reporting mechanisms. Additional 
opportunities to expand the field include increasing the resolution of the study 
regions, characterising WCEP trends over time, and exploring innovative policy 
approaches to managing national WCEP effectively.
This research contributes an improved set of metrics to characterise the 
baseline conditions of integrated water–energy systems. By benchmarking 
water consumption for energy to standard measures, policy-makers can better 
understand and track the status of this coupled system. They are then able to 
set targets to minimise water consumption, or at least understand some of the 
water implications of particular energy policy initiatives. Given the critical role 
that the monitoring of greenhouse gas emissions has played in shaping energy 
portfolios, it is time to similarly incorporate water consumption implications 
into energy portfolio planning.
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Over the past decade natural gas has emerged as a versatile source of energy 
and has been described as a transition fuel. It has facilitated the shift from 
coal to renewable energy resources while helping reduce CO2  emissions and 
curtail the power sector’s production of industrial chemicals (Vidic et al. 
2013). Advancements in unconventional drilling techniques, such as hydraulic 
fracturing and shale acidisation, have made the extraction of natural gas from 
previously inaccessible deep shale formations both practical and profitable.
Hydraulic fracturing involves a pressurised injection of water, proppants and 
chemical additives to expand fissures or fractures in shale formation to release 
trapped gases. Acidisation uses large quantities of hydrochloric acid under 
low pressure to dissolve sediments and solids, which serves to increase the 
permeability of the shale formation.
Despite the effectiveness of these technologies in liberating sequestered natural 
gas, they are not without environmental risk and are a cause for concern in 
today’s society. Anxieties over environmental stewardship, in conjunction with 
the prospect of using natural gas as a catalyst in achieving energy independence, 
have provided the impetus for a number of investigations designed to characterise 
the relationship between unconventional gas extraction and groundwater quality.
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At the forefront of the unconventional natural gas extraction discussion are 
concerns over the potential migration of methane gas, the leaching of harmful 
chemical compounds and the mishandling of produced waste. Each of these 
can have potentially negative effects on the surrounding groundwater. In areas 
where deep shale formations co-exist with shallow aquifers, methane — the 
main component of natural gas — can leach into private water wells from both 
natural and anthropogenic processes (Vidic et al. 2013).
Methane occurs naturally in two forms, biogenic methane and thermogenic 
methane. Biogenic methane is produced at shallow depths as a byproduct 
of bacterial metabolism. Thermogenic methane, the primary target of 
unconventional natural gas extraction, is formed by geological processes at 
depths exceeding 1000 metres as a function of high temperature and pressure 
transforming decomposing organic material into methane gas.
Isotopic (Osborn et al. 2011) and hydrocarbon ratio (Jackson, R.B. et al. 2013) 
analyses have been used to determine the source of methane found in private 
water wells in the Marcellus shale of Pennsylvania. The majority of methane 
detected was characteristic of deep, thermogenic methane that could only 
have been liberated through unconventional drilling activities. Methane was 
detected in approximately 80 per cent of the collected samples (Osborn et al. 
2011) with concentrations reaching their highest levels in close proximity to 
natural gas wells. The root cause of methane contamination events could be 
attributed to the opening of fractures by unconventional drilling activities 
that allowed thermogenic methane to migrate into water wells from abandoned 
historical gas wells (Jackson, R.E. et al. 2013).
In the case of Pennsylvania, approximately 350,000 legacy oil and gas wells 
have been drilled and the exact locations of ~100,000 of these are unknown 
(Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection). Additionally, instances 
of methane and chemical contamination can result from gas-well casing failures, 
a phenomenon that occurs in approximately three per cent of new gas well 
operations (Vidic et al. 2013). Changes induced by hydraulic fracturing can also 
facilitate advective transport of fracturing fluid and flowback into groundwater 
aquifers depending on the hydraulic conductivity and the presence of water-
filled voids in the geological formation (Saiers and Barth 2012).
In addition to the aforementioned pathways where groundwater can be directly 
affected by unconventional drilling activity, our research team at The University 
of Texas at Arlington has examined the effects of unconventional natural gas 
extraction on groundwater quality and found evidence for indirect mechanisms 
that could potentially lead to groundwater contamination (Fontenot et al. 2013).
In a recent peer-reviewed study published in Environmental Science and 
Technology, our team sampled 100 private water wells to assess the potential 
effects of natural gas extraction on water quality in the Barnett Shale formation 
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of north Texas (see Figure 1). Our analyses revealed levels of heavy metals 
above the US Environmental Protection Agency’s Maximum Contaminant Limit 
(MCL) for drinking water in private water well samples collected near natural 
gas extraction sites. Most notably, 29 of the 91 samples collected within five 
kilometres of an active natural gas extraction site had arsenic concentrations 
above the MCL of ten parts per billion (ppb), with a maximum concentration of 
161 ppb.
Figure 1: Map of the Barnett Shale aquifer and the study area
Source: Reprinted with permission from Fontenot et al. 2013. Copyright 2013 (American Chemical Society).
The maximum concentration discovered in one well was nearly 18 times greater 
than both the maximum concentration sampled from private water well samples 
located more than 14 kilometres from any active gas wells and the maximum 
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concentration sampled from historical data collected in the Barnett Shale prior to 
the expansion of unconventional extraction activities (http://www.twdb.state.
tx.us/groundwater/data/). We also found selenium and strontium at elevated 
concentrations, with selenium detected exclusively within two kilometres of 
natural gas wells.
One plausible explanation for the observed results involves large withdrawals of 
groundwater used in hydraulic fracturing operations that could cause localised 
declines in the water table. Such decreases can be associated with higher 
arsenic content in waters drawn from shallow water wells (Reedy et al. 2007). 
Another scenario to explain elevated heavy metals could be the mechanical 
vibrations produced from unconventional drilling activity. In this scenario, 
vibrations from nearby intense drilling activity could mechanically disturb a 
poorly maintained private water well that has accumulated rust, sulfate and/or 
carbonate scale. Once the rust and scale in the water well are disturbed, arsenic, 
selenium and strontium that were previously bound in oxide complexes could 
be mechanically liberated and released into the well water (Fontenot et al. 2013).
Our understanding of the relationship between groundwater quality and 
unconventional natural gas extraction is evolving. Future studies should focus 
not only on direct mechanisms of contamination from unconventional drilling 
activities such as fluid and methane leaks, but also on indirect mechanisms that 
could potentially lead to groundwater contamination. Additionally, a greater 
emphasis needs to be placed on the collection of baseline measurements prior to 
unconventional drilling activities.
In highly productive regions like the Bakken shale formation of North Dakota, or 
the Barnett, Eagle Ford and Wolfcamp shales of Texas, drilling operators are not 
required to perform baseline testing, making the characterisation of potential 
industrial contamination events extremely difficult. California is one of several 
states that have proposed legislation where groundwater monitoring efforts 
would be required before and after any well stimulation, as well as proposals for 
procedures to safely recycle or dispose of produced and flowback wastewaters. 
Whether these proposed laws are established and become more widely accepted 
remains to be determined. Regardless, the collection of baseline measurements 
prior to any natural gas extraction is the most direct way to quantify the 
environmental effects of unconventional drilling activity, and will greatly 
enhance our understanding of the relationship between shale gas extraction 
and groundwater quality.
Dr Zacariah L. Hildenbrand received his BSc and PhD from the University of 
Texas at El Paso. He is currently a faculty Research Associate at The University 
of Texas at Arlington where he is a lead scientist and project manager for several 
research studies analysing groundwater quality in the Barnett and Cline shale 
formations. 
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Dr Brian E. Fontenot graduated with a PhD in quantitative biology from The 
University of Texas at Arlington in 2009. His past research focused on genetics, 
ecology and hybridisation in animals, but he currently uses his background in 
statistical analysis and experimental design as part of a team of researchers at 
The University of Texas at Arlington studying water quality in areas of natural 
gas extraction in the Barnett Shale formation. 
Doug D. Carlton Jr is a PhD student in the Department of Chemistry and 
Biochemistry at The Univesity of Texas at Arlington. 
Kevin A Schug is Associate Professor and Shimadzu Distinguished Professor of 
Analytical Chemistry in the Department of Chemistry and Biochemistry at the 
University of Texas at Arlington. He received his BSc degree in chemistry in 
1998 from the College of William and Mary and his PhD degree in chemistry 
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25. Shale gas for energy security in 
India: Perspectives and constraints
Asit K. Biswas
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Singapore
Julian Kirchherr
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Singapore
India lacks energy. In 2011, almost 300 million people — 25 per cent of the 
country’s population — had no access to electricity. Even 65 years after 
independence, only nine states — Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Goa, 
Delhi, Haryana, Kerala, Punjab, and Tamil Nadu — out of a total of 28 have been 
officially declared as electrified (British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 2012). 
But even in these so-called electrified states, power shortages and power cuts are 
often common. In July 2012, the worst energy blackout in a decade left more 
than 620 million Indians without electricity, and total energy demand currently 
outstrips supply by as much as 15 per cent.
Chronic energy shortages and unreliable supplies threaten India’s economic 
growth. For investors, continuous and reliable supplies of energy are essential 
requirements for any ventures. According to  estimates by HDFC Bank, the 
country’s chronic energy shortages have already slowed down GDP growth 
from 8 per cent to 6.5 per cent (Economic Times 2012). With accelerating energy 
demand, poor management, political and institutional inertia and bureaucratic 
constraints, India’s energy gap is likely to remain for at least the next two decades. 
Policy-makers are urgently seeking solutions to ensure that the economy is not 
starved of energy.
Shale gas in India
Shale gas is a possible solution and the Indian Government plans to exploit 
the country’s shale gas resources to address the country’s energy problems. 
In September 2013 a shale gas exploration policy was released allowing two 
state-run institutions, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation and Oil India Limited, 
to explore shale gas that was previously allotted to them on a nomination basis. 
During the next phase, the government may offer shale oil and gas blocks to 
other companies. 
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It has been estimated that India may have recoverable shale gas reserves of as 
much as 96 trillion cubic feet; the exact amount is still unknown (livemint 2012). 
Large reserves have been confirmed in Khambhat, Assam-Arakan, Gondawana, 
and Cauvery. Currently, gas accounts for approximately 11 per cent of the 
country’s energy mix, nearly half of energy consumed is generated from coal, 
followed by hydropower at 25 per cent.
Shale gas now receives attention in many countries of the world. The 
International Energy Agency (IEA) has even announced that the world could 
enter a ‘golden age of gas’ (2011). Indeed, shale gas has turned the US energy 
market on its head and the country is about to switch from being a gas importer 
to a major exporter.1 China, which is estimated to hold the world’s largest 
shale gas resources, aims to replicate this American success story, with plans to 
produce as much as 3500 billion cubic feet of shale gas annually by 2020.
Technological and hydrological constraints on 
shale gas development
While the excitement in India over shale gas is understandable, it may be 
premature for two reasons.
First, India lacks the technological capabilities necessary to access its reserves. 
Hydraulic fracturing, commonly known as fracking, is the sophisticated and 
complex technique by which shale gas is exploited. Currently, only North America 
— with its favourable geology — has been able to exploit shale gas commercially 
on a large scale. India would have to enter countless strategic and long-term 
partnerships with foreign governments and private sector companies to acquire 
these technologies and skills and adapt them to its specific geology. This will take 
time and is unlikely to be as straight-forward as its proponents suggest. 
Second, extensive exploitation of shale gas in India is likely to devastate the 
country’s water resources, offsetting any social benefit from increased energy 
production by worsening India’s water crisis. The main constraint in this regard 
is likely to be India’s failure to treat wastewater. Exploiting shale gas requires 
massive amounts of water  which becomes heavily contaminated during the 
exploitation process (Cooley and Donnelly 2012).  There is now considerable 
uncertainty over whether it is possible to cost-effectively recycle shale gas 
wastewater (Ferrar et al. 2013). Because the growth of the American industry 
has outpaced regulatory guidelines, it is not yet possible to test systematically 
1 The US shale gas industry  grew by 45 per cent per year between 2005 and 2010 (Economist 2012a), 
reducing the American gas price  from US$30.00 to as little as US$03.00 per million British thermal units 
(mBtu) (Economist 2012b).
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and objectively if the treatment has been sufficient or appropriate. It is known, 
however, that the exploitation of shale gas can lead to the migration of toxic 
injection fluids into water sources, which may later be used for drinking, and 
contamination of groundwater by released methane gas also entails a range of 
health risks.2
India is, sadly, a world leader in water pollution: the Holy Ganges contains more 
than 60,000 faecal coliform bacteria per 100 millilitres in many parts, which is 
120 times more than what is considered safe for bathing (Economist 2008). In 
most parts of the country, including the capital region Delhi, sewage is disposed 
of to nearby rivers without any treatment. This is because India lacks sufficient 
treatment capacity and, even where such treatment plants exist, their proper 
operation and maintenance practices have been often poor.
In a country with such a record of wastewater treatment, it may be unrealistic to 
expect that wastewater from shale gas exploitation would be adequately treated. 
Indeed, even in the United States, with its record of wastewater treatment, 
there have been many reports of improperly disposed toxic wastewater from the 
fracking process. If India acquired the necessary technology and expertise to 
exploit shale gas, it may still fail to treat the resulting wastewater. Such a failure 
may offset any energy gain. For India’s poor, clean water often may be more 
important than access to energy.
For fracking to be practiced widely in India, the country will also have to allocate 
significant new sources of water. At present, because of poor management of 
water, the country is facing serious scarcity of water in most regions (Biswas 
2011). The interstate disputes on water are already fierce and the water available 
in the country is already over-allocated. The groundwater levels in provinces like 
Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, Gujarat and Maharashtra are declining precipitously. 
There is not a single important city which can provide 24-hour water supply to its 
citizens. Since water is free or heavily subsidised, and there is significant political 
opposition to water pricing, widespread water conservation is an unrealistic 
proposition for the foreseeable future. Under these conditions, it is unlikely that 
India will be able to divert water to a new, intensive use like fracking.
Outlook
The global perception of shale gas and its potential is still evolving. Hence, 
India may take the wrong path if it attempts to exploit its shale gas resources 
without considering the serious and unintended consequences.
2 See Hildenbrand et al. (2014) in this volume for further discussion of fracking impacts on groundwater 
quality.
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India must first carefully reassess the size and value of its recoverable shale gas 
reserves and weigh the potential benefits against the risks, particularly those 
related to water. Only if sufficient reserves are available and more pressing policy 
challenges are faced, should India then continue to build up its technological 
shale gas capabilities. 
Notably, India has already started to emphasise addressing some of the relevant 
policy challenges, particularly improving energy use and water efficiency. Faced 
with looming water and energy scarcities, many major industrial concerns are 
changing their industrial processes and practices.3
Despite such positive trends, India’s energy and water problems will most 
certainly continue to increase if the aspirations and expectations of its people are 
to be met. For example, India is now already the fourth largest energy consuming 
country of the world, yet its per capita energy consumption is low and it will 
continue to increase for decades, irrespective of all conservation measures. The 
country has to focus on the difficult task of concurrently expanding its energy 
sources and increasing energy conservation. Proponents will likely continue to 
propose shale gas as an option to address the first of these challenges.
On the other hand, water has become an increasingly critical resource in the 
country, primarily because of poor management. During the campaign for the 
2014 general election, for the first time water has become a part of the electoral 
strategy of all the major parties. Thus, there is no question that current and future 
water scarcities mean widespread fracking, even if it was possible at present, is 
not a viable option. Furthermore, legal and administrative arrangements for the 
land acquisition required for fracking are more complicated in India compared to 
the United States, and there are also the aforementioned technological barriers.
In some ways, these constraints may prove to be a blessing in disguise for the 
country. The delay in solving the institutional, legal, land and water-related 
problems will take at least a decade to overcome. One hopes that during this 
period the country can assess carefully and objectively the economic benefits 
and social and environmental costs of fracking so that the right decision can be 
made for the future. 
Asit K. Biswas is the Distinguished Visiting Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew 
School of Public Policy, Singapore, and Founder of Third World Centre for 
Water Management. 
Julian Kirchherr is a former Research Associate at the Lee Kuan Yew School of 
Public Policy.
3 For example, between 1997–2012, Nestlé India reduced its water requirements to produce a tonne of 
product by 74.3 per cent, and energy needs by 65 per cent (Authors’ research). 
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26. Dams on the Mekong
Stuart Orr
WWF International, Switzerland
Recent research carried out by World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and 
The  Australian National University (ANU) reveals the indirect impacts of 11 
dams that are proposed to be built on the mainstream of the lower Mekong 
River (Orr et al. 2012). The study evaluates the volume of additional water (i.e., 
the water footprint) and area of land (i.e., the land footprint) that would be 
required for the four Lower Mekong Basin (LMB) nations to replace calorie and 
protein loss from changes in fish catches following dam construction.
The water footprint and agricultural land analyses presented in this study are 
based on the available data. While limitations on this data mean that the specific 
results may be contested, the research highlights the need for a more detailed 
understanding of the indirect consequences of the proposed dams in order to 
better inform decision-making.
Background 
A recent strategic environmental assessment (SEA) of hydropower on the Mekong 
mainstream concluded that such projects would have significant negative 
impacts on both the fishery and agricultural sectors (International Center for 
Environmental Management (ICEM) 2010a, 2010b). The losses in fisheries due to 
the mainstream dams were estimated to be US$476 million per year, excluding 
effects on the coastal and delta fisheries. In addition, the assessment found that 
54 per cent of all riverbank gardens along the Mekong would be inundated, 
which, combined with losses in agricultural land for reservoirs and transmission 
lines, was estimated to cost US$25.1 million per year.
Estimates of the freshwater fisheries catch in the LMB vary and, as such, WWF 
has relied on the most recent Mekong River Commission (MRC) assessments 
for the purposes of this research (Baran and Myschowoda 2009). On the basis 
of this data, the annual yield is estimated to be around 2.6 million tonnes, or 
two per cent of global marine and freshwater fisheries landings. The per capita 
freshwater fish consumption in the region is 33.7 kilograms per year, or around 
80 grams per person per day for each of the 60 million people in the basin. The 
economic value of the LMB wild migratory fishery is US$2.5 billion.
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Research
The research undertaken by WWF and the ANU estimated the land and water 
requirements for alternative livestock protein sources, assuming that the 11 
proposed mainstream dams lead to a reduction in fish production of 60–70 per 
cent, which is a major source of dietary protein for the people of the lower 
Mekong basin.
It is important to note that people might adopt any number of dietary habits to 
substitute the loss of calories and protein from fish. The dynamics of consumer 
behaviour are complex and this study was limited to the most plausible scenario: 
that the share of meat proteins consumed in the LMB nations would increase 
in response to a fall in fish production. While vegetable protein intake could 
also increase and would come with its own costs, such scenarios have not been 
considered in this research and should be explored in further research.
By assuming an increase in the demand for meat protein to replace lost fish 
catches, our calculations suggest that water consumption for livestock protein 
production — the water footprint — will increase from six per cent to 17 per 
cent and will be considerably higher in Cambodia and Laos. Southeast Asia as 
a whole is not water scarce; however, such a major increase in consumption is 
likely to have significant opportunity costs. Substantial volumes of water in 
the natural environment are needed to sustain important ecosystem services in 
the basin, such as capture fisheries, low-input flood recession agriculture and 
maintenance of the delta. The proposed hydropower reservoirs would have a 
land footprint of at least 14,865 square kilometres (km2)—including 1350 km2 
of land proposed to be inundated for the dams—and this area of land includes 
some of the most productive riverside farmland in the LMB.
In addition, the area of pasture land required to replace fish protein with 
domestic livestock was estimated to range from 7080 to 24,188 km2 (13 per cent 
to 63 per cent). This will not be easy given that high quality agricultural land in 
the region is already occupied and agricultural rates of conversion are stagnant.
Consequently, the change in protein away from local river fisheries will have 
substantial social, economic and environmental implications, including greater 
water consumption, land use conversion and greater reliance on imports. 
Increased food prices associated with higher costs of livestock production could 
impact the poor and exacerbate poverty.
The supporting institutional and investment infrastructure required to accommodate 
these changes is substantial, yet the issues of ensuring that dam construction does 
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not impact the food sources of vulnerable populations have been overlooked. All 
stakeholders should be entitled to know what alternatives and strategies are in place 
for any situation where basic food supplies are at such a high risk of disruption.
Conclusion
Hydropower development is often justified by the projections of social and 
economic advantages, using assessment processes that are narrowly focused on 
the environmental and social impacts of the areas directly impacted by dam 
construction and inundation (World Commission on Dams (WCD) 2000). Indeed, 
the current assessment processes underway for the proposed dams on the main 
stem of the LMB appear to mirror this approach.
The data used in our assessment is the best available and these findings are first 
approximations of land and water requirements resulting from the proposed 
dams. The methods adopted here to estimate the impact on protein supplies due 
to dam construction are conservative in the use of SEA assessments of the loss 
in fish production and scaling up supply of other proteins in proportion to their 
existing consumption. 
Further, the data used here does not yet account for future population increases 
and resulting demand for protein. Similarly, other possible protein scenarios 
could be modelled and would add considerably to a wider understanding of 
the impacts and options available. Comprehensive estimations are required 
to establish detailed accounting of food costs, land and water use and access, 
livelihoods, equity and poverty. Studies for individual nations would determine 
a wider range of impacts and should be used to explore the institutional 
challenges that lay ahead. In this manner, the benefits of dams can be better 
compared to the negative trade-offs involved.
Regulatory authorities for these dam projects have an obligation to draw on 
the best available data to ensure their decisions optimise the benefits for their 
citizens and the environment.
Stuart Orr has been with WWF since 2006 and works with the private sector 
on a range of water-related issues. Orr has published mainly on water risk and 
water stewardship and has recently co-drafted guidelines for the United Nations 
compact on corporate engagement in water policy. He has an academic and 
research background in agricultural systems and water resource management and 
has worked for many years in the private sector in Asia and the United States.
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27. Water concepts
Karen Hussey
The Australian National University, Australia
While Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) remains the dominant 
concept informing water policy and management, the sector is now replete 
with others that are used by scholars and practitioners alike. For example, 
‘water security’, ‘hydropolitics’, ‘virtual water’, water as a critical component 
of the ‘energy-water-food nexus’, ‘water-sensitive-urban-design’ and the 
typology of green, blue and grey water are all relatively new concepts with 
a degree of currency in the water sector. The emergence of broader concepts, 
such as ‘ecosystem services’ and ‘resilience’, are also influential in discourses 
on water resources. In addition, the last 20 years has spawned new tools for 
managing water resources, many of which are infused with the key tenets of 
neoclassical economics, and terms like ‘water trading’, ‘water harvesting’, 
‘water footprinting’ and ‘water pricing’ are now part of the sector’s vernacular. 
Of course, the emergence of so many concepts, indicators and tools reflects our 
increasing understanding of the challenges that humanity faces in managing 
water resources. We have moved beyond a blunt appreciation of ‘droughts’ and 
‘floods’ to a nuanced appreciation of the degrees of impact afflicting different 
jurisdictions and the underlying causes of those impacts; hence the formulation 
of concepts such as ‘water stress’, ‘water deficit’ and ‘water scarcity’. Similarly, 
where once we might simply have referred to floods in relation to water-
related natural disasters, significant breakthroughs in climate science have 
afforded considerable understanding about the reasons for, consequences of, 
and connections between, sea-level rise, flash floods, and storm surges. The 
consequence of this knowledge and the conceptual thinking it has spawned is 
that a jurisdiction’s ability to undertake detailed and rigorous water profiling 
is significantly enhanced, but it also makes any subsequent debates about 
appropriate policy interventions more complex. 
It is, as they say, a crowded space.
But what should we make of this plethora of concepts informing water policy 
and management? How can so many concepts and indicators be understood 
and reconciled? Do they ‘speak’ to different audiences? Are they sufficiently 
different as to be individually useful and collectively complementary? Is there 
evidence that each successive, new concept is building on, and adding value 
to, the concepts that came before it? The authors in this section make excellent 
contributions to our understanding of the key concepts and indicators at play 
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in the water sector and in ‘unpacking’ these questions. All the chapters identify 
differences in the way key concepts are defined, measured, and applied in policy 
and investment decisions; and many question the benefits to be gained from so 
many ‘new’ concepts. 
In his critique of ‘water scarcity’, White (Chapter 28) grapples with the inherent 
tension that exists between the ease of using straight-forward indicators 
based on easily accessible data, with the contextual nuances and detail that 
is inevitably lost when more complicated indices are used. The existence of 
several definitions of water scarcity (he explores four), and indeed the different 
measures to capture aspects of it, can result in varied, sometimes contradictory, 
findings in relation to a region’s water stress. It is, therefore, important to 
understand which definition is ‘fit for purpose’, and to avoid relying on any 
single measure. A region’s capacity to employ multiple indices in decision-
making will, however, necessarily be constrained by the skills, knowledge, 
and data available to it, suggesting that even if definitional clarity is achieved, 
the value of using such concepts remains a direct function of the institutional 
capacity in that region. 
One of the most interesting developments in recent years has been the 
emergence of non-traditional security threats, and in particular the concept 
of ‘environmental security’ (Dalby 2002). The appeal of ‘securitisation’ as 
a conceptual frame lies in its realist roots: it is a familiar concept and draws 
considerable favour with the powers-that-be, not least because security issues 
are almost always in the purview of national governments. As a consequence, 
debates about environmental issues are afforded considerably more attention 
than might otherwise be the case — or so the argument goes. Interestingly, 
environmental security was very quickly disaggregated into ‘climate security’, 
‘energy security’, and ‘water security’, and it is the meaning and practical utility 
of the latter concept to which Lautze and Manthrithilake (Chapter 29) turn their 
attention. Specifically, their article is a plea for the concept of ‘water security’ 
to be defined in such a way as to be practically applied, and their suggestion is 
to develop some quantifiable criteria against which to evaluate a region’s water 
security — even though they are openly sceptical about the value of promoting 
yet another concept in this crowded space. 
Wichelns (Chapter 30) is similarly cautious in his chapter on the use of the ‘water 
footprint’ as a tool to inform policy. Of all the concepts and terms to emerge 
recently, surely it is water footprinting that has captured the imaginations of 
the public and politicians most completely. Certainly, there is something very 
appealing about distilling what is a very complex problem into a single, simple 
unit of measurement, but as Wichelns most ably demonstrates, the use of such 
an overly simplistic tool in isolation from other indicators could do more harm 
than good. And yet it persists and its use proliferates. 
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The wariness of new concepts continues in the next chapter, in which Iyer 
(Chapter 31) provides both an amusing and forensic analysis of the current 
misunderstandings of virtual water. Correctly, Iyer points to the misuse of 
‘virtual water’ in debates about the import and export of different products 
and the desire by many to use the term to inform the validity or otherwise of 
countries producing and exporting certain commodities. In this regard, Iyer 
points to the penchant for neo-liberal economic philosophy as a contributing 
factor, but whatever the cause, his projections of where the concept of virtual 
water might inadvertently take us is almost Kafkaesque, and delightfully so. 
Reimer (Chapter 32) responds to Iyer and argues that, instead of dismissing the 
concept, ‘virtual water’ should be redefined in line with existing practice in 
international trade theory. In essence, Reimer calls for a clarification of virtual 
trade in water to give prominence to the services provided by that trade, and he 
further highlights the potential the concept offers in enabling countries to use 
‘at the border’ policies to encourage more sustainable practices in the exporting 
country. The merits of such an approach ought to be debated vigorously — not 
least because of the implications it poses for the principle of free trade — but it 
does at least offer a tangible use for an otherwise confused concept. 
The last chapter in this section tackles a particularly nebulous concept: 
‘resilience’. As Smith (Chapter 33) laments, it is ‘intuitively appealing yet 
stubbornly intangible’, and while there are a number of ways in which the 
concept of resilience can be operationalised, there is as yet no consensus on the 
feasibility of those options writ-large and over time. 
In many ways, the proliferation of new conceptual frameworks for understanding 
what are, essentially, ancient problems brings to mind the children’s fable ‘The 
Emperor’s New Clothes’. In contrast to the role played by the stubbornly silent 
advisors in the original story, however, the authors in this section do a creditable 
job of critiquing the value of many of the concepts currently influencing 
regional, national and international water policy. Overall, their assessments are 
both enlightening and sobering. 
Dr Karen Hussey is a Associate Professor at the Fenner School of Environment 
and Society and Co-Chair of the ANU Water Initiative, The Australian National 
University.
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28. Understanding water scarcity: 
Definitions and measurements
Chris White
URS, United Kingdom
Water scarcity, which can broadly be understood as the lack of access to 
adequate quantities of water for human and environmental uses, is increasingly 
being recognised in many countries as a serious and growing concern. As a 
result, the term ‘water scarcity’ is regularly used by the media, government 
reports, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), international organisations 
such as the United Nations (UN) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), as well as in the academic literature, to highlight 
areas where water resources are under pressure.
Despite its frequent use, however, there is no consensus on how water scarcity 
should be defined or how it should be measured. Thus, a reference to water 
scarcity in one report may measure something different to other reports that use 
the same term. This can create confusion as to what water scarcity means and 
lead to different answers to the question of which regions are under the most 
water stress.
In order to reduce this confusion, this chapter looks at some of the most 
commonly used methods of defining and measuring water scarcity, so that 
readers can understand what is meant in each case.
One of the most commonly used measures of water scarcity is the ‘Falkenmark 
indicator’ or ‘water stress index’. This method defines water scarcity in terms 
of the total water resources that are available to the population of a region; 
measuring scarcity as the amount of renewable freshwater that is available 
for each person each year. If the amount of renewable water in a country is 
below 1700 cubic metres (m3) per person per year, that country is said to be 
experiencing water stress; below 1000 m3 it is said to be experiencing water 
scarcity; and below 500 m3, absolute water scarcity (Falkenmark et al. 1989).
The water stress index method is commonly used because it is straightforward, 
easy to use, and the data needed is readily available. Such a simplistic approach 
does, however, have limitations:
1. It ignores important regional differences in water availability, only measuring 
water scarcity at a country level.
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2. It fails to account for whether or not those water resources are accessible, for 
example, some of the freshwater resources of a country may be stored deep 
underground or may be heavily polluted.
3. It does not include man-made sources of freshwater, such as desalination 
plants, which increase water availability beyond what is naturally available.
4. It does not account for the fact that different countries, and regions within 
countries, use different amounts of water. In Australia for example, most of 
the demand for water is focused around the major urban and agricultural 
centres such as in the Murray-Darling Basin, with much less used in the 
sparsely populated centre (Rijsberman 2006).
An alternative way of defining and measuring water scarcity is to use a 
criticality ratio. This approach relaxes the assumption that all countries use the 
same amount of water, instead defining water scarcity in terms of each country’s 
water demand compared to the amount of water available; measuring scarcity as 
the proportion of total annual water withdrawals relative to total available water 
resources (Raskin et al. 1997). Using this approach, a country is said to be water 
scarce if annual withdrawals are between 20–40 per cent of annual supply, and 
severely water scarce if they exceed 40 per cent.
While this approach avoids the simplistic assumption that all countries have the 
same demand for water, it also has its limitations:
1. It does not consider man-made increases in water supply (such as desalination).
2. It ignores water withdrawals that are recycled and reused.
3. It doesn’t consider the capacity of countries to adapt to lower water availability 
through changing behaviour or new technology (Rijsberman 2006).
A third measure of water scarcity was developed by the International Water 
Management Institute (IWMI). This approach attempts to solve the problems listed 
above by including: water infrastructure, such as water in desalination plants, 
into the measure of water availability; recycled water, by limiting measurements of 
water demand to consumptive use rather than total withdrawals; and, the adaptive 
capacity of a country by assessing its potential for infrastructure development 
and efficiency improvements (Seckler et al. 1998).
Using this approach, the IWMI classifies countries that are predicted to be unable 
to meet their future water demand, without investment in water infrastructure 
and efficiency, as economically water scarce; and countries predicted to be 
unable to meet their future demand, even with such investment, as physically 
water scarce (Molden et al. 2007).
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While the IWMI measure of water scarcity is more sophisticated, its complexity 
means that it requires significant amounts of time and resources to estimate. This 
approach also fails to consider the ability of people within countries to adapt to 
reduced water availability by importing food grown in other countries, or by using 
water saving devices. The ability to adapt also depends on the economic resources 
available in countries as a whole, as well as to individuals within a country. For 
instance, wealthy residents in rich countries are more likely to be able to adapt to 
reduced water availability than poor people in developing countries.
A fourth approach to measuring water scarcity is the ‘water poverty index’. 
This approach attempts to take into account the role of income and wealth in 
determining water scarcity by measuring: (1) the level of access to water; (2) 
water quantity, quality, and variability; (3) water used for domestic, food and 
productive purposes; (4) capacity for water management; and, (5) environmental 
aspects (Sullivan et al. 2003). The complexity of this approach, however, means 
that it is more suited for analysis at a local scale, where data is more readily 
available, than on a national level.
There is, therefore, no single definition of water scarcity; different measurements 
capture different aspects of the pressures on water resources, and there isn’t 
one measure that captures them all. This point is illustrated in Figure 1, which 
shows two different measures of water scarcity for Africa and Western Europe; 
one which accounts for the impact that access to water technology can have on 
water scarcity, and one which does not.
First, by using a criticality ratio, the authors estimate the level of water scarcity 
based on a number of stressors (labelled in Figure 1 as Incident HWS threat). 
Since this measure does not include the impact that investment in technological 
development can have on improving water security, they then estimate an 
‘investment benefits factor’, which measures the investment capabilities of each 
country. This includes the investment benefits factor with the measure of water 
scarcity to estimate an adjusted measure of water scarcity when technological 
capacity is taken into account (labelled as Adjusted HWS threat) (Vorosmarty 
et al 2010).
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Figure 1: Different measures of water scarcity can produce different answers 
to the question of which regions are under the most water stress
Source: Vorosmarty et al. 2010. 
As Figure 1 shows, the way in which water scarcity is defined and measured 
has direct, and sometimes contradictory, implications on how serious the issue 
is perceived to be in different regions. As a result, relying on a single indicator 
may give a misleading impression about water scarcity issues. It is therefore 
important when discussing ‘water scarcity’, to be clear how the term is defined 
and which aspects of water scarcity it measures and to recognise that one 
measure by itself is not enough to give the whole picture.
Chris White is an Environmental Economist at URS, London, where his main area 
is working with the public and private sector on valuing the services provided 
by the environment in order to improve decision-making and account for 
impacts on natural capital. White is also a Research Associate at the Centre for 
Water Economics, Environment and Policy, The Australian National University 
and Managing Editor of the Global Water Forum. 
28. Understanding water scarcity: Definitions and measurements
165
References
Falkenmark, M., Lundquist, J. and Widstrand, C., 1989. ‘Macro-scale water 
scarcity requires micro-scale approaches: aspects of vulnerability in semi-
arid development’, Natural Resources Forum, 13(4):258–67.
Molden, D. (ed.), 2007. Water for Food, Water for Life: A comprehensive 
assessment of water management in agriculture, Earthscan/International 
Water Management Institute, London.
Raskin, P., Gleick, P.H., Kirshen, P., Pontius, R.G., and Strzepek, K., 1997. 
Water Futures: Assessment of long-range patterns and prospects, Stockholm 
Environment Institute.
Rijsberman, F.R., 2006. ‘Water scarcity: fact or fiction?’, Agricultural Water 
Management, 80:5–22.
Seckler, D., Amarasinghe, U., Molden, D., de Silva, R. and Barker, R., 1998. 
‘World water demand and supply, 1990 to 2025: scenarios and issues’, 
International Water Management Institute (IWMI) Research Report 19, 
IWMI, Colombo.
Sullivan, C.A., et al., 2003. ‘The water poverty index: development and 
application at the community scale’, Natural Resources Forum, 27:189–99.
Vorosmarty, C.J., et al., 2010. ‘Global threats to human water security and river 
biodiversity’, Nature, 467:555–61.

167
29. Water security: Converging 
toward common understanding 
through quantification
Jonathan Lautze 
International Water Management Institute, Sri Lanka
Herath Manthrithilake 
International Water Management Institute, Sri Lanka
Water security has come to assume an increasingly prominent position in 
the international water and development community in recent years. Staff 
at the World Bank have explained that water security is critical for growth 
and development (Grey and Sadoff 2007). The importance of water security 
for the sustainable development of countries like China has been recognised 
nationally (Liu et al. 2007). Water security has been at the heart of high-profile 
negotiations on, for example, a Cooperative Framework Agreement in the Nile 
Basin (WaterLink 2010). Finally, academia and other development actors have 
also emphasised the concept (Briscoe 2009).
What is missing?
Despite the elevated status that the term has increasingly acquired in policy 
documents and development discourse, the concept of water security remains 
largely unquantified. There are several benefits to translating water security into 
numerical terms. First, it can encourage clarity and common understanding of a 
concept around which there currently exists substantial ambiguity. Second, it 
can help to foster discussion and debate on scales and thresholds for evaluating 
the presence, absence or degree of water security. Third, it can help to assess the 
extent to which the concept is really being achieved on the ground in different 
locations. In a recent paper we devised an index that quantifies water security 
at a country level in order to encourage a more concrete understanding of the 
term (Lautze and Manthrithilake 2012).
Global Water: Issues and Insights
168
T
ab
le
 1
: 
W
at
er
 s
ec
ur
ity
 in
di
ca
to
r 
fr
am
ew
or
k
So
ur
ce
: L
au
tz
e 
an
d 
M
an
th
ri
th
ila
ke
 2
01
2.
29. Water security: Converging toward common understanding through quantification
169
Quantifying water security
The paper identified five key components of water security and translated them 
into numerical indicators that were applied across the countries of the Asia-
Pacific. Based on several definitions of the concept, a conceptual framework was 
developed that contains the following components: basic needs, agricultural 
production, the environment, risk management and independence (Table 1). Using 
publicly accessible data, country scores in each component were developed and 
placed on a five-point scale. To generate a score for overall water security, results 
for each of the five components were summed, producing a 25-point scale. Just 
as five-point scales indicate the degree of water security achieved in individual 
components, the broader score on a 25-point scale indicates the degree of overall 
water security in a particular country.
Results
Comparing the strength of overall water security scores across countries reveals 
substantial dispersion (Figure 1), with scores ranging from very poor (less 
than ten) to very good (greater than 20). Noticeably, even in those countries 
that appear water secure, there still exist weak spots (Figure 2). For example, 
despite Australia’s overall high level of water security, the specific component 
of risk management appears only mediocre, and Japan appears limited by its 
poor score in water security for the environment. While the results hold few 
surprises, if presented in countries where local knowledge may already exist on 
water sector strengths and weaknesses, a primary benefit of applying a water 
security framework such as this is to understand how water secure countries are 
in relation to one another. A secondary benefit, if the framework is reapplied in 
the future, is monitoring the rate and direction of change in water security to 
enable comparison over time.
Global Water: Issues and Insights
170
Figure 1: Overall water security index
Source: Lautze and Manthrithilake 2012.
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Figure 2: Water security in the Asia-Pacific, ordered from greatest to least 
water secure. *Indicates that data are available for only four of the five 
components. Countries with data for less than four components are not 
displayed
Source: Lautze and Manthrithilake 2012.
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So what?
An important goal of this paper was identifying some of the key issues inherent 
in assessing water security in order to spur more concrete discussion on what the 
concept truly means. One fundamental issue raised by the methods employed 
relates to assessment of relative versus absolute water security. More broadly, 
the development and application of the approach utilised in this paper has 
helped clarify the notion of water security, and prompts at least two overarching 
suggestions for understanding the meaning and practical utility of the concept. 
A first suggestion for reaching a more common understanding of the concept is 
to move beyond qualitative definitions to make a list, or finite set of criteria, on 
which water security is determined and evaluated, as proposed in this paper. 
While the criteria utilised in this paper may not be perfect, it is believed they 
mark a valuable step toward arriving at a clear meaning of the concept. 
A second suggestion is to clearly focus on the ends of water security — not 
the means to water security, and not the ends beyond water security. For 
example, conventional indicators in agricultural water management — such 
as water productivity and related sub-indicators of efficiency or yield per 
unit of evapotranspiration — could be proposed to measure water security. 
While improving water productivity is clearly a way to increase agricultural 
production and water security, it is simply one means and may not be essential. 
In areas of low water storage, for example, water storage augmentations may be 
far more important than productivity increases. 
Related to ends beyond water security, water security can be considered 
essential to enabling a range of development outcomes, such as adequate 
food consumption, health status, economic opportunities, and environmental 
conservation. Achieving water security, however, is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for achieving security in these other areas: water security can imply 
that economies are insulated from droughts and floods, but it does insulate 
them from external shocks, such as global financial crises. Similarly, while water 
security could imply sufficient agricultural production to feed a community or 
country, it is not associated with the many other aspects of food security, such 
as timely crop selection, distribution and provision. As such, water security 
is but one contributor to the security of other areas, such as food and the 
environment, because their ultimate security relies on factors over and above 
those specific to water.
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Final thoughts
The approach utilised in this paper constitutes an initial effort to assess the 
central components of water security and identify some of the major issues in 
undertaking such an exercise. In terms of the issue posed at the outset about 
the added value of introducing the concept of water security, the results are 
mixed. While focusing on five priority issues related to water management is 
important, the benefits of bundling these five issues under the umbrella of a 
new paradigm are not immediately apparent. On the contrary, with so many 
other new concepts related to water permeating discourse (e.g., IWRM, water 
governance, hydropolitics), there may be confusion, scepticism, and even 
fatigue associated with introduction of another new term that is not concretely 
defined, yet which is supposed to comprise a panacea for water managers.
Dr Jonathan Lautze is a Researcher at the International Water Management 
Institute-Southern Africa office in Pretoria. He has been involved in a range 
of applied research and development projects focused on topics such as water 
governance, water security, transboundary water management, climate change 
and water, and water and health. 
Dr Herath Manthrithilake has been involved in professional water sector work 
since the early 1970s. Currently, he serves as a Senior Researcher and Head of 
the Research Program of International Water Management Institute (IWMI) in 
Sri Lanka. This article is a summary version of Lautze and Manthrithilake, 2012, 
‘Water security: old concepts, new package, what value? Natural Resources 
Forum 36(2):76–87. For further details please contact email j.lautze@cgiar.org.
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30. Water footprints: Policy relevant 
or one-dimensional indicators?
Dennis Wichelns
National University of Singapore, Singapore
Water footprints are gaining traction in policy circles in several countries. 
In Spain, the Ministry of the Environment requires the discussion of water 
footprints in river basin plans that are prepared in compliance with the European 
Union Water Framework Directive (Aldaya et al. 2010). In the Netherlands, the 
Dutch House of Representatives has produced a motion requesting 
that the government, in its economic policy, aim for Dutch companies to 
present their water footprint and to reduce this footprint in those areas 
that are affected by water scarcity, for example, by actively addressing 
companies that receive support through export guarantees or innovation 
subsidies to reduce their water footprints, and to request that these 
companies calculate their water footprints and include this information 
in their sustainability reports. (Witmer & Cleij 2012)
In India, the Ministry of Water Resources convened a seminar on water footprints 
in New Delhi as part of India Water Week 2013. Several statements regarding 
water footprints appear in India’s new National Water Policy (Government of 
India 2012). The statements, which appear in the section pertaining to demand 
management and water use efficiency, are as follows:
i. A system to evolve benchmarks for water uses for different purposes; 
i.e., water footprints and water auditing should be developed to promote 
and incentivise efficient use of water; and
ii. The project appraisal and environment impact assessment for water 
uses, particularly for industrial projects, should, inter-alia, include the 
analysis of water footprints.
Promoted originally as attractive indicators of the amount of water required to 
produce a good or service, it appears water footprints are now being considered 
and adopted as policy tools in national legislation. These examples from India, 
Spain and the Netherlands might be the first of many cases in which governments 
consider requiring firms to measure and reduce their water footprints.
Thus, it seems prudent to ask if water footprints are indeed policy relevant. 
Do water footprints provide the information and insight required to determine 
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and design smart policy measures? Or might a focus on water footprints 
distract public officials from considering the broader set of inputs and impacts 
that require their attention when evaluating policy options? Might a focus on 
water footprints reduce net social benefits by motivating changes in water use 
that are not socially optimal?
It is likely that water footprints have succeeded in promoting greater awareness 
of the role of water in the production of many goods and services. In water-
scarce areas, such an outcome is certainly desirable. Yet, even in water-scarce 
areas, water is just one of many inputs. In many settings, producers, consumers 
and public officials must consider issues that extend beyond water when crafting 
public policies, or when determining optimal production and consumption 
strategies. Information is needed regarding the opportunity costs of water in 
each setting and use. Insight is required also regarding the potential impacts 
of changes in water use on the livelihoods of individuals engaged in household 
or productive activities that require water as an input. The remainder of this 
chapter explores these issues in more detail.
Information is not adequate
Water footprints consider only the volume of water used in production, without 
considering other inputs or opportunity costs. Water volumes, alone, are not 
sufficient indicators of the benefits or costs of water use in any setting. The 
benefits and costs are functions of complex interactions involving physical, 
economic and social dimensions that are not contained or reflected in estimates 
of water footprints.
Comparing two water footprints across activities, locations, or time is not 
a helpful exercise if one does not have information regarding water scarcity 
conditions, the opportunity costs of water and water’s role in supporting 
livelihoods in each setting. The water footprint of coffee might be 140 millilitres 
per cup, but that estimate provides no insight regarding the opportunity cost 
of water in the region where the coffee is produced, or the livelihoods earned 
by persons engaged in coffee production. Coffee produced in a country with 
abundant water might place no pressure on water supplies. Yet the activity 
might provide livelihoods to many residents who have few alternative sources 
of employment. Such aspects of water allocation decisions are not reflected in 
estimates of water footprints.
It is critical to consider both the opportunity cost of water (its scarcity value) and 
the opportunity cost of labor (alternative employment options) when evaluating 
policies that impact the allocation and use of water and other productive inputs. 
The water footprint of a coconut might be 2500 litres per kilogram, but most 
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coconuts are produced in humid regions with abundant water supplies. In such 
settings, the opportunity cost of much of the water used in coconut production 
is not substantial, and local residents might have few alternatives to earning 
their livelihoods in the production and processing of coconuts.
Inadequate consideration of costs and benefits
Reducing water footprints is not always a desirable objective. Water footprints 
consider only water volumes, which are not sufficient indicators of the benefits 
or costs of water use in any setting. The benefits and costs are functions of 
complex interactions involving physical, economic and social dimensions 
that are not reflected in estimates of water footprints. For example, in many 
humid areas, the costs of reducing water deliveries to agriculture might exceed 
the benefits. The expenditures on labour, energy and equipment required to 
improve irrigation management might exceed the incremental value of reducing 
irrigation diversions, particularly in regions where surface runoff and deep 
percolation are useful resources.
Public officials must consider an array of questions pertaining to incremental 
benefits and costs, before reaching decisions regarding water-resource allocation 
and use. For example, they must consider the scarcity costs and environmental 
implications of non-water inputs in the production of goods and services. 
Examples include land, labour, energy, fertiliser, pesticides and machinery. 
Farm-level decisions regarding water use can also influence the amounts of 
these other inputs that are used. Efforts to reduce water footprints can result 
in greater use of electricity or farm machinery, thus increasing any off-farm 
impacts associated with those inputs.
One must also carefully consider inherent water scarcity conditions. It might be 
unwise to reduce water footprints in areas where water is not scarce, particularly 
if there are notable direct or indirect costs involved in such efforts. Water and 
other natural resources are critical inputs in household production functions 
for much of humanity. Efforts to reduce water footprints regionally or as part of 
a national strategy, can have severe implications on employment opportunities 
in agriculture and on household-level access to water resources. Public officials 
must consider the potential impacts of initiatives regarding water resources 
on food security and livelihoods, rather than simply attempting to reduce a 
volumetric measure of water use.
In addition to its role as a critical input in crop production, water is required for 
many activities at the household level (Smits et al. 2010; van Coppen and Smits 
2010). In many areas of developing countries, individual and household water 
footprints are too small, rather than too large. Yet the manner in which water 
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footprints generally are presented in the literature suggests that smaller is better, 
and that consumers and producers everywhere should endeavour to reduce their 
water footprints. A broader view that embraces the many benefits of water use 
would be more appropriate, particularly when discussing public policies.
Summing up
Water footprints do not provide the information or insight required to serve as a 
policy-relevant analytical construct. Analysts considering only water footprints 
cannot determine optimal policy measures or interventions. Water footprints 
do not describe the opportunity costs or the incremental benefits of water use 
in any setting, and they do not describe potential implications for livelihoods. 
Thus, policies designed on the basis of estimated water footprints might have 
the effect of moving society further away from desirable outcomes.
Dennis Wichelns is an agricultural and natural resource economist with many 
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National University of Singapore. He has served as a Professor at the University 
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31. Virtual water: Some reservations
Ramaswamy R. Iyer
Steering Committee on Water, India
J.A. (Tony) Allan’s concept of virtual water, now two decades old (see Allan 
2003), is widely regarded as a major contribution to the discourse on water, and 
it received the accolade of the Stockholm Water Prize in 2008. The concept has 
been theoretically challenged (Merrett 2003; Iyer 2008). Allan’s statement that 
the concept is a descendant of the Ricardian theory of ‘comparative advantage’ 
(Allan 2003) has been questioned, and it has been argued that the two concepts 
might lead to different practical results in a given situation, that the concept can 
be misleading as a policy prescription, and that production and trade decisions by 
countries are based on many other considerations (Wichelns 2010). The concept 
has, however, gained common currency, along with its offshoot ‘virtual water 
trade’, and scholarly literature on the subject is growing (see Yang et al. 2006; 
Hoekstra 2003; Zimmer and Renault 2003; Siebert and Doll 2010; Dalin et al. 2012).
Merrett (2003) puts forward two criticisms of the concept. His first point is that 
what goes into the production of rice or wheat is real water and not virtual 
water. That is true enough, perhaps even obvious. At the production stage, the 
water is indeed real. It is when the rice or wheat is traded that the concept of 
virtual water comes into play: we can then say that when a country exports rice 
or wheat it is ‘virtually’ exporting the water that had gone into its production.
Merrett’s second point is that the terms ‘virtual water’ and ‘import of virtual 
water’ are unnecessary. He refers to this as a case of the application of Occam’s 
razor; that is, in the context of agriculture,‘virtual water’ can be replaced by 
‘the crop water requirements of food exports’ and ‘the import of virtual water’ 
can be replaced by ‘the import of food’.
Let me now state my critique of the concept, which is on somewhat different 
lines. I agree with the proposition that the concept of virtual water is useful 
as a warning signal to countries (or areas within a country) to be aware of the 
quantity of water that goes into what they produce and consume or export. 
Here I differ from Merrett. I do, however, have to qualify my acceptance of the 
concept with two reservations.
First, in the context of the general dominance today of a certain economic 
philosophy, there is a tendency to misuse the ideas of ‘virtual water’ and 
‘virtual water trade’ in international forums as instruments for the doctrinaire 
advocacy of neo-liberal economic prescriptions. What I am referring to is the 
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strong advocacy of the opening up of the markets of developing coutries to 
imports from developed coutries. In that pressure the concept of virtual water 
tends to become one more argument against domestic production. We need to be 
wary of that tendency, though of course Allan cannot be held responsible for it.
Secondly, while it is in order to say that large quantities of water are used in the 
production of certain agricultural commodities or industrial products, and that 
the export of those commodities or products is therefore virtually like exporting 
water, it does not follow that water is being in reality exported. The term ‘virtual 
export of water’ has become ‘export of virtual water’, and this leads on to the 
further term ‘virtual water trade’. ‘Virtual water’ tends to be regarded as a real 
commodity in which trade is taking place, and this in turn leads to the compilation 
of statistics of that unreal trade. This is an instance of what Wittgenstein might 
have called the bewitchment of the intelligence by language.
At the risk of stating the obvious, it needs to be said that when a country 
exports or imports sugar or rice or cotton, it is exporting or importing sugar or 
rice or cotton, and not water. (Merrett (2003) makes this point, but in a different 
way.) It is misleading to talk about ‘virtual water trade’ in this context. The only 
trade in water is where (real) water itself is traded in bottled form or in the form 
of soft drinks, or in exceptional cases of exports or imports of water in bulk.
Further, the water needed to produce a product is not the same thing as the 
water content of that product. This is another reason why the concept of ‘virtual 
water trade’ is misleading. (Allan had initially used the term ‘embedded water’, 
which he rightly corrected later to ‘virtual water’, but a bit of that original error 
seems to be surviving in the new term.)
A water-rich country may import a product instead of producing it domestically 
for various reasons, which have nothing to do with water. A water-short 
country may import a commodity or product because it does not have enough 
water to produce it, or for various other reasons, but it may not think of the 
import of that commodity or product as an import of water. The statement that a 
country that is not well endowed with natural resources may have to depend on 
imports is a statement of the obvious; there is no need for a concept of ‘virtual 
water trade’ to explain this. To regard such imports/exports of commodities or 
products as ‘water trade’ seems a seriously misleading proposition.
I am not arguing against the concept of ‘virtual water’ as a means of promoting 
an awareness of the water implications of the production or export of certain 
commodities or products. It is indeed useful for that purpose. The concept is 
also a useful adjunct to that of ‘water footprint’. ‘Virtual water’, however, is a 
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metaphor, and we must not push that metaphor too far and muddle ourselves 
into thinking that there is a real commodity called ‘virtual water’ and that there 
is a large international trade in it.
Incidentally, every export can be re-described with reference to what has gone 
into the production. If exports of rice and wheat can be treated as exports of 
water, they can also be treated as exports of fertilisers and pesticides; exports 
of iron ore, and of iron and steel produced from iron ore, can be regarded as 
exports of the soil of the country because the ore is part of that soil (or of coal 
because coal is used in the conventional blast furnace); exports of aluminium 
products can be described as exports of electricity because aluminium is 
produced in electric smelters; and so on. Should we then create concepts of 
‘virtual fertilisers/pesticides’, ‘virtual soil’, ‘virtual coal’, ‘virtual electricity’, 
and so on, and compile statistics of those virtual trades? Water is of course a 
special case because of its importance in our lives and its scarcity. The point that 
I am making here is that the concept of ‘virtual x’, whether it is water or coal 
or electricity or whatever, has essentially the cautionary purpose of drawing 
attention to what goes into the production of a certain crop or commodity, so 
that a producer/exporter can make an informed decision as to the production 
of that crop or commodity for domestic sale or export. It is fallacious to stretch 
that purpose and treat these as cases of virtual trade in x.
Besides, the theorists of virtual water trade fail to note an asymmetry between 
exporting and importing countries.
Trade implies two parties — a seller and a buyer. Even if we grant that the 
country selling rice needs to be aware that it is indirectly selling water, it does 
not follow that the country buying rice from abroad needs to be (or is in fact) 
aware that it is indirectly buying water. As already mentioned, it may have 
decided to import rice for various reasons unconnected with water, and may 
not be interested in or conscious of the water that has gone into the production 
process. If so, how can we talk about ‘trade’ in virtual water? 
Reimer proposes the terminology of ‘trade in water services’ (Reimer 2012). 
It may be an improvement on ‘trade in virtual water’, but it is difficult to see 
how it is an answer to the questions raised by me. Is the importing country 
aware of or even interested in the fact that ‘water services’ have gone into the 
production of the commodity or product that it is importing? If not, how can 
we talk about trade in water services? 
It will be seen that while Merrett (2003) says that (at the production stage) real 
water is mistakenly described as virtual water, I point out that in the context 
of trade, ‘virtual’ water is mistakenly treated as real water. Both are valid and 
necessary criticisms.
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32. Virtual water trade means ‘trade 
in water services’
Jeffrey J. Reimer
Oregon State University, United States
Disenchantment with the virtual water concept (Allan 1998) is summarised 
in Merrett (2003) and Iyer (2014). One concern is with the characterisation 
of virtual water, with Merrett (2003) noting that the ‘forging’ of appropriate 
terminology is ongoing and that, at this stage, the appropriate language is ‘still 
in the furnace’. Beyond the issue of terminology, these authors argue against the 
idea that virtual water can somehow be viewed as being traded.
Disenchantment also arises when virtual water is promoted as a framework for 
making water-allocation decisions. Critics point out that virtual water measures 
cannot serve as an indicator of environmental harm, or quantify the marginal 
value of water across time or space — at least without a good deal of additional 
information. A third general reason for disenchantment is that empirical studies 
show that relative water endowments, by country, are poor predictors of trade 
in water intensive goods (Reimer 2012).
In this paper I will address these concerns from the perspective of an 
international trade economist. With Merrett’s observation that the language is 
still in the furnace, I argue that what is needed is a new name: ‘trade in water 
services’. Why such a change? The phrase ‘virtual water’ has led to confusion. 
For example, Allan (2003) states that it is ‘confusing to suggest that water was 
being traded in the process of moving water intensive commodities, such as 
grain, from one place to another’. Building on this point, Merrett (2003) calls for 
an end to the term virtual water, suggesting that the phrase ‘import of virtual 
water’ be replaced by ‘the import of food’.
This latter approach has important limitations. First, it eliminates any reference 
to water. Second, there are many products, other than food, that are traded 
and which place a heavy burden on water supplies. Third, this phrase does not 
acknowledge that virtual water is a new twist on an old idea, as I explain below. 
For these and other reasons I propose the name ‘trade in water services’.
To understand my reasoning, it’s important to emphasise that there are two 
legitimate ways to view trade between regions (Davis and Weinstein 2003). 
The first is as the overt exchange of a product, such as wheat. The second 
way is as the international exchange of the ‘factor services’ that were used to 
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produce the wheat, with ‘factors’ referring to natural and other resources such 
as water, labour, land and capital used to produce wheat or its intermediate 
inputs. A major point of this paper is that virtual water is this latter approach 
of viewing trade between regions.
The associated theory, trade in factor services, is a long-standing way of 
viewing trade between regions, with contributions dating back to economists 
Heckscher (1919), Ohlin (1933), Samuelson (1949), Leontief (1953) and Vanek 
(1968). The idea is that when factors of production are immobile across 
regions, trade in products allows regions to consume more of something than 
they otherwise would. Regions specialise in the activity for which they have 
comparative advantage, according to relative factor abundance, and import 
products for which they are at comparative disadvantage. The associated 
theorem is called the Heckscher–Ohlin–Vanek theorem. A lengthy subsequent 
literature shows that many new insights are available when one works in terms 
of factor services.
In this framework, when we focus on labour as a factor of production, we use 
the term ‘labour services’. When we focus on land as a factor of production, we 
use the term ‘land services’. It follows that there is also something called ‘water 
services’, and that this includes all the water that was necessary for production 
and distribution of a product.
Let us turn now to Iyer’s (2013) statement that ‘“Virtual water” tends to be 
regarded as a real commodity in which trade is taking place, and this in turn 
leads to the compilation of statistics of that unreal trade.’ Far from characterising 
it as unreal trade, economists routinely calculate the exchange of factor services 
(Reimer 2006, 2011; Reimer and Hertel 2010). Calculations of this sort date back 
at least to the time of Leontief, who won the Nobel Prize in economic science 
in part for his use of input-output analysis to examine trade flows in labour 
services and capital services (Leontief 1953).
Many interesting findings come out of such calculations. For example, when a US 
citizen buys a garment manufactured in Bangladesh, he is importing not only the 
services of Bangladeshi water, labour and capital, but also — if the shirt was made 
of US-grown cotton — some services of US water, labour and capital.
In this light, Iyer’s (2013) concerns about theoretical challenges are undue. Instead 
of saying ‘import of food’ (suggested by Merrett), which eliminates any reference 
to water, I believe we should refer to ‘trade in water services’, and acknowledge 
that this is but a particular application of a long-established theorem.
We should not expect relative water endowments, by country or time, to be 
a strong predictor of trade in water intensive goods, when we are looking at a 
broad sample of goods and countries. This point is emphasised by Iyer (2013) 
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and especially Wichelns (2004), who suggests that international technology 
differences are significant in agriculture, for example, and may be a source of 
comparative advantage alongside relative abundance of water. Policy-related 
trade barriers, such as tariffs, can also be high in water-intensive sectors, such 
as agriculture, and therefore obscure the role of water (Reimer and Li 2010). This 
does not nullify trade in water services as a framework for analysis of water 
in the international economy. It simply means that additional information is 
needed if one is to fully account for observed patterns of trade. This is routinely 
done in the literature (Reimer 2006, 2011; Reimer and Hertel 2010).
The concept of trade in water services is linked to the literature of trade policy 
and its insights into how international border policies (subsidies, tariffs, quotas) 
influence water use in ways that are otherwise hard to discern. For example, 
suppose that export of agricultural products is associated with the depletion of 
an aquifer. It may not be politically feasible to intervene directly at the level of 
production, due to producer resistance. A more politically attractive approach 
might be to discreetly inhibit water use — say by export restriction. Yet any kind of 
policy undertaken at a national border often has hard-to-anticipate consequences 
on consumption and production in multiple regions. The international economics 
literature contains analysis of many such examples, and a means for comparing 
alternative policy choices.
Concluding thoughts
I have attempted to demonstrate that the virtual water concept is but a special 
case of a general theory in international economics, a venerable theory taught 
to virtually every undergraduate student who takes a course on international 
trade. I argue that the name we should use is trade in water services. This name 
emphasises that it is the services of water (as embodied in a product) that get 
traded, not the water itself. This is a wholly legitimate way to view trade, and 
such calculations are routinely made for land, labour and capital. I believe it is fine 
to do this for water as well, and that many insights can be gained in the process.
Jeff Reimer is Associate Professor in the Department of Applied Economics 
at Oregon State University. He received his PhD from Purdue University in 
2003. His research emphasises international trade, agricultural markets and 
international development.
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33. Understanding resilience: 
Implications for the water sector
Heather M. Smith
Cranfield University, United Kingdom
Policy rhetoric around water resources and infrastructure increasingly 
emphasises the need to promote ‘resilience’ within water and wastewater 
systems. This trend is particularly evident in countries like the United Kingdom 
— take, for instance, the Water Services Regulation Authority’s (Ofwat) recent 
report on the need for ‘Resilient [water] supplies’ (Ofwat 2010).  The UK 
Government also recently published the Water for Life White Paper (Department 
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) 2011),  which outlines its 
strategy for reforming the water sector and stresses the need to develop ‘secure, 
sustainable and resilient water resources’.
It is worth questioning, however, whether ‘resilience’ has simply joined a 
long list of intuitively appealing yet stubbornly intangible concepts (e.g., 
‘sustainability’). It’s certainly no easy matter to define resilience, or specify 
what a resilient system might look like.
Some are certainly trying to pin the concept down more firmly — for instance 
the European Union (EU)-funded Transitions to the Urban Water Services 
of Tomorrow (TRUST) project  is aiming, in part, to understand and promote 
resilience within urban water cycle systems. The work builds on previous efforts 
to define the idea, such as the US National Infrastructure Advisory Council’s 
report on Critical Infrastructure Resilience (NIAC 2009), which states:
Infrastructure resilience is the ability to reduce the magnitude and/or 
duration of disruptive events. The effectiveness of a resilient infrastructure 
or enterprise depends upon its ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or 
rapidly recover from a potentially disruptive event.
In light of this definition, infrastructure resilience is about delivering services, 
regardless of disruptive events that may occur — the ability to ‘take a licking 
and keep on ticking’ (to quote the old Timex slogan). This understanding of 
resilience seems to be a relatively common one in the water sector, and reports 
from the United Kingdom echo it.
Water and wastewater systems, however, are more than the sum of their 
engineered parts. They can be described as socio-technical or socio-ecological 
systems, as they involve complex interactions between human, technological 
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and environmental components. And, among researchers who study the 
behaviour of such big systems, the idea of resilience has broad implications. 
Its origins are often traced to early developments in the field of ecology.
In the 1970s, ecological theory was dominated by the idea that ecosystems have 
a single, relatively fixed point of equilibrium — one ‘steady state’. Resilience 
was, therefore, seen as an ecosystem’s ability to recover from disturbance and 
return to equilibrium. A common analogy is a rubber band — a resilient system 
could be subjected to stress and strain, but ultimately had the ability to return 
to its original state. The shorter the ‘return time’, the more resilient the system. 
This was referred to as ‘engineering resilience’ (Folke et al. 2010).
There were, however, those who challenged the idea that ecosystems have 
one single steady state. Holling (1973) proposed instead that ecosystems have 
multiple ‘domains of stability’, and that they could (and did) shift between these 
alternate steady states. Holling therefore viewed ecosystems as fundamentally 
dynamic — ‘disturbance’ is the rule rather than the exception and, in response 
to disturbance, systems are continually changing and developing, not just 
returning to the same point of equilibrium.
This also creates an alternative view of resilience, which can be seen as a system’s 
ability to absorb disturbances and reorganise itself into a better configuration, 
while still retaining its fundamental characteristics (Walker et al. 2004). In this 
view, resilient systems are less like rubber bands and more like plasticine — 
when subjected to stress they can adopt and retain a suitable new shape, rather 
than return to their original state.
It’s no wonder, then, that the concept of resilience has, for some, become nearly 
synonymous with ideas of adaptability and adaptive management — ensuring 
that systems have the ability to adjust in order to suit changing circumstances. 
These ideas are increasingly applied to social systems, particularly those focused 
on environmental/resource management. They are also becoming more powerful 
in light of climate change, as we increasingly have to ask ourselves how to 
manage for the unexpected.
For the water sector, these ideas imply moving beyond ‘engineering resilience’, 
and the traditional ‘predict and withstand’ approach for extreme conditions, 
towards a more dynamic and flexible system. There is, however, inevitable 
tension here — namely, can these ideas fit within a system that relies heavily on 
inflexible assets like pipes and treatment plants?
There are ways of making the built infrastructure more flexible and adaptable. 
On the water-supply side, for instance, two strategies are often suggested — 
diversification and connectivity. Diversification implies incorporating a broad 
range of source options within a water system, so that if one source is disrupted, 
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others can help to compensate (Staub and Moreau-Le-Golvan 2011). Similarly, the 
United Kingdom’s recent water white paper argues that improving connectivity 
between water supplies in different parts of the country (e.g., by encouraging 
water companies to share/trade water) will lead to a similar result (DEFRA 2011).
There are also ways of introducing flexibility within patterns of water demand. 
For instance, the scheme devised for the California San Francisco Bay/San 
Joaquin Delta water management program (CALFED) allowed different groups 
of users to ‘trade’ water allocations, so that patterns of use could be swiftly 
adjusted as water availability changed. This helped to overcome the frequent 
conflicts and stalemates that arose over allocations, and helped ensure that 
water was used where it was needed most (Booher and Innes 2010).
There is, however, significant uncertainty around such approaches. For instance, 
how much flexibility is needed or appropriate? Additionally, some argue that 
fostering resilience means supporting innovation and experimentation — in 
other words, allowing room for developing and trialling new technologies and 
new management approaches, learning from the outcomes and, perhaps most 
importantly, acting on those lessons learned (Olsson and Galaz 2009). Similarly, 
some argue that it means favouring reversible decisions over irreversible ones 
(Staub and Moreau-Le-Golvan 2011). But when it comes to planning future 
water infrastructure, especially large-scale assets, such ideas can be something 
of a luxury.
Planning processes may favour options with known benefits and consequences, 
particularly when spending must be justified to consumers and/or public bodies. 
For something as fundamental as water, it can be difficult to foster an appetite 
for creativity and experimentation. Furthermore, given the lengthy timeframes 
over which large-scale projects are decided and implemented, and the level of 
investment required, it is hardly feasible to ensure that all such decisions are 
reversible.
These challenges are certainly not unique to the water sector, and there are no 
easy answers for them. It is nonetheless important that they are considered and 
debated if resilience is to become a true operational concept, and not simply an 
intuitively appealing buzzword.
Dr Heather Smith is an Academic Fellow in Water Governance at Cranfield 
University. Her research examines the intersections between science, policy, 
social drivers and management decisions around water services, with a 
particular emphasis on the adoption of innovative technologies and practices 
in the water sector. Her PhD from the University of Aberdeen focused on the 
implementation of the EU Water Framework Directive.
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34. UNESCO Water Chairs and 
Centres
R. Quentin Grafton
The Australian National University, Australia
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation’s (UNESCO) 
engagement in the water sector is built on three tracks: (1) supporting scientific 
research that informs water-management policy, (2) facilitating education 
and capacity-building in the hydrological sciences, and (3) water resources 
assessment and management to achieve environmental sustainability (UNESCO 
2014). An important way in which these objectives are achieved is through 
the establishment and ongoing support of UNESCO Water Chairs at higher 
education institutions and UNESCO Water Centres throughout the world. These 
research centres focus on specific subject and geographic priorities in areas of 
water science and policy. 
The approximately 50 Water Chairs and Centres share knowledge and expertise 
through the International Hydrological Programme (IHP) network hosted by 
UNESCO. The IHP is the only intergovernmental program of the UN system 
that is devoted to water research, water-resources management, education and 
capacity-building. Other facets of the UNESCO freshwater program include: 
co-ordinating the publication of the annual World Water Development Report 
into the state of the world’s freshwater resources, and support for UNESCO-
IHE, the world’s largest international graduate water education facility, which 
is based in Delft, the Netherlands.
The following section presents the research and activities of five UNESCO Water 
Chairs and Centres. The wide range of activities in different disciplines and 
locations highlights the important policy-focused research that UNESCO is 
supporting globally. Ganoulis, Quartano, and Skoulikaris (Chapter 35) provide 
an overview of the work of the UNESCO Chair on Sustainable Management 
of Transboundary Waters and Conflict Resolution at Aristotle University of 
Thessaloniki, Greece. Established in 2003, this Chair conducts innovative 
research and education programs in the Balkans region of Europe. Working 
in a region affected by conflict in recent decades, this UNESCO Water Chair 
has supported transnational cooperation through: (1) the development of 
collaborative monitoring and data-sharing programs for transboundary 
waters, including the region’s over-exploited, yet previously under-researched, 
groundwater aquifers; (2) the implementation of models for collaborative 
management of transboundary waters between water authorities in different 
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countries; and, (3) the establishment of networks through which scientists from 
different countries collaborate on shared projects despite ongoing social and 
political problems, thereby acting as indirect links between their respective 
national institutions on transboundary water management.
Transboundary water management is also a major focus of the Centre for Water 
Law, Policy and Science that operates at the University of Dundee under the 
auspices of UNESCO. Litke and Rieu-Clarke (Chapter 36) provide an overview 
of the most authoritative instrument of international water law developed to 
date: the UN Watercourses Convention (UNWC). Adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in 1997, the Convention is the only global treaty on shared freshwater 
resources. It is principle-driven and provides a framework for rules that can 
be tailored to the circumstances of each international watercourse. Despite the 
pivotal role played by the UNWC in the development of international water law 
and its influence in many river basins of the world, the treaty itself is not yet 
in force; 31 states have ratified the treaty, four short of the required 35. As part 
of an international awareness campaign to secure the ratification of additional 
parties, the Centre for Water Law, Policy and Science developed the UNWC 
User’s Guide. This document provides an accessible, non-technical summary of 
the UNWC’s individual provisions and demonstrates the benefits of ratification. 
In addition, an online user’s guide has been developed that is being updated on 
an ongoing basis with case studies and additional educational materials.
Addressing existing problems of scarcity in the face of burgeoning urban water 
demand is arguably one of the greatest challenges facing water governance. 
Tajrishy, Abdolghafoorian, and Abrishamchi (Chapter 37) from the UNESCO 
Chair in Water and Environment Management for Sustainable Cities at Sharif 
University of Technology consider Tehran’s growing water crisis. Population 
growth and rising incomes are fuelling greater water consumption that is 
becoming increasingly unsustainable as ground and surface water resources 
decline. Fortunately, there are substantial unexploited opportunities to increase 
the efficiency of water use within the city. To illustrate possible ways forward 
the authors construct a detailed model of Tehran’s water and wastewater system, 
including major sources, treatment facilities and users. They demonstrate the 
substantial economic gains from supplying additional recycled wastewater and 
treated runoff to users that do not require high-quality water, such as parks, 
industrial plants and construction projects. Rather than being an intractable 
problem, they show that Tehran’s water crisis can be mitigated by appropriate 
investments in an integrated approach towards water and wastewater use.
The UNESCO Chair in Sustainable Water Services at Tampere University of 
Technology focuses on the governance and policy issues associated with water 
services, particularly urban and rural water supply and wastewater services 
(Chapter 38). In partnership with the Polytechnic of Namibia, the University 
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of Nairobi and another eight institutions in industrialised and developing 
countries, this Chair promotes education and research on sustainable water 
governance and the needs of local communities. Key aspects of this research 
agenda include: reform processes; whether water access should be considered 
an economic good or a human right; good governance; the importance of history 
in water-sector reform; and, the commonalities across research agendas of 
industrialised and developing countries, such as ageing water infrastructure. 
Dr R. Quentin Grafton FASSA is Professor of Economics, ANU Public Policy 
Fellow and Director of the Centre for Water Economics, Environment and 
Policy (CWEEP) at the Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National 
University. He is the Chairholder, the UNESCO Chair in Water Economics and 
Transboundary Water Governance and in August 2013 was appointed Executive 
Director at The Australian National Institute of Public Policy (ANIPP).
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United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), 
2014. ‘Website of the UNESCO Freshwater Programme’. Available at: http://
www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/environment/water/.
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The UNESCO Chair/INWEB (International Network of Water/Environment 
Centres for the Balkans) at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (AUTh), 
Greece, was established in 2003 as part of the UNITWIN/UNESCO Chairs 
program. It links INWEB, a water resources management network of academic 
and non-academic groups in south eastern Europe (SEE, or the Balkans) that has 
been active since 1999, with the UNESCO Chair on sustainable management of 
transboundary waters and conflict resolution. 
The UNESCO Chair/INWEB focuses on two main activities: 
• promoting and carrying out innovative research and educational programmes, 
and
• contributing to bridging the gap between academic research and practical 
implementation of new knowledge in the field. 
Being part of the extended UNESCO organisation means that INWEB seeks to 
promote cooperation, capacity-building and access to new knowledge in the 
Balkan countries and developing regions outside Europe.
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Figure 1: The UNESCO Chair/INWEB in SEE — the Balkans
Source: Authors’ research.
In this region of Europe, water cooperation among countries is vital because 
many surface and groundwater resources are shared by two or more countries. 
Taking both the Sub-Danubian transboundary river and lake basins and the 
internationally shared aquifers into account, more than 80 per cent of the water 
resources in this region are transboundary (INWEB 2008).
In the interests of mutually beneficial development it is necessary to develop 
shared plans for the protection and management of transboundary water 
resources to safeguard them against pollution and floods, and also to jointly 
plan the construction of major infrastructure.
International cooperation at the basin level in the Balkans continues to be fragile. 
The problems of minority groups, perceptions of injustice and nationalistic 
tendencies continue to pose a threat to the stability and social and economic 
development of the region. INWEB provides a framework within which 
relationships between scientists from all ten Balkan countries can be developed 
and reinforced in a spirit of rebuilding scientific cooperation across SEE. With 
this in mind, INWEB promotes cooperation by using water as a tool for peace. 
Our belief is that regional concerns over water issues can unite rather than 
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divide, and that countries can work together to improve water quality and ensure 
long-term water security. It is clear that successful regional cooperation begins 
with all participants understanding the importance of sharing information and 
knowledge at the appropriate time.
INWEB’s regional inventories of transboundary 
waters
Monitoring programs in the Balkans were in many cases disrupted, or even 
abandoned, during regional conflicts. Data is therefore difficult to obtain and 
may be incomplete. The new institutional structures within the multitude of 
small international river basins created by the collapse of the former Yugoslavia 
cannot in many cases provide consistent and complete historical information. 
There is an urgent need for improved development and sharing of both water 
quantity and quality data in transboundary river basins throughout the area. 
INWEB is working to address this need, as can be seen from the identification 
in 2008 of 17 Sub-Danubian transboundary river and lake basins in the SEE 
(Figure 2).
Groundwater exploitation in SEE has increased dramatically during recent 
decades. Over-exploited aquifers are consequently a major concern in most 
countries. Many groundwater resources are at risk of being exhausted to meet 
the rising demands of irrigated agriculture, tourism and industry. The pressures 
on groundwater resources are highest in the summer period, when natural 
supply is minimal and water demand is at a maximum for irrigation and tourism. 
Groundwater scarcity is often accompanied by poor water quality, particularly 
in coastal aquifers where water is often highly saline and unusable. In addition 
to a general trend towards over-extraction, contamination in recharge areas 
and mismanagement of irrigation practices has led to a general deterioration in 
groundwater quality in many parts of the Mediterranean region.
Transboundary aquifer systems are important sources of fresh water in many 
regions of the world, particularly under the arid- and semi-arid climatic conditions 
which prevail in the Mediterranean region. With growing groundwater scarcity 
and quality deterioration, the demands on these shared aquifers to meet 
growing regional water demand are only likely to increase. In this situation, a 
fundamental task for joint management is the production and sharing of reliable 
scientific knowledge and information to mitigate potential conflicts between 
neighbouring countries. Furthermore, cooperative arrangements to jointly 
develop, manage and protect shared aquifers will become a necessity, not only 
to avoid conflict, but also to optimise utilisation and to achieve water security.
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Figure 2: Sub-Danubian transboundary river and lake basins in SEE
Source: INWEB 2008.
35. Promoting cooperation for transboundary water security: The experience of the UNESCO Chair/INWEB
207
Figure 3: Overview map of transboundary aquifers in the SEE region
Source: Authors’ research.
In order to facilitate an integrated approach to transboundary groundwater-
resources management in the Balkans, INWEB adopted the UNESCO/ISARM 
(International Shared Aquifer Resources Management) initiative. This was 
launched in June 2000 at the 14th Session of the Intergovernmental Council of 
UNESCO-IHP (International Hydrological Programme) and is an intergovernmental 
project involving all national IHP Committees. 
A number of UNESCO-ISARM activities have taken place in the Mediterranean 
region, particularly in SEE. In this region the UNESCO Chair/INWEB has 
worked with UNESCO/IHP, the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), the 
Economic and Social Commission of Western Asia (ESCWA), and the Economic 
Commission of Africa (ECA) to investigate shared aquifer resources using a 
two-step methodological approach: (1) collate available data from a wide range 
of sources and develop an inventory of the transboundary aquifers across the 
entire region, and (2) make an interactive online meta-database available to all 
stakeholders using Google Earth technology.
Global Water: Issues and Insights
208
Some transboundary aquifers in the region had previously been identified and 
noted in earlier UNECE and INWEB inventories. The region has, however, seen 
major political change in the last two decades and many aquifers that were located 
within a single country are now shared between new countries. For example, 
while the previous UNECE inventory recorded 23 regional transboundary 
aquifers and the draft INWEB reported 47, this latest assessment identified 65. 
The locations of these aquifers are shown in Figure 3. 
The database of transboundary aquifer resources in SEE is available on 
INWEB’s web platform (http://www.inweb.gr). Two main types of aquifers are 
distinguished: 
1. Sedimentary basins with shallow unconfined aquifers and deep confined 
layered aquifers, namely alluvial aquifers. Unconfined aquifers are found 
in river channels or in floodplains and are usually recharged by direct 
infiltration of rainfall or streamflow; nevertheless due to their shallow 
nature, they are subjected to contamination and pollution risks. On the other 
hand, the water volume stocked in confined aquifers is under pressure, since 
an overlaying impermeable layer deteriorates the quality of water seeping 
into or out of the aquifer. The replenishment of these aquifers occurs only 
in areas where the porosity of the confining layer allows water infiltration, 
usually at some considerable distance away from the aquifer. The recharge 
procedure is a long-term process and groundwater in these aquifers dates 
back centuries.
2. Karstic carbonate aquifers. This type of aquifer is found in areas where 
chemically soluble rock, such as limestone or dolomite, is dominant. This is 
due to the fact that flowing water containing carbon dioxide dissolves these 
rocks. For the countries along the Adriatic coast, the karstic aquifer complex 
known as the Dinaric karst (estimated at 110,500 square kilometres (km2)), 
is the main source of water supply. More than 73 per cent of the national 
territories of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Albania 
lie over this significant aquifer complex. These aquifers are vulnerable to 
contamination since rock porosity, together with swallow holes, facilitate 
the diffuse or point infiltration of contaminants of pollutants.
Integrated management of transboundary 
waters
Different models for collaborative activities related to transboundary water 
resources management (TWRM) have been proposed globally (UN World Water 
Development Report (WWDR) 2006, 2009), and for the SEE region in particular 
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(Ganoulis et al. 1996, 2000, 2006, 2011). The approaches of such models differ 
according to the particular associated scientific discipline or professional 
community.
On the one hand, engineers, hydrologists, hydrogeologists and environmental 
professionals, emphasise the physical and ecological assessment and modelling 
of transboundary hydro-systems in terms of: 
• delineating their natural borders; i.e., hydrologic basins for transboundary 
rivers and lakes, and hydrogeological boundaries for groundwater aquifers 
• analysing relationships between physical and ecological variables, such as 
precipitation, groundwater recharge, river flow, pollutant inputs, lake water 
quality, and ecological biodiversity, and 
• suggesting constructional projects, such as dams, diversion channels 
and irrigation networks, or non-structural measures, such as demand 
management, ratification of EU legislation, developing agreements and 
implementing guidelines.
On the other hand, lawyers and social scientists (i.e., geographers, economists 
and sociologists) emphasise human factors that can be complex and difficult to 
analyse and predict, such as institutional cooperation, stakeholder participation 
and negotiation strategies. The main challenge here is whether different 
national administrations will implement international rules at the domestic 
level and, at the same time, coordinate their activities with their neighbours 
through bilateral or regional cooperation agreements. One way to address this 
challenge is to raise public and stakeholder awareness of and engagement with 
participatory processes involving national institutions, academic partners and 
international organisations. 
In reality, all the above issues and approaches coexist and are inter-related. 
In order to achieve effective TWRM these models, whether descriptive or 
prescriptive, need to merge. Ganoulis et al. (2011) present two main strategies for 
achieving such integration: (a) through effective capacity building and training 
in TWRM, and (b) by producing and analysing a general framework of conflict 
resolution based on how riparian countries may share benefits and risks. 
The UNESCO Chair/INWEB has chosen the Mesta/Nestos Basin as a case study 
of integrated TWRM in SEE. The river rises in the Rila and Pirin mountains in 
southern Bulgaria and flows some 230 km through Bulgarian and Greek territory 
before emptying into the North Aegean Sea (Fig. 4). About 126 km of the river 
flows through Bulgaria and about 130 km through Greece, with a total catchment 
area of 5613 km² (2770 km² in Bulgaria and 2843 km² in Greece). The Mesta/
Nestos River is the most important water resource in the region and has been the 
subject of bilateral negotiations for many years. For both countries it provides 
municipal water supply, irrigation and hydroelectric power production. 
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A conceptual model for TWRM in the Mesta/Nestos Basin is illustrated in 
Figure 5. This model employs the following seven steps and may be adapted 
to any case study of transboundary waters. 
1. stakeholder consultation and collaboration, social issues, legal and 
institutional agreements: this step should interact with each following step
2. problem definition: transboundary diagnostic analysis (TDA)
3. agree on data collection, common monitoring and data sharing
4. develop a common vision and common strategic action plan (CSAP)
5. physical and environmental assessment and modelling
6. scenario analysis and decision support systems (DSS) and
7. transfer of models and DSS to stakeholders, applications.
Figure 5: A conceptual model for effective management of transboundary 
water resources
Source: Authors’ research.
In the Mesta/Nestos Basin, step 1 of the proposed model aiming to address the 
lack of communication between scientists, experts, water managers and public 
stakeholders was achieved with the organisation of a series of workshops and 
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roundtables. TDA analysis (step 2) focused on improving the understanding of 
water resources in the project region and their environmental status, in order to 
identify issues of transboundary concern and their causes. The prepared TDA 
was the baseline for the interventions and priority actions that were specified 
in the CSAP. Step 3 targeted the development of common protocols on data 
collection, installation of monitoring sensors, in situ measurements in both 
countries and, last but not least, sharing of the available information between 
the two countries. CSAP prioritised water management issues and computer 
based models (step 5) were used for investigating the importance and impacts 
of these issues. The models coupled hydrological modelling, hydropower 
production tools, economic tools, and agricultural models with climate change 
scenarios (Skoulikaris et al. 2011). The simulation results set the base for the 
scenario analysis and the development of DSS with the use of multi-criteria 
decision analysis methods (step 6, see Ganoulis et al 2008). The final outputs 
(step 7) were communicated to water management authorities.
Conclusions
Ongoing social and political problems continue to pose a threat to stability in 
the Balkans. This atmosphere, in some cases, has hindered INWEB’s ability to 
develop transparency and sharing, and it has sometimes been difficult to achieve 
full cooperation between stakeholders. There is no precedent for data sharing 
on an international basis in the Balkans, and hesitancy may be encountered 
when cooperation is proposed.
One of INWEB’s greatest achievements, however, has been to establish the 
framework under which scientists can cooperate and work together on various 
joint projects. The fact that INWEB has facilitated the forging of personal links 
and trust is reflected in how individual scientists present cooperative projects 
to their respective national institutions. This result cannot be quantified, but 
it clearly cannot be disregarded. Overall, the work of the UNESCO Chair/
INWEB at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki demonstrates that effective 
networking and information sharing are strategic instruments to promote peace 
and stability through transboundary water resources management. 
Professor Jacques Ganoulis is Director of the UNESCO Chair/INWEB 
(International Network of Water/Environment Centres for the Balkans) at the 
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece. 
Katie Quartano works with the UNESCO Chair/INWEB and has an international 
background in business administration and tourism. 
Dr Charalampos Skoulikaris is Research Associate at the Balkan Environment 
Centre and Secretary General of the UNESCO Chair/INWEB.
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Alistair Rieu-Clarke 
University of Dundee, United Kingdom 
International water law (IWL) has developed mainly over the second half of 
the twentieth century, and has enjoyed increasing legitimacy in recent times 
(McCaffrey 2013). A range of legal instruments have progressively strengthened 
key principles of international water law and defined the rights and duties 
of states with respect to their uses of shared watercourses,1 such as: the 
International Law Association’s 1966 Helsinki Rules (ILA 1967), the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe 1992 Helsinki Convention (UNECE 
1992), the International Law Commission’s 2008 Draft Articles on Transboundary 
Aquifers (ILC 2008), numerous regional and basin-specific agreements (Wolf 
2002) and decisions by international courts.
Within the context of this development of IWL, the UN Watercourses 
Convention (UNWC) holds an important position. The Convention was 
negotiated on the basis of Draft Articles developed by the ILC and its final 
text, adopted at the UN General Assembly in 1997, is the result of ardent 
discussions between states and the recommendations of no less than five special 
rapporteurs.2 The UNWC was proposed as a response to the acknowledgment 
that a global legal instrument was needed to bolster cooperation between 
states over their shared water resources and mitigate the potential for conflict. 
It is also important to note that the UNWC was meant as a global treaty whose 
role was to support other watercourse treaties by acting as a template and 
filling the gaps where coverage was lacking (McCaffrey 1998).
Along with the UNECE Helsinki Convention (which will soon be open to 
accession by non-UNECE members (UNECE 2013)), the 1997 UNWC is the 
1 See Wolf (2002) for a list of transboundary water-related agreements.
2 For details of the negotiation and adoption process see Salman (2007).
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only global treaty governing transboundary watercourses (McCaffrey 2008). 
As a framework convention, it is principle-driven rather than result-driven; 
it provides rules that can be tailored to the distinct circumstances of each 
international watercourse and gives liberty to watercourse states to take the 
actions that suit their needs and interests as required by the singularity of the 
situation (McCaffrey 2008). Both the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) 2000 Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses, and the 2009 Agreement 
on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework provide examples of instruments 
that have tailored the provisions of the 1997 UNWC to a regional and basin-
specific context. 
The UNWC, which is now widely recognised as the most authoritative source 
of international water law, is a pivotal document of IWL in a number of ways: 
it creates a strong framework for water governance arrangements (Rieu-Clarke 
and Hayward 2007) and a basic common ground that enhances predictability 
and encourages reciprocity (Rieu-Clarke and Lopez 2013); it codifies and 
clarifies existing norms and develops emerging principles of customary IWL; 
it constitutes a model that can guide the interpretation of other treaties and the 
negotiation and drafting of future ones (Rocha Loures et al. 2013); and, it has 
informed the judgments of international and regional courts (McCaffrey 2008). 
The key aim of the Convention is to ‘ensure the utilisation, development, 
conservation, management and protection of international watercourses and 
the promotion of the optimal and sustainable utilisation thereof’ (UNWC 
1997). The provisions of the Convention develop and consolidate fundamental 
principles of IWL:
1. Equitable and reasonable use and participation, stipulates that states 
reconcile any competing claims to an international watercouse on the basis 
of equity whilst protecting the sustainability of the system. Pursuant to the 
1997 UNWC such claims should be reconciled based on all relevant factors 
and circumstances, and no use enjoys inherent priority (articles 5 and 6). 
2. Obligation not to cause significant harm, which places states under a due 
diligence obligation to take all appropriate measures not to prevent signifcant 
harm to other watercourse states, unless it can be ascertained that such harm 
is both equitable and reasonable (Article 7). 
3. Protection of ecosystem, whereby states are under an obligation, either 
individually or where appropriate jointly, to protect and preserve the 
ecosystems of an international watercourse (Article 20).
4. General obligation to cooperate, which requires that states cooperate on the 
basis of sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good 
faith (Article 8). Such cooperation may lead to the adoption of watercourse 
agreements and joint institutions. 
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5. Notificiation and consultation, whereby states must notify, exchange 
information and, if necessary, consult and negotiate with other watercourse 
states, on the possible effects of planned measures that may have a significant 
adverse effect upon other watercourse states (Part III).
6. Regular exchange of data and information, which obliges states to exchange 
data and information on the condition of the watercourse (Article 9).
7. Peaceful settlement of disputes, which requires states to settle their disputes 
in a peaceful manner via a range of mechanisms including negotiation, 
mediation, conciliation, third-party fact-finding, arbitration and adjudication 
(Article 33). 
Despite the discernable role played by the UNWC in the development of IWL 
and its influence in many river basins of the world, the treaty itself is not yet 
officially in force. Fifteen years after an overwhelming majority of states voted 
in favour of the adoption of the Convention, it has received 31 instruments of 
ratification, four short of the 35 needed for its entry into force. A range of reasons 
have been suggested as to why the convention has been slow to enter into force. 
These include treaty congestion at the time of its adoption, lack of awareness 
relative to the content of the UNWC and low levels of understanding about its 
relevance, an absence of leadership in promoting ratification, and a number 
of highly vocal — but not necessarily widely representative — opponents 
who claim that there is no need for a global legal instrument (Rieu-Clarke and 
Hayward 2007; Dellapenna et al. 2013).
This situation has led a number of actors across the globe to campaign for 
the ratification of the Convention by raising awareness and understanding of 
the Convention’s text and organising events to publicise the benefits that the 
UNWC’S entry into force would bring to water governance. These awareness-
raising efforts have been assisted by 2013 being declared ‘International Year of 
Water Cooperation’ by the UN General Assembly. A series of events, programs, 
projects and activities were organised throughout the year to promote water 
cooperation, several of which addressed the role and relevance of the UNWC 
(Rieu-Clarke 2013). 
The UNWC Global Initiative, launched in 2006 by the World Wildlife Fund for 
Nature (WWF), is one of the high-profile campaigns surrounding the UNWC.3 
The Global Initiative has mobilised a range of actors including governments, 
international organisations and academics in an effort to raise awareness, build 
capacity, and support countries interested in ratifying the Convention. In order 
to deepen knowledge and understanding of the relevance of the Convention, the 
initiative has supported research related to the Convention in various regions, 
basins and countries, with a view to securing additional state ratifications and 
the instrument’s eventual entry into force. 
3 Learn more about the Global Initiative at WWF ‘UN Watercourses Convention’. 
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A key output of the UNWC Global Initiative was the UNWC User’s Guide (Rieu-
Clarke et al. 2012) developed by the Centre for Water, Law, Policy and Science 
under the auspices of UNESCO at the University of Dundee. This Guide is one of 
the major tools supporting the efforts towards the Convention’s entry into force. 
It was conceived out of the recognition that increased awareness and enhanced 
accessibility are the key to the effective adoption and implementation of the 
UNWC. Indeed, the guide is intended to foster knowledge of the Convention 
among all relevant stakeholders, including policymakers, bodies responsible 
for transboundary water issues, and anyone wishing to gain insight into the 
Convention. It was designed to disseminate information about the UNWC and 
enhance understanding of the text and relevance of the Convention. 
In addition to an overview of the legal architecture surrounding transboundary 
watercourses, recounting the history of the adoption process of the Convention 
and listing the opportunities and challenges of the UNWC’s entry into effect, 
the guide offers a precise and thorough analysis of each of the Convention’s 
provisions. It also provides examples of the benefits of the UNWC by 
demonstrating how it might be applied within a range of settings and scenarios, 
such as when determining whether a certain activity complies with the principle 
of equitable and reasonable utilisation, or in deciding whether or not a state 
should notify other states of a planned measure. 
An Online User’s Guide has been developed (Rieu-Clarke et al. 2013b) to 
complement the material provided by the user’s guide. In addition to the 
Convention’s text and the analysis provided by the user’s guide, the website 
includes: exclusive media content, fact sheets and resources which feed into to 
the analysis of the role and relevance of the UNWC; case studies analysing the 
role and relevance of the UNWC in regions around the globe; and quizzes to test 
knowledge and understanding of the Convention.
The purpose of the online user’s guide is to create a forum where documents can 
be freely accessed and the tools and analysis necessary to enhance knowledge 
and understanding of the UNWC are provided. The website also regularly posts 
news stories to allow readers to keep tabs on the latest developments in the 
world of international water law. One day, it is hoped that the title of one of 
those news stories will be: ‘UNWC enters into force’.
The UNWC Online User’s Guide can be accessed at: http://www.
unwatercoursesconvention.com. You can also follow UNWC-related activities via 
twitter: @unwconline. The PDF version of the user’s guide can be found at: http://
dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/391260/UN%20Watercourses%20Convention%20
-%20User%27s%20Guide.pdf. 
The Centre for Water Law, Policy and Science under the auspices of UNESCO 
at University of Dundee was created in 2006. It is a world leader in its field 
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and works to find new ways of effectively integrating law, policy and science 
to address water challenges of the twenty-first century. The centre undertakes 
a wide breadth of research and consultancy, recognising that if water law is 
to effectively implement integrated water-resource management and help the 
international community reach international development targets, it is essential 
to have legal frameworks to manage water rights and water quality and establish 
institutional mechanisms.
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Introduction
Over the last century, global and rapid urbanisation and population growth 
have produced serious water shortages and water pollution in urban areas. 
Consequently, interest in wastewater reuse has grown over the past decade, 
particularly in arid regions, as a technology that can promote sustainable, 
efficient, and appropriate water use (Maksimovic and Tejada-Guibert 2001).
Tehran’s water resource problems 
Tehran, the capital of Iran, has a population of over 7.5 million. Population 
growth will place immense demands on the city’s water resources within the 
next decade. The mean annual precipitation is only 250 millimetres, most of 
which falls during winter and spring. The most important freshwater resources 
in Tehran are the Karaj, Lar, Latian, Mamloo and Taleghan reservoirs. Water 
from these dams is transferred to four water treatment plants (WTP). Tehran 
supplements surface water with groundwater to mitigate the water shortage, 
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and at least 250 million cubic metres (MCM) of water is discharged from 
wells annually in Tehran (Tajrishy and Abrishamchi 2005). Table 1 shows the 
maximum water capacity of each of Tehran’s water resources. 
Table 1: Maximum water capacity of Tehran’s water resources 
Water 
resource
Aqueduct Well Karaj
Dam
Mamloo
Dam
Latian
Dam
Lar 
Dam
Taleghan 
Dam
MCM/year 96 595 330 90 180 150 150
Sources: Ministry of Energy (MoE) 2009.
Table 2 lists Tehran’s population and annual water consumption from 1966 to 
2006 and demonstrates that water consumption has increased more than an 
order of magnitude over these years.
Table 2: Population and water consumption in Tehran
Year Water 
consumption
(MCM/year)
Population
(thousands)
Per capita water 
consumption
(lit/day.capita)
1966 98 2720 99
1976 346 4530 209
1980 443 5454 223
1986 542 6042 246
1991 681 6475 288
1996 780 6759 316
2006 1100 7798 386
Sources: MoE 2009.
Iran’s water and sewage utility (ABFA company), states that per capita water 
production in Tehran is currently about 378 litres per day. If water consumption 
continues to follow current trends, water consumption will be 1290 MCM/year 
in 2026 (MoE 2009). In this situation, even if all water resources were utilised 
to their fullest capacities, the city would still be faced with a water shortage of 
more than 100 MCM/year in drought years.
Water resource managers in Tehran are faced with increased water demand and 
waste production due to population growth and socioeconomic development, 
decreased availability of water per capita, large losses of urban water, and 
local depletion and pollution of surface and groundwater. In countries facing 
similar freshwater crises, such as Australia, Japan, France and Germany, water 
reuse and wastewater recycling are already being deployed (Chu and Chen 
2004). The time has come for these options to be considered in Tehran.
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Wastewater reuse potential
In semi-arid cities like Tehran, water for irrigating natural vegetation, 
landscaping and park areas is in short supply. Tehran has more than 7000 
hectares of parks that require more than 130 MCM of water per year, and most 
of them use groundwater for their irrigation. Many of these parks are located 
close to wastewater treatment plants (WWTP), but the discharge of outflow 
from these plants into seepage pits and surface storm water channels wastes 
a potentially valuable resource. Moreover, wastewater from treatment plant 
effluent could also be used for groundwater recharge in the eastern part of the 
city, which is under development and is faced with a falling groundwater level.
Water efficiency is very low in the industrial sector of Iran, and water recycling 
and reuse are not sufficiently emphasised. After treatment, municipal wastewater 
can be reused for cooling and processing water in industry, as has become an 
established practice in many countries. The greatest potential for industrial 
water reuse in Tehran lies in supplementing or replacing the potable water 
demand of the Ray Petrochemical Complex with treated municipal wastewater 
effluent (MoE 2009). Other industries in the western part of the city (Karaj 
Industrial Park) could use reclaimed wastewater for landscape irrigation, direct 
evaporative cooling, indirect refrigeration (food processing), or for in-plant 
transport and washing.
There are nine public and 18 private WWTP in Tehran that can treat more than 
100 MCM of wastewater per year. This capacity will increase to 250 MCM per 
year after the Tehran Wastewater Project is completed. There are many small 
canals that join the two main canals (Kan and Darband), and these small canals 
transfer more than 400 MCM per year; but the water quality in these canals is not 
suitable for many reasons, including discharge of wastewater from surrounding 
houses and industrial centres. The water quality can thus be improved at little 
cost by controlling discharge or treating runoff, and this water could then be 
used as another new resource that has not yet been utilised in Tehran.
Methodology
In recent research, we categorised the city’s primary water users (users that 
consume more than 300,000 cubic metres of water per year and can use 
reclaimed wastewater and runoff, such as parks and industries) and evaluated 
the quality and quantity of water they required. Then, we analysed different 
water resources, including WWTP effluent, groundwater (wells), runoff in canals 
and transferred water from dams (Karaj, Lar, Mamloo, Taleghan and Latian). 
After determining the possible water transfer pathways (according to the water 
quality that users require and the water quality of each water resource), a linear 
Global Water: Issues and Insights
226
programming optimisation model, with the object of cost minimisation for the 
water provision and sewage management utility (ABFA Company), was used 
to allocate the water among users and resources. This research builds upon 
existing literature in water reuse planning and management modeling (Chu and 
Chen 2004; Ganoulis and Papalopoulou 1996; Oron 1996; Keckler 1997; Zhao 
and Chen 2008; Mohammadnejad and Tajrishy 1998) to model a user-supplier 
water resources network for the first time in a city of Iran. 
In our model, urban water is used for three primary purposes: domestic uses, 
industrial processes and the irrigation of parks and landscapes. Domestic users 
require high-quality water. Because of the lack of modern treatment technology 
in Tehran’s WWTP, the water network includes industries and parks as 
normal users, even though these users do not require high-quality water. The 
superstructure of the model is shown in Figure 1. Only the users that require 
more than 300,000 cubic metres per year are considered network elements in 
our model. 
Figure 1: Superstructure of the model
Sources: Authors’ research.
Water suppliers in Tehran are divided into four groups:
1. WTP effluent: There are four WTP in Tehran, which receive water from five 
reservoirs near the city. 
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2. Well (groundwater): There are 260 wells located throughout the city. In the 
model, these wells are divided into 20 groups according to location, and 20 
virtual wells are defined as 20 supplier elements to represent each group of 
wells in the model (with the capacity of each virtual well being equal to the 
sum of the capacities of the wells in the corresponding group).
3. WWTP effluent: There are 14 large WWTP in Tehran with capacities ranging 
from 770 to 18300 cubic metres/day. 
4. Water in canals: Two main canals crossing the city from north to south have 
been confined and canalised by concrete and stone. Local WWTP effluent 
and storm water are discharged to these canals. 
Results and discussion
Currently, the two main canals and the effluent of wastewater treatment plants 
in Tehran are not of suitable quality for irrigation and industrial processes, so 
the model is run under three different sets of conditions:
1. Present Condition: In this case, the water quality of all suppliers in the 
model is the same as current data reported from laboratory tests. Only WTPs 
and wells can supply any users’ water demands. The WWTPs do not treat 
their effluent streams to sufficiently high quality for user’s purposes, and 
the quality of the water in the canals is not sufficient for reuse because local 
WWTPs and factories discharge their effluents directly to the canals. 
2. Improved System: In this case, it is assumed that simple actions, such as 
reduction of WWTP loads, disinfection, filtration and protecting the canals 
against pollution have been taken and that the water quality of canals and 
WWTP effluent has sufficiently improved for use in irrigating parks with 
restricted access and in some industrial processes. Under these conditions, 
WTPs and wells can supply the water demand of any user, while WWTPs 
and canals can supply the water demands of users with limited access.
3. Ideal System: This case incorporates technical improvements to WWTPs 
such as adequate filtration and using ozone or ultraviolet (UV) light for 
disinfection. Water quality in the canals is also improved, and WWTPs and 
industries are forbidden to discharge effluent to the canals. In this case, all 
suppliers provide water of sufficient quality to supply the water demands of 
all users in the network. 
Table 3 shows an economic and environmental comparison of the three cases. 
The major finding is that developing WWTPs, improving the quality of WWTP 
effluent, and controlling the runoff into canals would result in reduced freshwater 
and groundwater usage. Increasing the use of WWTP effluent will reduce 
soil and groundwater pollution in the south of the city because the transfer 
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of sewage is prevented. As fresh water and groundwater usage decreases, the 
growing requirements for sanitary water will be met through other means, and 
the falling groundwater level will stabilise. Clearly, Tehran could compensate 
for water shortages in drought years whilst preserving its aquifers.
Naturally, the total cost of water transmission and distribution in the Ideal 
System is greater than in the Improved System because treating wastewater to a 
high-quality  level costs more than treating it to moderate quality. The total cost 
of water transmission and distribution in the Present Condition is, however, 
higher than in either of the other two cases because of the high energy costs 
associated with pumping water from wells and transferring water from dams. 
The cost savings that would result should encourage the authorities to improve 
WWTP technology and control runoff quality.
Table 3: Comparison between Present System and two new systems
Present Condition Improved System Ideal System
Freshwater usage
(MCM/year)
51.7 7.7 0
Groundwater usage
(MCM/year)
115.8 23.4 0
WWTPs effluent usage
(MCM/year)
0 21.5 37.8
Channel usage
(MCM/year)
0 115 129.7
Transportation cost
(106 $/year) 1.4 1.3 1.5
Purchase cost
(106 $/year) 1.3 0.2 0
Operation cost
(106 $/year) 41.8 28.3 33.5
Benefit
(106 $/year) 13.9 10.8 11.1
Total cost
(106 $/year) 30.6 19.0 23.9
Sources: Authors’ research.
In order to test the conclusions, we also conducted a sensitivity analysis of 
model parameters. A number of observations emerge:
• If the costs of wastewater and runoff treatment increase, the resulting water 
allocation in the network changes. Until the cost of wastewater treatment 
is higher than that of runoff treatment, runoff usage is preferred to use of 
WWTP effluent (because the other costs of these two resources are nearly 
identical) and the latter is therefore the best solution as far as reducing total 
cost and adjusting usage of water resources.
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• Reducing the income from selling WWTP effluent and runoff produce 
a reduction in the overall benefit to ABFA and, as a result, it becomes 
economical for ABFA to distribute fresh water and groundwater instead of 
WWTP effluent and runoff.
• If the price ABFA must pay to the MoE to buy water from dams and wells 
increases (e.g., due to new policies that reduce subsidies), then supplying 
water from WWTP effluent and runoff becomes more economical than using 
fresh water and groundwater. 
Conclusions
Like many megacities in the world, Tehran is faced with increasing freshwater 
demand and limited water resources because of rapid population growth. 
Our model’s results demonstrate that positive economic impacts result when 
users that do not require high-quality water, such as parks, industrial plants 
and construction projects, utilise WWTP effluent and treated runoff rather 
than fresh water and groundwater.
Although improving WWTPs and controlling runoff quality require large 
initial investments, over time, they are likely become more economical than 
the present system. This result is dependent, however, on the cost of treating 
wastewater and runoff and the purchase cost of fresh water and groundwater, 
with the latter result being a direct function of policy settings.
Tehran may have a pressing need for solutions to its water crisis, but there are 
solutions available. Our research demonstrates that water reuse and wastewater 
recycling are not only physically feasible but also economically attractive 
options. In future the complexity of urban water issues will increase, continuing 
to push the traditional boundaries of water and sewage management into the 
areas of integrated solutions within the water sector. The most plausible option 
is to integrate water supply, wastewater and stormwater to satisfy outdoor water 
use demands of sprawling megacities in the developing world.
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Background and objectives of the UNESCO 
Chair in Sustainable Water Services
The biggest global challenges of mankind are all, in one way or another, related 
to water — its availability, occurrence and quality. In terms of water uses, 
community water supply is generally set as the highest priority for policymakers 
(Katko and Rajala 2005), yet water quality, water pollution control and water-
use conflicts are also a huge concern in many areas. 
Currently some 0.8 billion people lack access to improved sources of drinking 
water, and as many as 2.5 billion cannot access basic sanitation (United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF)/World Health Organization (WHO)2012). Looking 
beyond the Millennium Development Goals, water was identified as one of 
the seven Critical Issues at the UN Conference on Sustainable Development 
(Rio+20 Summit) in 2012. At Rio+20, UN-Water emphasised that the success 
of the broader green economy depends on sustainable, integrated and resource-
efficient management of water resources, and on safe and sustainable provision 
of water supply and adequate sanitation services (UN-Water 2012).
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The UNESCO Water Chair No. 27 in Sustainable Water Services (UNECWAS) 
was established at Tampere University of Technology (TUT), Finland, in 2012, 
and is linked to the Capacity Development in Water and Environmental Services 
(CADWES) research team based at TUT. The foci of the Chair are management, 
development, governance, policy and institutional issues associated with water 
services, particularly urban and rural water supply and wastewater services. 
The overall development objective of the Chair is to promote education 
and research on sustainable water governance, especially services, based 
on co-creation principles (see Frontier Strategy 2009) and the needs of local 
communities. A major objective is also to strengthen knowledge creation and 
sharing and enhance the capacity of partners through North–South–South 
collaboration between six universities in the South, two UNESCO centres in the 
North, and three other European partners. 
Research agenda
Reform processes
The two biggest challenges confronting the water supply and sanitation sector 
in both industrialised and developing countries are increasing coverage and 
infrastructure maintenance (Prasad 2007). Many developing countries are 
presently undergoing or planning substantial policy and institutional reforms of 
their water sector to overcome these challenges. Typically, these processes entail 
reform of both policy and the legal and administrative water rights framework 
(Aagaard  and Ravnborg 2006). These reform processes are often driven by 
foreign experts and donors. International water policies and strategies have in 
the past, however, concentrated on a few fashionable and, based on research, 
questionable aspects — like privatisation of urban water delivery — instead of 
being holistic and comprehensive (Seppälä 2004). Although the reforms have 
been on the agenda for several years in the south, little research has been carried 
out on how reforms are implemented and the process occurs. 
Water access as an economic good or a human right?
In 1992 a high-level meeting of water experts released the Dublin Statement 
on Water and Sustainable Development (ICWE 1992), also known as 
the  Dublin Principles, that would provide the foundation for Integrated 
Water Management and subsequent thinking on water. Dublin principle no. 
4 recognised that water has an economic value in all its competing uses and 
it should be treated as an economic good: ‘managing water as an economic 
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good is an important way of achieving efficient and equitable use, and of 
encouraging conservation and protection of water resources’ (Global Water 
Partnership (GWP) no date). The same principle also pointed out, however, 
the vital importance of recognising the fundamental right of all human beings 
to have access to clean water and sanitation at an affordable price. 
Shortly after the Dublin Principles were developed — with the economic good 
aspect being the main emphasis of subsequent interpretations — privatisation 
of water supply in developing countries emerged, largely at the prompting of 
international financial bodies. As Franceys (2008) mentions, this ‘privatisation 
decade’ lasted roughly from 1995–2003. The belief behind it was that private 
investments could be attracted through the involvement of multinational 
companies. For many reasons this has not been the case, and it seems that 
multinational companies are, rather, withdrawing from water services operations 
in developing economies (Annez 2006; Hukka and Katko 2003; Bakker 2010; 
Castro 2008). One of the main pitfalls was the question of regulation and the fact 
that private operations require a strong public sector and regulation capacity. 
In several cases, in Latin America and even in Paris and Berlin, municipalities 
have assumed responsibility after the concession or operational contract expired. 
Consequently, some 90 per cent of the world’s water utilities are currently publicly 
owned and managed; in sewage the share is about 95 per cent (Hall et al. 2011). 
After gaining independence in the 1960s and 1970s, many Sub-Saharan countries 
introduced a free water policy. It was considered justified in the prevailing political 
climate, but soon proved unrealistic (Mashauri and Katko 1993). The mainland of 
Tanzania, for example, abandoned its free water policy at the national level in the 
1990s, while Zanzibar, the other part of the United Republic, held out until 2006. 
Yet, water as a basic human right was promoted by the United Nations Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, November 2002, which reminded that 
access to water as a human right — a social and cultural good, not merely an 
economic commodity — defines the public nature of water as ‘a limited natural 
resource and a public commodity fundamental to life and health’. This process 
continued and culminated in the historic United Nations (2010) resolution ‘Right 
to water and sanitation’ in July 2010.
Governance and stakeholders
It is clear from the above discussion that water services governance has multiple 
objectives and criteria to incorporate. Beyond the economic good/human right 
distinction, these also include: balancing the water requirements of households, 
food production, energy production and the environment. Besides, water also 
has various dimensions as a cultural good, common pool resource, natural 
resource, public good and social good. 
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The numerous examples of different water requirements and dimensions stated 
above show how strong external pressures can be applied to water services. 
Indeed, the operational environment of water services is complex with a number 
of stakeholders whose preferences and priorities can create conflicts (see Figure 1). 
Whatever the priorities, it is obvious that mechanisms are required to co-ordinate 
and balance various interests and, particularly, to keep in mind the fundamental 
purpose of water services: to serve citizens and the society at large. 
As pointed out by United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific (UNESCAP) (2003), addressing inefficiencies and shortcomings of 
water and sanitation service production are essentially a governance problem in 
many countries. Failure to observe good governance principles is considered to 
be one of the root causes of all major problems associated with public and private 
sector administration. In the case of water, for example, the 2nd World Water 
Development Report (WWDR2) (UN-Water 2006) noted the linkages between 
‘water and poverty’, water and governance’ and ‘water and environment’, and 
emphasised that ‘the water crisis is essentially a crisis of governance’. 
Figure 1: Internal domain framework: major stakeholders of water services
Source: Authors’ research.
Good governance is participatory, consensus-oriented, accountable, transparent, 
responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the 
rule of law (UNESCAP no date). It also ensures that corruption is minimised, 
the views of minorities are taken into account, and that the most vulnerable 
members of society are considered in decision-making. It is also responsive to 
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the future needs of society. One positive example of movement towards these 
standards in recent times are the national transparency activities now common 
in developing nations, such as Kenya (Transparency International Kenya (TIK) 
2014) and Uganda (Transparency International Uganda (TIU) 2014). It should be 
noted, however, that whatever the water governance systems and frameworks 
present in any country, the likelihood of achieving better and more sustainable 
development is low without educated experts. 
The importance of history
The current challenges of water-sector reform show how history and past policies 
and decisions impact our futures. The concept of path-dependence, which 
originated in economics, has recently been applied to the history of technology 
(Melosi 2000). The premise is that major decisions may have postponed the 
introduction of certain systems, decisions may have been made that limit 
options, or decisions may have been made that severely restrict available options 
(Figure 2). The importance of these factors are evidenced in historical research 
of water-sector reforms in Kenya (Nyangeri 2011).
Figure 2: Path dependence: postponing, limiting and binding decisions and 
their impacts on future options
Source: Kaivo-oja et al. 2004.
Presents (or potential present states) are bound by laws and regulations, 
compliance with them and their enforcement, and political objectives and 
decisions that are inevitably related to alternative futures. Futures (or potential 
future states) can be classified as possible, credible and preferable. Analogies and 
path dependencies link pasts (or alternative past states), presents and futures 
to each other (Juuti and Katko 2005). The plural form is used deliberately to 
point out that several interpretations of each time dimension exist. Note that 
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an understanding of water-sector reforms requires a lengthy period to analyse 
the driving forces across time, and the implications of changes and strategic 
decisions need to be considered for each period.
Futures researchers emphasise the evolutionary nature of development. 
Accordingly, development and technology are not deterministic and bifurcations 
(or turning points) are bound to occur, as shown in Figure 3. Sometimes 
revolving paths are encounterd, such as in the selection of urban raw-water 
sources in Finland. In the late 1800s groundwater was favoured by cities, this 
declined in the 1920s, began again in the 1960s, and has now been contested in 
the early twenty-first century (Katko et al. 2006). 
Figure 3: Bifurcate nature of technological development
Source: Adapted from Mannermaa 1991.
Common research agendas in both North and South
The current research themes of the partners of the UNESCO Chair show that 
social needs in the water services sectors of the South and the North are 
remarkably similar: regionalisation, operational improvements, pricing, asset 
management, rehabilitation, ageing infrastructure, ageing workforce and 
tacit knowledge management, small systems management, public-private 
collaboration, leadership and stewardship, more transparent decision-making, 
and significance of water. 
An example of common research agendas is the broad issue of ageing water 
infrastructure, though the physical manifestation of the issues may vary greatly 
by location. A recent study in Finland (Heino et al. 2011) based on the views of 
48 sector experts showed this to be the most severe challenge to water services. 
Similar findings have been made in other industrialised countries, such as 
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Sweden, Norway and the United States. Moreover, ageing infrastructure is also 
one of the biggest challenges in the Sub-Saharan region, in addition to related 
specific issues such as delivery challenges in peri-urban and unplanned areas. 
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